MindCORE Seminar Series

External cues imbued with significance can enhance the motivational state of an organism, trigger related memories and influence future planning and goal directed behavior. At the same time, internal thought and imaginings can moderate and counteract the impact of external motivational cues. The neural underpinnings of imagination have been largely opaque, due to the inherent inaccessibility of mental actions. The talk will describe studies utilizing imagination and tracking how its neural correlates bidirectionally interact with external motivational cues. Stimulus-response associative learning is only one form of memory organization. A more comprehensive and efficient organizational principal is the cognitive map. In the last part of the talk we will examine this concept in the case of abstract memories and social space. Social encounters provide opportunities to become intimate or estranged from others and to gain or lose power over them. The locations of others on the axes of power and affiliation can serve as reference points for our own position in the social space. Research is beginning to uncover the spatial-like neural representation of these social coordinates. We will discuss recent and growing evidence on utilizing the principals of the cognitive map across multiple domains, providing a systematic way of organizing memories to navigate life.

Mahzarin Banaji and her colleague coined the term “implicit bias” in the mid-1990s to refer to behavior that occurs without conscious awareness. Today, Professor Banaji is Cabot Professor of Social Ethics in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the National Academy of Sciences and has received numerous awards for her scientific contributions. The purpose of the seminar, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People, is to reveal the surprising and even perplexing ways in which we make errors in assessing and evaluating others when we recruit and hire, onboard and promote, lead teams, undertake succession planning, and work on behalf of our clients or the public we serve. It is Professor Banaji’s belief that people intend well and that the inconsistency we see, between values and behavior, comes from a lack of awareness. But because implicit bias is pervasive, we must rely on scientific evidence to “outsmart” our minds. If we do so, we will be more likely to reach the life goals we have chosen for ourselves and to serve better the organizations for which we work.

Across species, humans are uniquely able to acquire deep relational systems of the kind needed for mathematics, science, and human language. Analogical comparison processes are a major contributor to this ability. Analogical comparison engages a structure-mapping process (Gentner, 1983) that fosters learning in at least three ways: first, it highlights common relational systems and thereby promotes abstraction; second, it promotes inferences from known situations to less familiar situations; and, third, it reveals potentially important differences between examples. In short, structure-mapping is a domain-general learning process by which abstract, portable knowledge can arise from experience. It is operative from early infancy on, and is critical to the rapid learning we see in human children. Although structure-mapping processes are present pre-linguistically, their scope is greatly amplified by language. Analogical processes are instrumental in learning relational language, and the reverse is also true: relational language acts to preserve relational abstractions and render them accessible for future learning and reasoning. Although structure-mapping processes are present pre-linguistically, their scope is greatly amplified by language. Analogical processes are instrumental in learning relational language, and the reverse is also true: relational language acts to preserve relational abstractions and render them accessible for future learning and reasoning.

Constraints on control-dependent processing have become a fundamental concept in general theories of cognition that explain human behavior in terms of rational adaptations to these constraints. However, theories miss a rationale for why such constraints would exist in the first place. Recent work suggests that constraints on the allocation of control facilitate flexible task switching at the expense of the stability needed to support goal-directed behavior in face of distraction. We formulate this problem in a dynamical system, in which control signals are represented as attractors and in which constraints on control allocation limit the depth of these attractors. We derive formal expressions of the stability-flexibility tradeoff, showing that constraints on control allocation improve cognitive flexibility but impair cognitive stability. We provide evidence that human participants adapt higher constraints on the allocation of control as the demand for flexibility increases but that participants deviate from optimal constraints. In continuing work, we are investigating how collaborative performance of a group of individuals can benefit from individual differences defined in terms of balance between cognitive stability and flexibility.

I will discuss our recent evidence showing that information about abstract rules can be decoded from neuronal activity in primate visual cortex even in the absence of sensory stimulation. Furthermore, that rule information is greatest among neurons with the least visual activity and the weakest coupling to local neuronal networks. In addition, I will talk about recent developments in large-scale neurophysiological techniques in nonhuman primates.

Initial social perceptions are often thought to reflect direct “read outs” of facial features. Instead, we outline a perspective whereby initial perceptions emerge from an automatic yet gradual process of negotiation between the perceptual cues inherent to a person (e.g., facial cues) and top-down social cognitive processes harbored within perceivers. This perspective argues that perceivers’ social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in perceptions, and thus how we think about social groups, emotions, or personality traits helps determine how we visually perceive them in other people. Integrative evidence from real-time behavioral paradigms (e.g., mouse-tracking), multivariate fMRI, and computational modeling will be discussed. Together, this work shows that the way we use facial cues to categorize other people into social groups (e.g., gender, race), perceive their emotion (e.g., anger), or infer their personality (e.g., trustworthiness) are all fundamentally shaped by prior social-conceptual knowledge and stereotypical assumptions. We find that these top-down impacts on initial perceptions are driven by the interplay of higher-order prefrontal regions involved in top-down predictions and lower-level fusiform regions involved in face processing. We argue that the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as resulting from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. In this system, both visual and social cognitive processes are in a close exchange, and initial social perceptions emerge in part out of the structure of social-conceptual knowledge.

What do other people really think of you? In this talk, I highlight the unique perspective that other people have on the most consequential aspects of our personalities—how we treat others, our best and worst qualities, and our moral character. First, I compare how people thought they behaved with how they actually behaved in everyday life (based on observer ratings of unobtrusive audio recordings; 217 people, 2,519 observations). I show that when people think they are being kind (vs. rude), others do not necessarily agree. This suggests that people may have blind spots about how well they are treating others in the moment. Next, I compare what 463 people thought their own best and worst traits were with what their friends thought about them. The results reveal that friends are more likely to point out flaws in the prosocial and moral domains (e.g., “inconsiderate”, “selfish”, “manipulative”) than are people themselves. Does this imply that others might want us to be more moral? To find out, I compare what targets (N = 800) want to change about their own personalities with what their close others (N = 958) want to change about them. The results show that people don’t particularly want to be more moral, and their close others don’t want them to be more moral, either. I conclude with future directions on honest feedback as a pathway to self-insight and, ultimately, self-improvement.

Over the past 50 years, sociolinguistic studies on black Americans have expanded in both theoretical and technical scope, and newer research has moved beyond seeing speakers, especially black speakers, as a monolithic sociolinguistic community (Wolfram 2007, Blake 2014). Yet there remains a dearth of critical work on complex identities existing within black American communities as well as how these identities are reflected and perceived in linguistic practice. At the same time, linguists have begun to take greater interest in the ways in which public figures, such as politicians, may illuminate the wider social meaning of specific linguistic variables. In this talk, I will present results from analyses of multiple aspects of ethnolinguistic variation in the speech of Vice President Kamala Harris during the 2019-2020 Democratic Party Primary debates. Together, these results show how VP Harris expertly employs both enregistered and subtle linguistic variables, including aspects of African American Language morphosyntax, vowels, and intonational phonology in the construction and performance of a highly specific sociolinguistic identity that reflects her unique positions politically, socially, and racially. The results of this study expand our knowledge about how the complexities of speaker identity are reflected in sociolinguistic variation, as well as press on the boundaries of what we know about how speakers in the public sphere use variation to reflect both who they are and who we want them to be.

Tobacco use is the leading cause of preventable deaths and illnesses in the United States and globally. Sexual, racial, ethnic minorities, young adults, and populations from rural areas and lower socioeconomic positions are disproportionately impacted by the health harms of tobacco use and exposure to secondhand smoke. In this talk, Andy Tan, Associate Professor at the Annenberg School for Communication, will provide an overview of integrating communication science to address inequalities in health information exposure, message processing, and behavioral effects associated with pro- and anti-tobacco communications among vulnerable populations. He will present findings from recent work including examining inequities in tobacco advertising exposure among young adult sexual minorities, experiences of smoking risk and protective factors among transgender and gender expansive adults, and development of a culturally responsive communication intervention to increase resilience against tobacco marketing influences and reduce smoking among young adult LGB women.

How can people coordinate their actions or make joint decisions? One possibility is that each person attempts to predict the actions of the other(s), and best-responds accordingly. But this can lead to bad outcomes, and sometimes even vicious circularity. An alternative view is that each person attempts to work out what the two or more players would agree to do, if they were to bargain explicitly. If the result of such a "virtual" bargain is "obvious," then the players can simply play their respective roles in that bargain. I suggest that virtual bargaining is essential to genuinely social interaction (rather than viewing other people as instruments), and may even be uniquely human. This approach aims to respect methodological individualism, a key principle in many areas of social science, while explaining how human groups can, in a very real sense, be "greater" than the sum of their individual members.

Humans are biologically adapted for cultural life in ways that other primates are not. Humans have unique motivations and cognitive skills for sharing emotions, experience, and collaborative actions (shared intentionality). These motivations and skills first emerge in human ontogeny at around one year of age, as infants begin to participate with other persons in various kinds of collaborative and joint attentional activities, including linguistic communication. Our nearest primate relatives understand important aspects of intentional action - especially in competitive situations - but they do not seem to have the motivations and cognitive skills necessary to engage in activities involving collaboration, shared intentionality, and, in general, things cultural.

One of the central challenges facing the science of consciousness is that of identifying ways of measuring consciousness. Can we go beyond our pre-theoretical ways of detecting consciousness and develop independently validated measures of consciousness. Some theorists think not, arguing that we cannot go beyond the everyday markers of consciousness with which we begin. Others are more optimistic, and hold that we will be able to develop independent measures of consciousness, or "consciousness meters". This talk discusses various ways in which one might attempt to validate a consciousness meter, arguing that the most promising approach involves treating consciousness as a natural kind.

Every day when we fall asleep we lose consciousness, we are not there. And then, every morning, when we wake up, we regain it. What mechanisms give rise to consciousness, and how can we explain consciousness in the realm of the physical world of atoms and matter? For centuries, philosophers and scientists have aimed to crack this mystery. Much progress has been made in the past decades to understand how consciousness is instantiated in the brain, yet critical questions remain: can we develop a consciousness meter? Are computers conscious? What about other animals and babies? We have embarked in a large-scale, multicenter project to test, in the context of an open science, adversarial collaboration, two of the most prominent theories: Integrated information theory (IIT) and Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) theory. We are collecting over 500 datasets including invasive and non-invasive recordings of the human brain, i.e.. fMRI, MEG and ECoG. We hope this project will enable theory-driven discoveries and further explorations that will help us better understand how consciousness fits inside the human brain.

I argue that the evolution of our life history, with its distinctively long, protected human childhood allows an early period of broad hypothesis search and exploration, before the demands of goal-directed exploitation set in. This cognitive profile is also found in other animals and is associated with early behaviours such as neophilia and play. I relate this developmental pattern to computational ideas about explore-exploit trade-offs, search and sampling, and to neuroscience findings. I also present several lines of new empirical evidence suggesting that young human learners are highly exploratory, both in terms of their search for external information and their search through hypothesis spaces. In fact, they are sometimes more exploratory than older learners and adults.

What psychological mechanisms do primates use to engage in self-control, and what is the ultimate function of these skills? I will argue that a suite of decision-making capacities, including choices about the timing of benefits, evolved in the context of foraging behaviors and vary with ecological complexity across species. Then, I will examine how these foraging capacities can be generalized to solve novel problems posing temporal costs that are important for humans, such as cooking food, and can therefore underpin evolutionary transitions in behavior. Finally, I will present work testing the hypothesis that a limited future time horizon constrains the expression of other complex abilities in nonhumans, explaining the emergence of human-unique forms of social cognition and behavior.