Developmental emergence of personality

The Nature versus Nurture debate has generally been considered from the lens of genome versus experience dichotomy and has dominated our thinking about behavioral individuality and personality traits. In contrast, the role of nonheritable noise during brain development in behavioral variation is understudied. Using the Drosophila melanogaster visual system, I will discuss our efforts to dissect how individuality in circuit wiring emerges during development, and how that helps generate individual behavioral variation.

SWEBAGS conference 2024: Shared network mechanisms of dopamine and deep brain stimulation for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease: From modulation of oscillatory cortex – basal ganglia communication to intelligent clinical brain computer interfaces

SWEBAGS conference 2024: The involvement of the striatum in autism spectrum disorder

SWEBAGS conference 2024: The basal ganglia in action

Piecing together the puzzle of emotional consciousness

Conscious emotional experiences are very rich in their nature, and can encompass anything ranging from the most intense panic when facing immediate threat, to the overwhelming love felt when meeting your newborn. It is then no surprise that capturing all aspects of emotional consciousness, such as intensity, valence, and bodily responses, into one theory has become the topic of much debate. Key questions in the field concern how we can actually measure emotions and which type of experiments can help us distill the neural correlates of emotional consciousness. In this talk I will give a brief overview of theories of emotional consciousness and where they disagree, after which I will dive into the evidence proposed to support these theories. Along the way I will discuss to what extent studying emotional consciousness is ‘special’ and will suggest several tools and experimental contrasts we have at our disposal to further our understanding on this intriguing topic.

SWEBAGS conference 2022

SWEBAGS conference 2022

SWEBAGS conference 2022

Time as its own representation? Exploring a link between timing of cognition and time perception

The way we represent and perceive time has crucial implications for studying temporality in conscious experience. Contrasting positions posit that temporal information is separately abstracted out like any other perceptual property, or that time is represented through representations having temporal properties themselves. To add to this debate, we investigated alterations in felt time in conditions where only conscious visual experience is altered while a bistable figure remains physically unchanged. In this talk, I will discuss two studies that we have done in relation to answering this question. In study 1, we investigated whether perceptual switches in fixed intervals altered felt time. In three experiments we showed that a break in visual experience (via a perceptual switch) also leads to a break in felt time. In study 2, we are currently looking at figure-ground perception in ambigous displays. Here, in experiment 1 we show that differences in flicker frequencies on ambigous regions can induce figure-ground segregation. To see if a reverse complementarity exists for felt time, we ask participants to view ambigous regions as figure/ground and show that they have different temporal resolutions for the same region based on whether it is seen as figure or background. Overall, the two studies provide evidence for temporal mirroring and isomorphism in visual experience, arguing for a link between the timing of experience and time perception.

Flexible codes and loci of visual working memory

Neural correlates of visual working memory have been found in early visual, parietal, and prefrontal regions. These findings have spurred fruitful debate over how and where in the brain memories might be represented. Here, I will present data from multiple experiments to demonstrate how a focus on behavioral requirements can unveil a more comprehensive understanding of the visual working memory system. Specifically, items in working memory must be maintained in a highly robust manner, resilient to interference. At the same time, storage mechanisms must preserve a high degree of flexibility in case of changing behavioral goals. Several examples will be explored in which visual memory representations are shown to undergo transformations, and even shift their cortical locus alongside their coding format based on specifics of the task.

Peripersonal space (PPS) as a primary interface for self-environment interactions

Peripersonal space (PPS) defines the portion of space where interactions between our body and the external environment more likely occur. There is no physical boundary defining the PPS with respect to the extrapersonal space, but PPS is continuously constructed by a dedicated neural system integrating external stimuli and tactile stimuli on the body, as a function of their potential interaction. This mechanism represents a primary interface between the individual and the environment. In this talk, I will present most recent evidence and highlight the current debate about the neural and computational mechanisms of PPS, its main functions and properties. I will discuss novel data showing how PPS dynamically shapes to optimize body-environment interactions. I will describe a novel electrophysiological paradigm to study and measure PPS, and show how this has been used to search for a basic marker of potentials of self-environment interaction in newborns and patients with disorders of consciousness. Finally, I will discuss how PPS is also involved in, and in turn shaped by, social interactions. Under these acceptances, I will discuss how PPS plays a key role in self-consciousness.

On biological and cognitive autonomy

In this talk I will introduce the central notions of the theory of autonomy, as it is being currently developed in biology and cognitive science. The theory of autonomy puts forward the capacity of self-determination of organisms as whole systems, and constitutes thereby an alternative to more reductionist and mechanistic approaches. I will discuss how the theory of autonomy provides a justification for the scientific use of notions as function, norm, agency and teleology, whose epistemological legitimacy is highly debated. I will conclude by describing the difficult challenges that poses the transition from biological to cognitive autonomy.

The Standard Model of the Retina

The science of the retina has reached an interesting stage of completion. There exists now a consensus standard model of this neural system - at least in the minds of many researchers - that serves as a baseline against which to evaluate new claims. The standard model links phenomena from molecular biophysics, cell biology, neuroanatomy, synaptic physiology, circuit function, and visual psychophysics. It is further supported by a normative theory explaining what the purpose is of processing visual information this way. Most new reports of retinal phenomena fit squarely within the standard model, and major revisions seem increasingly unlikely. Given that our understanding of other brain circuits with comparable complexity is much more rudimentary, it is worth considering an example of what success looks like. In this talk I will summarize what I think are the ingredients that led to this mature understanding of the retina. Equally important, a number of practices and concepts that are currently en vogue in neuroscience were not needed or indeed counterproductive. I look forward to debating how these lessons might extend to other areas of brain research.

Unchanging and changing: hardwired taste circuits and their top-down control

The taste system detects 5 major categories of ethologically relevant stimuli (sweet, bitter, umami, sour and salt) and accordingly elicits acceptance or avoidance responses. While these taste responses are innate, the taste system retains a remarkable flexibility in response to changing external and internal contexts. Taste chemicals are first recognized by dedicated taste receptor cells (TRCs) and then transmitted to the cortex via a multi-station relay. I reasoned that if I could identify taste neural substrates along this pathway, it would provide an entry to decipher how taste signals are encoded to drive innate response and modulated to facilitate adaptive response. Given the innate nature of taste responses, these neural substrates should be genetically identifiable. I therefore exploited single-cell RNA sequencing to isolate molecular markers defining taste qualities in the taste ganglion and the nucleus of the solitary tract (NST) in the brainstem, the two stations transmitting taste signals from TRCs to the brain. How taste information propagates from the ganglion to the brain is highly debated (i.e., does taste information travel in labeled-lines?). Leveraging these genetic handles, I demonstrated one-to-one correspondence between ganglion and NST neurons coding for the same taste. Importantly, inactivating one ‘line’ did not affect responses to any other taste stimuli. These results clearly showed that taste information is transmitted to the brain via labeled lines. But are these labeled lines aptly adapted to the internal state and external environment? I studied the modulation of taste signals by conflicting taste qualities in the concurrence of sweet and bitter to understand how adaptive taste responses emerge from hardwired taste circuits. Using functional imaging, anatomical tracing and circuit mapping, I found that bitter signals suppress sweet signals in the NST via top-down modulation by taste cortex and amygdala of NST taste signals. While the bitter cortical field provides direct feedback onto the NST to amplify incoming bitter signals, it exerts negative feedback via amygdala onto the incoming sweet signal in the NST. By manipulating this feedback circuit, I showed that this top-down control is functionally required for bitter evoked suppression of sweet taste. These results illustrate how the taste system uses dedicated feedback lines to finely regulate innate behavioral responses and may have implications for the context-dependent modulation of hardwired circuits in general.

Functional segregation of rostral and caudal hippocampus in associative memory

It has long been established that the hippocampus plays a crucial role for episodic memory. As opposed to the modular approach, now it is generally assumed that being a complex structure, the HC performs multiplex interconnected functions, whose hierarchical organization provides basis for the higher cognitive functions such as semantics-based encoding and retrieval. However, the «where, when and how» properties of distinct memory aspects within and outside the HC are still under debate. Here we used a visual associative memory task as a probe to test the hypothesis about the differential involvement of the rostral and caudal portions of the human hippocampus in memory encoding, recognition and associative recall. In epilepsy patients implanted with stereo-EEG, we show that at retrieval the rostral HC is selectively active for recognition memory, whereas the caudal HC is selectively active for the associative memory. Low frequency desynchronization and high frequency synchronization characterize the temporal dynamic in encoding and retrieval. Therefore, we describe here anatomical segregation in the hippocampal contributions to associative and recognition memory.

Dissecting the neural processes supporting perceptual learning

The brain and its inherent functions can be modified by various forms of learning. Learning-induced changes are seen even in basic perceptual functions. In particular, repeated training in a perceptual task can lead to a significant improvement in the trained task—a phenomenon known as perceptual learning. There has been a long-standing debate about the mechanisms of perceptual learning. In this talk, I will present results from our series of electrophysiological studies. These studies have consistently shown that perceptual learning is mediated by concerted changes in both perceptual and cognitive processes, resulting in improved sensory representation, enhanced top-down influences, and refined readout process.

Do Capuchin Monkeys, Chimpanzees and Children form Overhypotheses from Minimal Input? A Hierarchical Bayesian Modelling Approach

Abstract concepts are a powerful tool to store information efficiently and to make wide-ranging predictions in new situations based on sparse data. Whereas looking-time studies point towards an early emergence of this ability in human infancy, other paradigms like the relational match to sample task often show a failure to detect abstract concepts like same and different until the late preschool years. Similarly, non-human animals have difficulties solving those tasks and often succeed only after long training regimes. Given the huge influence of small task modifications, there is an ongoing debate about the conclusiveness of these findings for the development and phylogenetic distribution of abstract reasoning abilities. Here, we applied the concept of “overhypotheses” which is well known in the infant and cognitive modeling literature to study the capabilities of 3 to 5-year-old children, chimpanzees, and capuchin monkeys in a unified and more ecologically valid task design. In a series of studies, participants themselves sampled reward items from multiple containers or witnessed the sampling process. Only when they detected the abstract pattern governing the reward distributions within and across containers, they could optimally guide their behavior and maximize the reward outcome in a novel test situation. We compared each species’ performance to the predictions of a probabilistic hierarchical Bayesian model capable of forming overhypotheses at a first and second level of abstraction and adapted to their species-specific reward preferences.

SWEBAGS conference 2021

SWEBAGS conference 2021

NMC4 Short Talk: Multiscale and extended retrieval of associative memory structures in a cortical model of local-global inhibition balance

Inhibitory neurons take on many forms and functions. How this diversity contributes to memory function is not completely known. Previous formal studies indicate inhibition differentiated by local and global connectivity in associative memory networks functions to rescale the level of retrieval of excitatory assemblies. However, such studies lack biological details such as a distinction between types of neurons (excitatory and inhibitory), unrealistic connection schemas, and non-sparse assemblies. In this study, we present a rate-based cortical model where neurons are distinguished (as excitatory, local inhibitory, or global inhibitory), connected more realistically, and where memory items correspond to sparse excitatory assemblies. We use this model to study how local-global inhibition balance can alter memory retrieval in associative memory structures, including naturalistic and artificial structures. Experimental studies have reported inhibitory neurons and their sub-types uniquely respond to specific stimuli and can form sophisticated, joint excitatory-inhibitory assemblies. Our model suggests such joint assemblies, as well as a distribution and rebalancing of overall inhibition between two inhibitory sub-populations – one connected to excitatory assemblies locally and the other connected globally – can quadruple the range of retrieval across related memories. We identify a possible functional role for local-global inhibitory balance to, in the context of choice or preference of relationships, permit and maintain a broader range of memory items when local inhibition is dominant and conversely consolidate and strengthen a smaller range of memory items when global inhibition is dominant. This model therefore highlights a biologically-plausible and behaviourally-useful function of inhibitory diversity in memory.

NMC4 Short Talk: Neural Representation: Bridging Neuroscience and Philosophy

We understand the brain in representational terms. E.g., we understand spatial navigation by appealing to the spatial properties that hippocampal cells represent, and the operations hippocampal circuits perform on those representations (Moser et al., 2008). Philosophers have been concerned with the nature of representation, and recently neuroscientists entered the debate, focusing specifically on neural representations. (Baker & Lansdell, n.d.; Egan, 2019; Piccinini & Shagrir, 2014; Poldrack, 2020; Shagrir, 2001). We want to know what representations are, how to discover them in the brain, and why they matter so much for our understanding of the brain. Those questions are framed in a traditional philosophical way: we start with explanations that use representational notions, and to more deeply understand those explanations we ask, what are representations — what is the definition of representation? What is it for some bit of neural activity to be a representation? I argue that there is an alternative, and much more fruitful, approach. Rather than asking what representations are, we should ask what the use of representational *notions* allows us to do in neuroscience — what thinking in representational terms helps scientists do or explain. I argue that this framing offers more fruitful ground for interdisciplinary collaboration by distinguishing the philosophical concerns that have a place in neuroscience from those that don’t (namely the definitional or metaphysical questions about representation). And I argue for a particular view of representational notions: they allow us to impose the structure of one domain onto another as a model of its causal structue. So, e.g., thinking about the hippocampus as representing spatial properties is a way of taking structures in those spatial properties, and projecting those structures (and algorithms that would implement them) them onto the brain as models of its causal structure.

The Unfolding Argument: theoretical and methodological implications

In the first part of this talk, I will briefly present the unfolding argument by Doerig et al. (2019) and the various replies in the philosophical and neuroscientific literature. In the second part of the talk, I will explore the ramifications that this debate has for the science of consciousness and its philosophy, with particular focus on these questions: (i) which type of explanation should a theory of consciousness provide? (ii) what is the evidential basis for theories of consciousness?

NMC4 Short Talk: Untangling Contributions of Distinct Features of Images to Object Processing in Inferotemporal Cortex

How do humans perceive daily objects of various features and categorize these seemingly intuitive and effortless mental representations? Prior literature focusing on the role of the inferotemporal region (IT) has revealed object category clustering that is consistent with the semantic predefined structure (superordinate, ordinate, subordinate). It has however been debated whether the neural signals in the IT regions are a reflection of such categorical hierarchy [Wen et al.,2018; Bracci et al., 2017]. Visual attributes of images that correlated with semantic and category dimensions may have confounded these prior results. Our study aimed to address this debate by building and comparing models using the DNN AlexNet, to explain the variance in representational dissimilarity matrix (RDM) of neural signals in the IT region. We found that mid and high level perceptual attributes of the DNN model contribute the most to neural RDMs in the IT region. Semantic categories, as in predefined structure, were moderately correlated with mid to high DNN layers (r = [0.24 - 0.36]). Variance partitioning analysis also showed that the IT neural representations were mostly explained by DNN layers, while semantic categorical RDMs brought little additional information. In light of these results, we propose future works should focus more on the specific role IT plays in facilitating the extraction and coding of visual features that lead to the emergence of categorical conceptualizations.

Toward Naturalistic Paradigms of Agency

Voluntary control of behavior requires the ability to dynamically integrate internal states and external evidence to achieve one’s goals. However, neuroscientific studies of intentional action and critical philosophical commentary of that research have taken a rather narrow turn in recent years, focussing on the neural precursors of spontaneous simple actions as potential realizers of intentions. In this session, we show how the debate can benefit from incorporating other types of experimental approaches, focussing on agency in dynamic contexts.

Contrasting neuronal circuits driving reactive and cognitive fear

The last decade in the field of neuroscience has been marked by intense debate on the meaning of the term fear. Whereas some have argued that fear (as well as other emotions) relies on cognitive capacities that are unique to humans, others view it as a negative state constructed from essential building blocks. This latter definition posits that fear states are associated with varying readouts that one could consider to be parallel processes or serial events tied to a specific hierarchy. Within this framework, innate defensive behaviors are considered to be common displays of fear states that lie under the control of hard-wired brain circuits. As a general rule, these defensive behaviors can be classified as either reactive or cognitive based on a thread imminence continuum. However, while evidence of the neuronal circuits that lead to these divergent behavioral strategies has accrued over the last decades, most literature has considered these responses in isolation. As a result, important misconceptions have arisen regarding how fear circuits are distributed in the brain and the contribution of specific nodes within these circuits to defensive behaviors. To mitigate the status quo, I will conduct a systematic comparison of brain circuits driving the expression of freezing and active avoidance behavior, which I will use as well-studied proxies of reactive and cognitive fear, respectively. In addition, I propose that by integrating associative information with interoceptive and exteroceptive signals the central nucleus of the amygdala plays a crucial role in biasing the selection of defensive behaviors.

Astrocytes contribute to remote memory formation by modulating hippocampal-cortical communication during learning

How is it that some memories fade in a day while others last forever? The formation of long-lasting (remote) memories depends on the coordinated activity between the hippocampus and frontal cortices, but the timeline of these interactions is debated. Astrocytes, star-shaped glial cells, sense and modify neuronal activity, but their role in remote memory is scarcely explored. We manipulated the activity of hippocampal astrocytes during memory acquisition and discovered it impaired remote, but not recent, memory retrieval. We also revealed a massive recruitment of cortical-projecting hippocampal neurons during memory acquisition, a process that is specifically inhibited by astrocytic manipulation. Finally, we directly inhibited this projection during memory acquisition to prove its necessity for the formation of remote memory. Our findings reveal that the foundation of remote memory can be established during acquisition with projection-specific effect of astrocytes.

Towards a Translational Neuroscience of Consciousness

The cognitive neuroscience of conscious perception has seen considerable growth over the past few decades. Confirming an influential hypothesis driven by earlier studies of neuropsychological patients, we have found that the lateral and polar prefrontal cortices play important causal roles in the generation of subjective experiences. However, this basic empirical finding has been hotly contested by researchers with different theoretical commitments, and the differences are at times difficult to resolve. To address the controversies, I suggest one alternative venue may be to look for clinical applications derived from current theories. I outline an example in which we used closed-loop fMRI combined with machine learning to nonconsciously manipulate the physiological responses to threatening stimuli, such as spiders or snakes. A clinical trial involving patients with phobia is currently taking place. I also outline how this theoretical framework may be extended to other diseases. Ultimately, a truly meaningful understanding of the fundamental nature of our mental existence should lead to useful insights for our colleagues on the clinical frontlines. If we use this as a yardstick, whoever loses the esoteric theoretical debates, both science and the patients will always win.

Kamala Harris and the Construction of Complex Ethnolinguistic Political Identity

Over the past 50 years, sociolinguistic studies on black Americans have expanded in both theoretical and technical scope, and newer research has moved beyond seeing speakers, especially black speakers, as a monolithic sociolinguistic community (Wolfram 2007, Blake 2014). Yet there remains a dearth of critical work on complex identities existing within black American communities as well as how these identities are reflected and perceived in linguistic practice. At the same time, linguists have begun to take greater interest in the ways in which public figures, such as politicians, may illuminate the wider social meaning of specific linguistic variables. In this talk, I will present results from analyses of multiple aspects of ethnolinguistic variation in the speech of Vice President Kamala Harris during the 2019-2020 Democratic Party Primary debates. Together, these results show how VP Harris expertly employs both enregistered and subtle linguistic variables, including aspects of African American Language morphosyntax, vowels, and intonational phonology in the construction and performance of a highly specific sociolinguistic identity that reflects her unique positions politically, socially, and racially. The results of this study expand our knowledge about how the complexities of speaker identity are reflected in sociolinguistic variation, as well as press on the boundaries of what we know about how speakers in the public sphere use variation to reflect both who they are and who we want them to be.

Motor Cortex in Theory and Practice

A central question in motor physiology has been whether motor cortex activity resembles muscle activity, and if not, why not? Over fifty years, extensive observations have failed to provide a concise answer, and the topic remains much debated. To provide a different perspective, we employed a novel behavioral paradigm that affords extensive comparison between time-evolving neural and muscle activity. Single motor-cortex neurons displayed many muscle-like properties, but the structure of population activity was not muscle-like. Unlike muscle activity, neural activity was structured to avoid ’trajectory tangling’: moments where similar activity patterns led to dissimilar future patterns. Avoidance of trajectory tangling was present across tasks and species. Network models revealed a potential reason for this consistent feature: low tangling confers noise robustness. Remarkably, we were able to predict motor cortex activity from muscle activity alone, by leveraging the hypothesis that muscle-like commands are embedded in additional structure that yields low tangling. Our results argue that motor cortex embeds descending commands in additional structure that ensure low tangling, and thus noise-robustness. The dominant structure in motor cortex may thus serve not a representational function (encoding specific variables) but a computational function: ensuring that outgoing commands can be generated reliably. Our results establish the utility of an emerging approach: understanding the structure of neural activity based on properties of population geometry that flow from normative principles such as noise robustness.

Developmental origin of individuality in brain and behaviour

The “Nature versus Nurture” debate on the origin of behaviour has long been dominated by a genome versus experience dichotomy. However, evidence that genetically identical individuals kept under identical conditions are behaviourally different is incontrovertible. Where might such individuality come from? Neither genes nor the environment directly encode behaviour. They encode or influence processes, notably the development of neuronal circuits, that in turn control behaviour. An understanding of how neuronal circuits develop and function at the individual organism level is therefore essential for understanding the origin of individuals. I will discuss our efforts to address this issue over the past decade using the Drosophila fruit fly as a model system.

Sleep, semantic memory, and creative problem solving

Creative thought relies on the reorganisation of existing knowledge. Sleep is known to be important for creative thinking, but there is a debate about which sleep stage is most relevant, and why. I will address this issue by proposing that Rapid Eye Movement sleep, or 'REM', and Non-REM sleep facilitate creativity in different ways. Memory replay mechanisms in Non-REM can abstract rules from corpuses of learned information, while replay in REM may promote novel associations. I propose that the iterative interleaving of REM and Non-REM across a night boosts the formation of complex knowledge frameworks, and allows these frameworks to be restructured - thus facilitating creative thought. My talk will discuss experiments exploring these hypotheses, and the mechanisms for these processes.