Abstract: There is no doubt that the study of brain damaged individuals has contributed greatly to our understanding of the mind/brain. Within this broad approach, cognitive neuropsychology accentuates the cognitive dimension: it investigates the structure and organization of perceptual, motor, cognitive, and language systems – prerequisites for understanding the functional organization of the brain – through the analysis of their dysfunction following brain damage. Significant insights have come specifically from this paradigm. But progress has been slow and enthusiasm for this approach has waned somewhat in recent years, and the use of existing findings to constrain new theories has also waned. What explains the current diminished status of cognitive neuropsychology? One reason may be failure to calibrate expectations about the effective contribution of different subfields of the study of the mind/brain as these are determined by their natural peculiarities – such factors as the types of available observations and their complexity, opportunity of access to such observations, the possibility of controlled experimentation, and the like. Here, I also explore the merits and limitations of cognitive neuropsychology, with particular focus on the role of intellectual, pragmatic, and societal factors that determine scientific practice within the broader domains of cognitive science/neuroscience. I conclude on an optimistic note about the continuing unique importance of cognitive neuropsychology: although limited to the study of experiments of nature, it offers a privileged window into significant aspects of the mind/brain that are not easily accessible through other approaches. Biography: Alfonso Caramazza's research has focussed extensively on how words and their meanings are represented in the brain. His early pioneering studies helped to reformulate our thinking about Broca's aphasia (not limited to production) and formalised the logic of patient-based neuropsychology. More recently he has been instrumental in reconsidering popular claims about embodied cognition.