Cognition seminars

Dominant theories of analogical thinking postulate that making an analogy consists in discovering that two superficially different situations share isomorphic systems of similar relations. According to this perspective, the comparison between the two situations may eventually lead to the construction of a schema, which retains the structural aspects they share and deletes their specific contents. We have developed a new approach to analogical thinking, whose purpose is to explain a particular type of analogies: those in which the analogs are exemplars of a schema-governed category (e.g., two instances of robbery). As compared to standard analogies, these comparisons are noteworthy in that a well-established schema (the schema-governed category) mediates each one of the subprocesses involved in analogical thinking. We argue that the category assignment approach is able to provide a better account of how the analogical subprocesses of retrieval, mapping, re-representation, evaluation and inference generation are carried out during the processing of this specific kind of analogies. The arguments presented are accompanied by brief descriptions of some of the studies that provided support for this approach.

The rules governing behavior often vary with behavioral contexts. As a result, an action rewarded in one context may be discouraged in another. Animals and humans are capable of switching between behavioral strategies under different contexts and acting adaptively according to the variable rules, a flexibility that is thought to be mediated by the prefrontal cortex (PFC). However, how the PFC orchestrates the context-dependent switch of strategies remains unclear. Here we show that pathway-specific projection neurons in the medial PFC (mPFC) differentially contribute to context-instructed strategy selection. In mice trained in a decision-making task in which a previously established rule and a newly learned rule are associated with distinct contexts, the activity of mPFC neurons projecting to the dorsomedial striatum (mPFC-DMS) encodes the contexts and further represents decision strategies conforming to the old and new rules. Moreover, mPFC-DMS neuron activity is required for the context-instructed strategy selection. In contrast, the activity of mPFC neurons projecting to the ventral midline thalamus (mPFC-VMT) does not discriminate between the contexts, and represents the old rule even if mice have adopted the new one. Furthermore, these neurons act to prevent the strategy switch under the new rule. Our results suggest that mPFC-DMS neurons promote flexible strategy selection guided by contexts, whereas mPFC-VMT neurons favor fixed strategy selection by preserving old rules.

Brains can gracefully weed out irrelevant stimuli to guide behavior. This feat is believed to rely on a progressive selection of task-relevant stimuli across the cortical hierarchy, but the specific across-area interactions enabling stimulus selection are still unclear. Here, we propose that population gating, occurring within A1 but controlled by top-down inputs from mPFC, can support across-area stimulus selection. Examining single-unit activity recorded while rats performed an auditory context-dependent task, we found that A1 encoded relevant and irrelevant stimuli along a common dimension of its neural space. Yet, the relevant stimulus encoding was enhanced along an extra dimension. In turn, mPFC encoded only the stimulus relevant to the ongoing context. To identify candidate mechanisms for stimulus selection within A1, we reverse-engineered low-rank RNNs trained on a similar task. Our analyses predicted that two context-modulated neural populations gated their preferred stimulus in opposite contexts, which we confirmed in further analyses of A1. Finally, we show in a two-region RNN how population gating within A1 could be controlled by top-down inputs from PFC, enabling flexible across-area communication despite fixed inter-areal connectivity.

Behavioral studies have demonstrated that certain task features reliably enhance classification performance for challenging visual stimuli. These include extended image presentation time and the valid cueing of attention. Here, I will show how convolutional neural networks can be used as a model of the visual system that connects neural activity changes with such performance changes. Specifically, I will discuss how different anatomical forms of recurrence can account for better classification of noisy and degraded images with extended processing time. I will then show how experimentally-observed neural activity changes associated with feature attention lead to observed performance changes on detection tasks. I will also discuss the implications these results have for how we identify the neural mechanisms and architectures important for behavior.

The hippocampus is one of the few regions in the adult mammalian brain which is endowed with life-long neurogenesis. Despite intense investigation, it remains unclear how neurons newly-generated may retain unique functions that contribute to modulate hippocampal information processing and cognition. In this talk, I will present some recent findings revealing how enhanced forms of plasticity in adult-born neurons underlie the way they become incorporated into pre-existing networks in response to experience.

Cognitive control guides behavior by controlling what, where, and how information is represented in the brain. Perhaps the most well-studied form of cognitive control has been ‘attention’, which controls how external sensory stimuli are represented in the brain. In contrast, the neural mechanisms controlling the selection of representations held ‘in mind’, in working memory, are unknown. In this talk, I will present evidence that the prefrontal cortex controls working memory by selectively enhancing and transforming the contents of working memory. In particular, I will show how the neural representation of the content of working memory changes over time, moving between different ‘subspaces’ of the neural population. These dynamics may play a critical role in controlling what and how neural representations are acted upon.

Visual perception is traditionally studied in isolation from other sensory systems, and while this approach has been exceptionally successful, in the real world, visual objects are often accompanied by sounds, smells, tactile information, or taste. How is visual processing influenced by these other sensory inputs? In this talk, I will review studies from our lab showing that a sound can influence the perception of a visual object in multiple ways. In the first part, I will focus on spatial interactions between sound and sight, demonstrating that co-localized sounds enhance visual perception. Then, I will show that these cross-modal interactions also occur at a higher contextual and semantic level, where naturalistic sounds facilitate the processing of real-world objects that match these sounds. Throughout my talk I will explore to what extent sounds not only improve visual processing but also alter perceptual representations of the objects we see. Most broadly, I will argue for the importance of considering multisensory influences on visual perception for a more complete understanding of our visual experience.

What do people do when they comprehend language in discourse? According to many psychologists, they build and maintain cognitive representations of utterances in four complementary mental models for discourse that interact with each other: the surface text, the text base, the situation model, and the context model. When people encounter metaphors in these utterances, they need to incorporate them into each of these mental representations for the discourse. Since influential metaphor theories define metaphor as a form of (figurative) analogy, involving cross-domain mapping of a smaller or greater extent, the general expectation has been that metaphor comprehension is also based on analogizing. This expectation, however, has been partly borne out by the data, but not completely. There is no one-to-one relationship between metaphor as (conceptual) structure (analogy) and metaphor as (psychological) process (analogizing). According to Deliberate Metaphor Theory (DMT), only some metaphors are handled by analogy. Instead, most metaphors are presumably handled by lexical disambiguation. This is a hypothesis that brings together most metaphor research in a provocatively new way: it means that most metaphors are not processed metaphorically, which produces a paradox of metaphor. In this talk I will sketch out how this paradox arises and how it can be resolved by a new version of DMT, which I have described in my forthcoming book Slowing metaphor down: Updating Deliberate Metaphor Theory (currently under review). In this theory, the distinction between, but also the relation between, analogy in metaphorical structure versus analogy in metaphorical process is of central importance.

Understanding the brain is not only intrinsically fascinating, but also highly relevant to increase our well-being since our brain exhibits a power over the body that makes it capable both of provoking illness or facilitating the healing process. Bearing in mind this dark force, brain sciences have undergone and will undergo an important revolution, redefining its boundaries beyond the cranial cavity. During this presentation, we will discuss about the communication between the brain and other systems that shapes how we feel the external word and how we think. We are starting to unravel how our organs talk to the brain and how the brain talks back. That two-way communication encompasses a complex, body-wide system of nerves, hormones and other signals that will be discussed. This presentation aims at challenging a long history of thinking of bodily regulation as separate from "higher" mental processes. Four centuries ago, René Descartes famously conceptualized the mind as being separate from the body, it is time now to embody our mind.

Over the course of evolution, the human race has achieved a number of remarkable innovations, that have enabled us to adapt to and benefit from the environment ever more effectively. The ongoing environmental threats and health disasters of our world have now made it crucial to understand the cognitive mechanisms behind innovative behaviours. In my talk, I will present two research projects with examples of innovation-based behavioural adaptation from the taxonomic kingdom of animals, serving as a comparative psychological model for mapping the evolution of innovation. The first project focuses on the challenge of overcoming physical disability. In this study, we investigated an injured kea (Nestor notabilis) that exhibits an efficient, intentional, and innovative tool-use behaviour to compensate his disability, showing evidence for innovation-based adaptation to a physical disability in a non-human species. The second project focuses on the evolution of fire use from a cognitive perspective. Fire has been one of the most dominant ecological forces in human evolution; however, it is still unknown what capabilities and environmental factors could have led to the emergence of fire use. In the core study of this project, we investigated a captive population of Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) that has been regularly exposed to campfires during the cold winter months for over 60 years. Our results suggest that macaques are able to take advantage of the positive effects of fire while avoiding the dangers of flames and hot ashes, and exhibit calm behaviour around the bonfire. In addition, I will present a research proposal targeting the foraging behaviour of predatory birds in parts of Australia frequently affected by bushfires. Anecdotal reports suggest that some birds use burning sticks to spread the flames, a behaviour that has not been scientifically observed and evaluated. In summary, the two projects explore innovative behaviours along three different species groups, three different habitats, and three different ecological drivers, providing insights into the cognitive and behavioural mechanisms of adaptation through innovation.

Cerebrovascular support is critical for healthy cognitive ageing. Reduced cerebral blood flow in ageing is caused, among other things, by hypertension, arteriosclerosis (i.e. stiffening of the arteries) and plaque formation. Arterial stiffness is predictive of cognitive decline, is a critical risk factor for cerebrovascular accidents, and has been linked to heightened risks for Alzheimer’s Disease and other forms of dementia. The elasticity of cerebral arteries is influenced by lifestyle factors, including cardiorespiratory fitness. Monica will discuss data obtained in their laboratory with new noninvasive measures of cerebrovascular health (pulse-DOT, a diffuse optical tomographic method for studying cerebral arteriosclerosis), in conjunction with structural and functional brain measures and cognitive assessments. These findings support a model in which localised changes in arteriosclerosis lead to specific profiles of structural, functional, and cognitive declines, paving a way to individualised interventions.

Face detection is an initial step of many social interactions involving a comparison between a visual input and a mental representation of faces, built from previous experience. Whilst emotional state was found to affect the way humans attend to faces, little research has explored the effects of emotions on the mental representation of faces. Here, we examined the specific perceptual modulation of geometric properties of the mental representations associated with state anxiety and state depression on face detection, and to compare their emotional expression. To this end, we used an adaptation of the reverse correlation technique inspired by Gosselin and Schyns’, (2003) ‘Superstitious Approach’, to construct visual representations of observers’ mental representations of faces and to relate these to their mental states. In two sessions, on separate days, participants were presented with ‘colourful’ noise stimuli and asked to detect faces, which they were told were present. Based on the noise fragments that were identified as faces, we reconstructed the pictorial mental representation utilised by each participant in each session. We found a significant correlation between the size of the mental representation of faces and participants’ level of depression. Our findings provide a preliminary insight about the way emotions affect appearance expectation of faces. To further understand whether the facial expressions of participants’ mental representations reflect their emotional state, we are conducting a validation study with a group of naïve observers who are asked to classify the reconstructed face images by emotion. Thus, we assess whether the faces communicate participants’ emotional states to others.

Several species of insects have been observed to perform accurate path integration, constantly updating a vector memory of their location relative to a starting position, which they can use to take a direct return path. Foraging insects such as bees and ants are also able to store and recall the vectors to return to food locations, and to take novel shortcuts between these locations. Other insects, such as dung beetles, are observed to integrate multimodal directional cues in a manner well described by vector addition. All these processes appear to be functions of the Central Complex, a highly conserved and strongly structured circuit in the insect brain. Modelling this circuit, at the single neuron level, suggests it has general capabilities for vector encoding, vector memory, vector addition and vector rotation that can support a wide range of directed and navigational behaviours.

Faces and voices convey much of the non-verbal information that we use when communicating with other people. We look at faces and listen to voices to recognize others, understand how they are feeling, and decide how to act. Recent research in my lab aims to investigate whether there are similar coding mechanisms to represent faces and voices, and whether there are brain regions that integrate information across the visual and auditory modalities. In the first part of my talk, I will focus on an fMRI study in which we found that a region of the posterior STS exhibits modality-general representations of familiar people that can be similarly driven by someone’s face and their voice (Tsantani et al. 2019). In the second part of the talk, I will describe our recent attempts to shed light on the type of information that is represented in different face-responsive brain regions (Tsantani et al., 2021).

In popular media, there is often a connection drawn between the advent of awareness in artificial agents and those same agents simultaneously achieving human or superhuman level intelligence. In this talk, I will examine the validity and potential application of this seemingly intuitive link between consciousness and intelligence. I will do so by examining the cognitive abilities associated with three contemporary theories of conscious function: Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Information Generation Theory (IGT), and Attention Schema Theory (AST), and demonstrating that all three theories specifically relate conscious function to some aspect of domain-general intelligence in humans. With this insight, we will turn to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and find that, while still far from demonstrating general intelligence, many state-of-the-art deep learning methods have begun to incorporate key aspects of each of the three functional theories. Given this apparent trend, I will use the motivating example of mental time travel in humans to propose ways in which insights from each of the three theories may be combined into a unified model. I believe that doing so can enable the development of artificial agents which are not only more generally intelligent but are also consistent with multiple current theories of conscious function.

In the first half of my talk, I will discuss our recent work on the midbrain dopamine system. The hypothesis that midbrain dopamine neurons broadcast an error signal for the prediction of reward is among the great successes of computational neuroscience. However, our recent results contradict a core aspect of this theory: that the neurons uniformly convey a scalar, global signal. I will review this work, as well as our new efforts to update models of the neural basis of reinforcement learning with our data. In the second half of my talk, I will discuss our recent findings of state-dependent decision-making mechanisms in the striatum.

Analogical reasoning –learning about new things by relating it to previous knowledge– lies at the heart of human intelligence and creativity and forms the core of educational practice. Children start creating and using analogies early on, making incredible progress moving from associative processes to successful analogical reasoning. For example, if we ask a four-year-old “Horse belongs to stable like chicken belongs to …?” they may use association and reply “egg”, whereas older children will likely give the intended relational response “chicken coop” (or other term to refer to a chicken’s home). Interestingly, despite state-of-the-art AI-language models having superhuman encyclopedic knowledge and superior memory and computational power, our pilot studies show that these large language models often make mistakes providing associative rather than relational responses to verbal analogies. For example, when we asked four- to eight-year-olds to solve the analogy “body is to feet as tree is to …?” they responded “roots” without hesitation, but large language models tend to provide more associative responses such as “leaves”. In this study we examine the similarities and differences between children's and six large language models' (Dutch/multilingual models: RobBERT, BERT-je, M-BERT, GPT-2, M-GPT, Word2Vec and Fasttext) responses to verbal analogies extracted from an online adaptive learning environment, where >14,000 7-12 year-olds from the Netherlands solved 20 or more items from a database of 900 Dutch language verbal analogies.