Cognition seminars

Learning the consequences our choices have as we interact with our world is critical for flexible behavior. Relational knowledge of one’s environment gives structure to otherwise-individual one-to-one stimulus-outcome mappings, providing a substrate to globally update behavioral contingencies in the face of changes in the landscape of reward. In the brain, this relational knowledge is thought to be encoded in the hippocampus (HPC) in the form of a cognitive map, while prefrontal regions, such as orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), are thought to instantiate subjective estimates of location on the map, though direct neurophysiological evidence is lacking. In this talk, I will present recent work demonstrating the causal relationship between HPC and OFC as nonhuman primates perform a reward learning task requiring them to learn and maintain knowledge of changing stimulus-outcome associations. I will then provide direct evidence that single primate hippocampal neurons represent an abstract map of the value space defined by the task. Finally, I use behavioral modeling to highlight one possible strategy by which knowledge of value space is exploited by animals to detect changes in choice-outcome mappings and proactively update their behavior in response.

Animals are motivated to acquire knowledge. A particularly striking example is information seeking behavior: animals often seek out sensory cues that will inform them about the properties of uncertain future rewards, even when there is no way for them to use this information to influence the reward outcome, and even when this information comes at a considerable cost. Evidence from monkey electrophysiology and human fMRI studies suggests that orbitofrontal cortex and midbrain dopamine neurons represent the subjective value of knowledge during information seeking behavior. However, it remains unclear how the brain assigns value to information and how it integrates this with other incentives to drive behavior. We have therefore developed a task to test if information preferences are present in mice and study how informational value is imparted on stimuli. Mice are trained to enter a center port and receive an initial odor that instructs them to either go to an informative side port, go to an uninformative side port, or choose freely between them. The chosen side port then yields a second odor cue followed by a delayed probabilistic water reward. The informative port’s odor cue indicates whether the upcoming reward will be big or small. The uninformative port’s odor cue is uncorrelated with the trial outcome. Crucially, the two ports only differ in their odor cues, not in their water value since both offer identical probabilities of big and small rewards. We find that mice prefer the informative port. This preference is evident as a higher percentage choice of the informative port when given a free choice (67% +/- 1.7%, n = 14, p < 0.03), as well as by faster reaction times when instructed to go to the informative port (544ms +/- 21ms vs 795ms +/- 21ms, n = 14, p < 0.001). The preference for information is robust to within-animal reversals of informative and uninformative port locations, and, moreover, mice are willing to pay for information by choosing the informative port even if its reward amount is reduced to be substantially lower than the uninformative port. These behavioral observations suggest that odor stimuli are imparted with informational value as mice learn the information seeking task. We are currently imaging neural activity in orbitofrontal cortex with microendoscopes to identify changes in neural activity that may reflect value associated with the acquisition of knowledge.

In recent years it has become increasingly clear that (Shannon) information is a central resource for organisms, akin in importance to energy. Any decision that an organism or a subsystem of an organism takes involves the acquisition, selection, and processing of information and ultimately its concentration and enaction. It is the consequences of this balance that will occupy us in this talk. This perception-action loop picture of an agent's life cycle is well established and expounded especially in the context of Fuster's sensorimotor hierarchies. Nevertheless, the information-theoretic perspective drastically expands the potential and predictive power of the perception-action loop perspective. On the one hand information can be treated - to a significant extent - as a resource that is being sought and utilized by an organism. On the other hand, unlike energy, information is not additive. The intrinsic structure and dynamics of information can be exceedingly complex and subtle; in the last two decades one has discovered that Shannon information possesses a rich and nontrivial intrinsic structure that must be taken into account when informational contributions, information flow or causal interactions of processes are investigated, whether in the brain or in other complex processes. In addition, strong parallels between information and control theory have emerged. This parallelism between the theories allows one to obtain unexpected insights into the nature and properties of the perception-action loop. Through the lens of information theory, one can not only come up with novel hypotheses about necessary conditions for the organization of information processing in a brain, but also with constructive conjectures and predictions about what behaviours, brain structure and dynamics and even evolutionary pressures one can expect to operate on biological organisms, induced purely by informational considerations.

Visual attention selects only a tiny fraction of visual input information for further processing. Selection starts in the primary visual cortex (V1), which creates a bottom-up saliency map to guide the fovea to selected visual locations via gaze shifts. This motivates a new framework that views vision as consisting of encoding, selection, and decoding stages, placing selection on center stage. It suggests a massive loss of non-selected information from V1 downstream along the visual pathway. Hence, feedback from downstream visual cortical areas to V1 for better decoding (recognition), through analysis-by- synthesis, should query for additional information and be mainly directed at the foveal region. Accordingly, non-foveal vision is not only poorer in spatial resolution, but also more susceptible to many illusions.

Impulsivity and compulsivity are behavioural traits that underlie many aspects of decision-making and form the characteristic symptoms of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and Gambling Disorder (GD). The neural underpinnings of aspects of reward and avoidance learning under the expression of these traits and symptoms are only partially understood. " "The present study combined behavioural modelling and neuroimaging technique to examine brain activity associated with critical phases of reward and loss processing in OCD and GD. " "Forty-two healthy controls (HC), forty OCD and twenty-three GD participants were recruited in our study to complete a two-session reinforcement learning (RL) task featuring a “probability switch (PS)” with imaging scanning. Finally, 39 HC (20F/19M, 34 yrs +/- 9.47), 28 OCD (14F/14M, 32.11 yrs ±9.53) and 16 GD (4F/12M, 35.53yrs ± 12.20) were included with both behavioural and imaging data available. The functional imaging was conducted by using 3.0-T SIEMENS MAGNETOM Skyra syngo MR D13C at Monash Biomedical Imaging. Each volume compromised 34 coronal slices of 3 mm thickness with 2000 ms TR and 30 ms TE. A total of 479 volumes were acquired for each participant in each session in an interleaved-ascending manner. " " The standard Q-learning model was fitted to the observed behavioural data and the Bayesian model was used for the parameter estimation. Imaging analysis was conducted using SPM12 (Welcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, United Kingdom) in the Matlab (R2015b) environment. The pre-processing commenced with the slice timing, realignment, normalization to MNI space according to T1-weighted image and smoothing with a 8 mm Gaussian kernel. " " The frontostriatal brain circuit including the putamen and medial orbitofrontal (mOFC) were significantly more active in response to receiving reward and avoiding punishment compared to receiving an aversive outcome and missing reward at 0.001 with FWE correction at cluster level; While the right insula showed greater activation in response to missing rewards and receiving punishment. Compared to healthy participants, GD patients showed significantly lower activation in the left superior frontal and posterior cingulum at 0.001 for the gain omission. " " The reward prediction error (PE) signal was found positively correlated with the activation at several clusters expanding across cortical and subcortical region including the striatum, cingulate, bilateral insula, thalamus and superior frontal at 0.001 with FWE correction at cluster level. The GD patients showed a trend of decreased reward PE response in the right precentral extending to left posterior cingulate compared to controls at 0.05 with FWE correction. " " The aversive PE signal was negatively correlated with brain activity in regions including bilateral thalamus, hippocampus, insula and striatum at 0.001 with FWE correction. Compared with the control group, GD group showed an increased aversive PE activation in the cluster encompassing right thalamus and right hippocampus, and also the right middle frontal extending to the right anterior cingulum at 0.005 with FWE correction. " " Through the reversal learning task, the study provided a further support of the dissociable brain circuits for distinct phases of reward and avoidance learning. Also, the OCD and GD is characterised by aberrant patterns of reward and avoidance processing.

Dr Jennifer Lawlor Title: Tracking changes in complex auditory scenes along the cortical pathway Complex acoustic environments, such as a busy street, are characterised by their everchanging dynamics. Despite their complexity, listeners can readily tease apart relevant changes from irrelevant variations. This requires continuously tracking the appropriate sensory evidence while discarding noisy acoustic variations. Despite the apparent simplicity of this perceptual phenomenon, the neural basis of the extraction of relevant information in complex continuous streams for goal-directed behavior is currently not well understood. As a minimalistic model for change detection in complex auditory environments, we designed broad-range tone clouds whose first-order statistics change at a random time. Subjects (humans or ferrets) were trained to detect these changes.They were faced with the dual-task of estimating the baseline statistics and detecting a potential change in those statistics at any moment. To characterize the extraction and encoding of relevant sensory information along the cortical hierarchy, we first recorded the brain electrical activity of human subjects engaged in this task using electroencephalography. Human performance and reaction times improved with longer pre-change exposure, consistent with improved estimation of baseline statistics. Change-locked and decision-related EEG responses were found in a centro-parietal scalp location, whose slope depended on change size, consistent with sensory evidence accumulation. To further this investigation, we performed a series of electrophysiological recordings in the primary auditory cortex (A1), secondary auditory cortex (PEG) and frontal cortex (FC) of the fully trained behaving ferret. A1 neurons exhibited strong onset responses and change-related discharges specific to neuronal tuning. PEG population showed reduced onset-related responses, but more categorical change-related modulations. Finally, a subset of FC neurons (dlPFC/premotor) presented a generalized response to all change-related events only during behavior. We show using a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) that the same subpopulation in FC encodes sensory and decision signals, suggesting that FC neurons could operate conversion of sensory evidence to perceptual decision. All together, these area-specific responses suggest a behavior-dependent mechanism of sensory extraction and generalization of task-relevant event. Aleksandar Ivanov Title: How does the auditory system adapt to different environments: A song of echoes and adaptation

Humans’ ability to perceive and abstract relational structure is fundamental to our learning. It allows us to acquire knowledge all the way from linguistic grammar to spatial knowledge to social structures. How does a learner begin to perceive structure in the world? Why do we sometimes fail to see structural commonalities across events? To begin to answer these questions, I attempt to bridge two large, yet somewhat separate research traditions in understanding human’s structural abstraction: rule learning (Marcus et al., 1999) and analogical learning (Gentner, 1989). On the one hand, rule learning research has shown humans’ domain-general ability and ease—as early as 7-month-olds—to abstract structure from a limited experience. On the other hand, analogical learning works have shown robust constraints in structural abstraction: young learners prefer object similarity over relational similarity. To understand this seeming paradox between ease and difficulty, we conducted a series of studies using the classic rule learning paradigm (Marcus et al., 1999) but with an analogical (object vs. relation) twist. Adults were presented with 2-minute sentences or events (syllables or shapes) containing a rule. At test, they had to choose between rule abstraction and object matches—the same syllable or shape they saw before. Surprisingly, while in the absence of object matches adults were perfectly capable of abstracting the rule, their ability to do so declined sharply when object matches were present. Our initial results suggest that rule learning ability may be subject to the usual constraints and signatures of analogical learning: preference to object similarity can dampen rule generalization. Humans’ abstraction is also concrete at the same time.

Irina is a research scientist at DeepMind, where she works in the Froniers team. Her work aims to bring together insights from the fields of neuroscience and physics to advance general artificial intelligence through improved representation learning. Before joining DeepMind, Irina was a British Psychological Society Undergraduate Award winner for her achievements as an undergraduate student in Experimental Psychology at Westminster University, followed by a DPhil at the Oxford Centre for Computational Neuroscience and Artificial Intelligence, where she focused on understanding the computational principles underlying speech processing in the auditory brain. During her DPhil, Irina also worked on developing poker AI, applying machine learning in the finance sector, and working on speech recognition at Google Research."" https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.14304.pdf

From a developmental standpoint, it has been argued that two major complementary factors contribute to the development of analogy comprehension: world knowledge and executive functions. Here I will provide evidence in support of the second view. Beyond paradigms that manipulate task difficulty (e.g., number and types of distractors and semantic distance between domains) we will provide eye-tracking data that describes differences in the way children and adults compare the base and target domains in analogy problems. We will follow the same approach with ageing people. This latter population provides a unique opportunity to disentangle the contribution of knowledge and executive processes in analogy making since knowledge is (more than) preserved and executive control is decreasing. Using this paradigm, I will show the extent to which world knowledge (assessed through vocabulary) compensates for decreasing executive control in older populations. Our eye-tracking data suggests that, to a certain extent, differences between younger and older adults are analogous to the differences between younger adults and children in the way they compare the base and the target domains in analogy problems.

In this talk, I will present some data showing that people’s similarity judgments among word pairs reflect distinctions between abstract semantic relations like contrast, cause-effect, or part-whole. Further, the extent that individual participants’ similarity judgments discriminate between abstract semantic relations was linearly associated with both fluid and crystallized verbal intelligence, albeit more strongly with fluid intelligence. Finally, I will compare three models according to their ability to predict these similarity judgments. All models take as input vector representations of individual word meanings, but they differ in their representation of relations: one model does not represent relations at all, a second model represents relations implicitly, and a third model represents relations explicitly. Across the three models, the third model served as the best predictor of human similarity judgments suggesting the importance of explicit relation representation to fully account for human semantic cognition.

Body motion is a fundamental signal of social communication. This includes facial as well as full-body movements. Combining advanced methods from computer animation with motion capture in humans and monkeys, we synthesized highly-realistic monkey avatar models. Our face avatar is perceived by monkeys as almost equivalent to a real animal, and does not induce an ‘uncanny valley effect’, unlike all other previously used avatar models in studies with monkeys. Applying machine-learning methods for the control of motion style, we were able to investigate how species-specific shape and dynamic cues influence the perception of human and monkey facial expressions. Human observers showed very fast learning of monkey expressions, and a perceptual encoding of expression dynamics that was largely independent of facial shape. This result is in line with the fact that facial shape evolved faster than the neuromuscular control in primate phylogenesis. At the same time, it challenges popular neural network models of the recognition of dynamic faces that assume a joint encoding of facial shape and dynamics. We propose an alternative physiologically-inspired neural model that realizes such an orthogonal encoding of facial shape and expression from video sequences. As second example, we investigated the perception of social interactions from abstract stimuli, similar to the ones by Heider & Simmel (1944), and also from more realistic stimuli. We developed and validated a new generative model for the synthesis of such social interaction, which is based on a modification of human navigation model. We demonstrate that the recognition of such stimuli, including the perception of agency, can be accounted for by a relatively elementary physiologically-inspired hierarchical neural recognition model, that does not require the assumption of sophisticated inference mechanisms, as postulated by some cognitive theories of social recognition. Summarizing, this suggests that essential phenomena in social cognition might be accounted for by a small set of simple neural principles that can be easily implemented by cortical circuits. The developed technologies for stimulus control form the basis of electrophysiological studies that can verify specific neural circuits, as the ones proposed by our theoretical models.

Learning depends on both the learning mechanism and the regularities in the training material, yet most research on human and machine learning focus on the discovering the mechanisms that underlie powerful learning. I will present evidence from our research focusing on the statistical structure of infant visual learning environments. The findings suggest that the statistical structure of those learning environments are not like those used in laboratory experiments on visual learning, in machine learning, or in our adult assumptions about how teach visual categories. The data derive from our use of head cameras and head-mounted eye trackers capturing FOV experiences in the home as well as in simulated home environments in the laboratory. The participants range from 1 month of age to 24 months. The observed statistical structure offers new insights into the developmental foundations of visual object recognition and suggest a computational rethinking of the problem of visual category formation. The observed environmental statistics also have direct implications for understanding the development of cortical visual systems.

Human learners acquire not only disconnected bits of information, but complex interconnected networks of relational knowledge. The capacity for such learning naturally depends on the architecture of the knowledge network itself, and also on the architecture of the computational unit – the brain – that encodes and processes the information. Here, I will discuss emerging work assessing network constraints on the learnability of relational knowledge, and the neural correlates of that learning.

The stream of consciousness refers to ideas, images, and memories that meander across the mind when we are otherwise unoccupied. The standard view is that these thoughts are associationistic in character and they arise from subpersonal processes—we are for the most part passive observers of them. Drawing on a series of laboratory studies we have conducted as well as Buddhist models of mind, I argue that these views are importantly incorrect. On the alternative view I put forward, these thoughts arise from minimal decision processes, which lie in a grey zone: They are both manifestations of agency as well as obstacles to it.