One of Tali's cherished goals was to transform biology into physics. In his view, biologists were far too enamored by the details of the specific models they studied, losing sight of the big principles that may govern the behavior of these models. One such big principle that he suggested was the 'information bottleneck (IB) principle'. The iIB principle is an information-theoretical approach for extracting the relevant information that one random variable carries about another. Tali applied the IB principle to numerous problems in biology, gaining important insights in the process. Here I will describe two applications of the IB principle to neurobiological data. The first is the formalization of the notion of surprise that allowed us to rigorously estimate the memory duration and content of neuronal responses in auditory cortex, and the second is an application to behavior, allowing us to estimate 'optimal policies under information constraints' that shed interesting light on rat behavior.

Consciousness is a phenomenon unlike any other studied in natural science. Yet when building theories and designing experiments, we often proceed as if this were not the case. In this talk, I present two recent investigations of mine which explore the implications of consciousness' unique epistemic context for scientific theory building and experimental design. The first investigation is concerned with falsifications of theories of consciousness and identifies a rather deep problem in the usual scheme of testing theories. The second is an axiomatization and subsequent formalization of some of consciousness' more problematic epistemic features that allows to precisely quantify where the usual scientific methodology ceases to be applicable. For both cases, I indicate ways to resolve the problem.