Understanding the neural mechanisms of reward-guided learning is a long-standing goal of computational neuroscience. Recent methodological innovations enable us to collect ever larger neural and behavioral datasets. This presents opportunities to achieve greater understanding of learning in the brain at scale, as well as methodological challenges. In the first part of the talk, I will discuss our recent insights into the mechanisms by which zebra finch songbirds learn to sing. Dopamine has been long thought to guide reward-based trial-and-error learning by encoding reward prediction errors. However, it is unknown whether the learning of natural behaviours, such as developmental vocal learning, occurs through dopamine-based reinforcement. Longitudinal recordings of dopamine and bird songs reveal that dopamine activity is indeed consistent with encoding a reward prediction error during naturalistic learning. In the second part of the talk, I will talk about recent work we are doing at DeepMind to develop tools for automatically discovering interpretable models of behavior directly from animal choice data. Our method, dubbed CogFunSearch, uses LLMs within an evolutionary search process in order to "discover" novel models in the form of Python programs that excel at accurately predicting animal behavior during reward-guided learning. The discovered programs reveal novel patterns of learning and choice behavior that update our understanding of how the brain solves reinforcement learning problems.

Understanding the neural mechanisms of reward-guided learning is a long-standing goal of computational neuroscience. Recent methodological innovations enable us to collect ever larger neural and behavioral datasets. This presents opportunities to achieve greater understanding of learning in the brain at scale, as well as methodological challenges. In the first part of the talk, I will discuss our recent insights into the mechanisms by which zebra finch songbirds learn to sing. Dopamine has been long thought to guide reward-based trial-and-error learning by encoding reward prediction errors. However, it is unknown whether the learning of natural behaviours, such as developmental vocal learning, occurs through dopamine-based reinforcement. Longitudinal recordings of dopamine and bird songs reveal that dopamine activity is indeed consistent with encoding a reward prediction error during naturalistic learning. In the second part of the talk, I will talk about recent work we are doing at DeepMind to develop tools for automatically discovering interpretable models of behavior directly from animal choice data. Our method, dubbed CogFunSearch, uses LLMs within an evolutionary search process in order to "discover" novel models in the form of Python programs that excel at accurately predicting animal behavior during reward-guided learning. The discovered programs reveal novel patterns of learning and choice behavior that update our understanding of how the brain solves reinforcement learning problems.

This webinar addressed computational perspectives on how animals and humans make decisions, spanning normative, descriptive, and mechanistic models. Sam Gershman (Harvard) presented a capacity-limited reinforcement learning framework in which policies are compressed under an information bottleneck constraint. This approach predicts pervasive perseveration, stimulus‐independent “default” actions, and trade-offs between complexity and reward. Such policy compression reconciles observed action stochasticity and response time patterns with an optimal balance between learning capacity and performance. Jonathan Pillow (Princeton) discussed flexible descriptive models for tracking time-varying policies in animals. He introduced dynamic Generalized Linear Models (Sidetrack) and hidden Markov models (GLM-HMMs) that capture day-to-day and trial-to-trial fluctuations in choice behavior, including abrupt switches between “engaged” and “disengaged” states. These models provide new insights into how animals’ strategies evolve under learning. Finally, Kenji Doya (OIST) highlighted the importance of unifying reinforcement learning with Bayesian inference, exploring how cortical-basal ganglia networks might implement model-based and model-free strategies. He also described Japan’s Brain/MINDS 2.0 and Digital Brain initiatives, aiming to integrate multimodal data and computational principles into cohesive “digital brains.”

Contrary to the original normative decision-making standpoint, empirical studies have repeatedly reported that risk preferences are affected by the disclosure of choice outcomes (feedback). Although no consensus has yet emerged regarding the properties and mechanisms of this effect, a widespread and intuitive hypothesis is that repeated feedback affects risk preferences by means of a learning effect, which alters the representation of subjective probabilities. Here, we ran a series of seven experiments (N= 538), tailored to decipher the effects of feedback on risk preferences. Our results indicate that the presence of feedback consistently increases risk-taking, even when the risky option is economically less advantageous. Crucially, risk-taking increases just after the instructions, before participants experience any feedback. These results challenge the learning account, and advocate for a dispositional effect, induced by the mere anticipation of feedback information. Epistemic curiosity and regret avoidance may drive this effect in partial and complete feedback conditions, respectively.

Deep learning provides new data-driven tools to relate neural activity to perception and cognition, aiding scientists in developing theories of neural computation that increasingly resemble biological systems both at the level of behavior and of neural activity. But what in a deep neural network should correspond to what in a biological system? This question is addressed implicitly in the use of comparison measures that relate specific neural or behavioral dimensions via a particular functional form. However, distinct comparison methodologies can give conflicting results in recovering even a known ground-truth model in an idealized setting, leaving open the question of what to conclude from the outcome of a systems comparison using any given methodology. Here, we develop a framework to make explicit and quantitative the effect of both hypothesis-driven aspects—such as details of the architecture of a deep neural network—as well as methodological choices in a systems comparison setting. We demonstrate via the learning dynamics of deep neural networks that, while the role of the comparison methodology is often de-emphasized relative to hypothesis-driven aspects, this choice can impact and even invert the conclusions to be drawn from a comparison between neural systems. We provide evidence that the right way to adjudicate a comparison depends on the use case—the scientific hypothesis under investigation—which could range from identifying single-neuron or circuit-level correspondences to capturing generalizability to new stimulus properties

Perhaps the most impressive aspect of the way the brain enables us to act on the sensory world is its flexibility. We can make a general inference about many sensory features (rating the ripeness of mangoes or avocados) and map a single stimulus onto many choices (slicing or blending mangoes). These can be thought of as flexibly mapping many (features) to one (inference) and one (feature) to many (choices) sensory inputs to actions. Both theoretical and experimental investigations of this sort of flexible sensorimotor mapping tend to treat sensory areas as relatively static. Models typically instantiate flexibility through changing interactions (or weights) between units that encode sensory features and those that plan actions. Experimental investigations often focus on association areas involved in decision-making that show pronounced modulations by cognitive processes. I will present evidence that the flexible formatting of visual information in visual cortex can support both generalized inference and choice mapping. Our results suggest that visual cortex mediates many forms of cognitive flexibility that have traditionally been ascribed to other areas or mechanisms. Further, we find that a primary difference between visual and putative decision areas is not what information they encode, but how that information is formatted in the responses of neural populations, which is related to difference in the impact of causally manipulating different areas on behavior. This scenario allows for flexibility in the mapping between stimuli and behavior while maintaining stability in the information encoded in each area and in the mappings between groups of neurons.

Psychology and neuroscience are increasingly looking to fine-grained analyses of decision-making behaviour, seeking to characterise not just the variation between subjects but also a subject's variability across time. When analysing the behaviour of each subject in a choice task, we ideally want to know not only when the subject has learnt the correct choice rule but also what the subject tried while learning. I introduce a simple but effective Bayesian approach to inferring the probability of different choice strategies at trial resolution. This can be used both for inferring when subjects learn, by tracking the probability of the strategy matching the target rule, and for inferring subjects use of exploratory strategies during learning. Applied to data from rodent and human decision tasks, we find learning occurs earlier and more often than estimated using classical approaches. Around both learning and changes in the rewarded rules the exploratory strategies of win-stay and lose-shift, often considered complementary, are consistently used independently. Indeed, we find the use of lose-shift is strong evidence that animals have latently learnt the salient features of a new rewarded rule. Our approach can be extended to any discrete choice strategy, and its low computational cost is ideally suited for real-time analysis and closed-loop control.

When experts are immersed in a task, a natural assumption is that their brains prioritize task-related activity. Accordingly, most efforts to understand neural activity during well-learned tasks focus on cognitive computations and task-related movements. Surprisingly, we observed that during decision-making, the cortex-wide activity of multiple cell types is dominated by movements, especially “uninstructed movements”, that are spontaneously expressed. These observations argue that animals execute expert decisions while performing richly varied, uninstructed movements that profoundly shape neural activity. To understand the relationship between these movements and decision-making, we examined the movements more closely. We tested whether the magnitude or the timing of the movements was correlated with decision-making performance. To do this, we partitioned movements into two groups: task-aligned movements that were well predicted by task events (such as the onset of the sensory stimulus or choice) and task independent movement (TIM) that occurred independently of task events. TIM had a reliable, inverse correlation with performance in head-restrained mice and freely moving rats. This hinted that the timing of spontaneous movements could indicate periods of disengagement. To confirm this, we compared TIM to the latent behavioral states recovered by a hidden Markov model with Bernoulli generalized linear model observations (GLM-HMM) and found these, again, to be inversely correlated. Finally, we examined the impact of these behavioral states on neural activity. Surprisingly, we found that the same movement impacts neural activity more strongly when animals are disengaged. An intriguing possibility is that these larger movement signals disrupt cognitive computations, leading to poor decision-making performance. Taken together, these observations argue that movements and cognitionare closely intertwined, even during expert decision-making.

Humans and animals are not always rational. They not only rationally exploit rewards but also explore an environment owing to their curiosity. However, the mechanism of such curiosity-driven irrational behavior is largely unknown. Here, we developed a decision-making model for a two-choice task based on the free energy principle, which is a theory integrating recognition and action selection. The model describes irrational behaviors depending on the curiosity level. We also proposed a machine learning method to decode temporal curiosity from behavioral data. By applying it to rat behavioral data, we found that the rat had negative curiosity, reflecting conservative selection sticking to more certain options and that the level of curiosity was upregulated by the expected future information obtained from an uncertain environment. Our decoding approach can be a fundamental tool for identifying the neural basis for reward–curiosity conflicts. Furthermore, it could be effective in diagnosing mental disorders.

Running, swimming, or flying through the world, animals are constantly making decisions while on the move—decisions that allow them to choose where to eat, where to hide, and with whom to associate. Despite this most studies have considered only on the outcome of, and time taken to make, decisions. Motion is, however, crucial in terms of how space is represented by organisms during spatial decision-making. Employing a range of new technologies, including automated tracking, computational reconstruction of sensory information, and immersive ‘holographic’ virtual reality (VR) for animals, experiments with fruit flies, locusts and zebrafish (representing aerial, terrestrial and aquatic locomotion, respectively), I will demonstrate that this time-varying representation results in the emergence of new and fundamental geometric principles that considerably impact decision-making. Specifically, we find that the brain spontaneously reduces multi-choice decisions into a series of abrupt (‘critical’) binary decisions in space-time, a process that repeats until only one option—the one ultimately selected by the individual—remains. Due to the critical nature of these transitions (and the corresponding increase in ‘susceptibility’) even noisy brains are extremely sensitive to very small differences between remaining options (e.g., a very small difference in neuronal activity being in “favor” of one option) near these locations in space-time. This mechanism facilitates highly effective decision-making, and is shown to be robust both to the number of options available, and to context, such as whether options are static (e.g. refuges) or mobile (e.g. other animals). In addition, we find evidence that the same geometric principles of decision-making occur across scales of biological organisation, from neural dynamics to animal collectives, suggesting they are fundamental features of spatiotemporal computation.

Theories from reinforcement learning have been highly influential for interpreting neural activity in the biological circuits critical for animal and human learning. Central among these is the identification of phasic activity in dopamine neurons as a reward prediction error signal that drives learning in basal ganglia and prefrontal circuits. However, recent findings suggest that dopaminergic prediction error signals have access to complex, structured reward predictions and are sensitive to more properties of outcomes than learning theories with simple scalar value predictions might suggest. Here, I will present recent work in which we probed the identity-specific structure of reward prediction errors in an odor-guided choice task and found evidence for multiple predictive “threads” that segregate reward predictions, and reward prediction errors, according to the specific sensory features of anticipated outcomes. Our results point to an expanded class of neural reinforcement learning algorithms in which biological agents learn rich associative structure from their environment and leverage it to build reward predictions that include information about the specific, and perhaps idiosyncratic, features of available outcomes, using these to guide behavior in even quite simple reward learning tasks.

Voluntary actions are actions that agents choose to make. Volition is the set of cognitive processes that implement such choice and initiation. These processes are often held essential to modern societies, because they form the cognitive underpinning for concepts of individual autonomy and individual responsibility. Nevertheless, psychology and neuroscience have struggled to define volition, and have also struggled to study it scientifically. Laboratory experiments on volition, such as those of Libet, have been criticised, often rather naively, as focussing exclusively on meaningless actions, and ignoring the factors that make voluntary action important in the wider world. In this talk, I will first review these criticisms, and then look at extending scientific approaches to volition in three directions that may enrich scientific understanding of volition. First, volition becomes particularly important when the range of possible actions is large and unconstrained - yet most experimental paradigms involve minimal response spaces. We have developed a novel paradigm for eliciting de novo actions through verbal fluency, and used this to estimate the elusive conscious experience of generativity. Second, volition can be viewed as a mechanism for flexibility, by promoting adaptation of behavioural biases. This view departs from the tradition of defining volition by contrasting internally-generated actions with externally-triggered actions, and instead links volition to model-based reinforcement learning. By using the context of competitive games to re-operationalise the classic Libet experiment, we identified a form of adaptive autonomy that allows agents to reduce biases in their action choices. Interestingly, this mechanism seems not to require explicit understanding and strategic use of action selection rules, in contrast to classical ideas about the relation between volition and conscious, rational thought. Third, I will consider volition teleologically, as a mechanism for achieving counterfactual goals through complex problem-solving. This perspective gives a key role in mediating between understanding and planning on the one hand, and instrumental action on the other hand. Taken together, these three cognitive phenomena of generativity, flexibility, and teleology may partly explain why volition is such an important cognitive function for organisation of human behaviour and human flourishing. I will end by discussing how this enriched view of volition can relate to individual autonomy and responsibility.

Metacognition has long been defined as “cognition about cognition”. One of its aspects is the error monitoring ability, which includes being aware of one’s own errors without external feedback. This ability is mostly investigated in two-alternative forced choice tasks, where the performance has all or none nature in terms of accuracy. The previous literature documents the effect of different influences on the error monitoring ability, such as working memory, feedback and sensorimotor involvement. However, these demonstrations fall short of generalizing to the real life scenarios where the errors often have a magnitude and a direction. To bridge this gap, recent studies showed that humans could keep track of the magnitude and the direction of their errors in temporal, spatial and numerical domains in two metrics: confidence and short-long/few-more judgements. This talk will cover how the documented effects that are obtained in the two alternative forced choices tasks apply to the temporal error monitoring ability. Finally, how magnitude and direction monitoring (i.e., confidence and short-long judgements) can be differentiated as the two indices of temporal error monitoring ability will be discussed.

The ‘quantification’ of perception is arguably both one of the most important and most difficult aspects of perception study. This is particularly true in visual perception, in which the evaluation of the perceptual threshold is a pillar of the experimental process. The choice of the correct adaptive psychometric procedure, as well as the selection of the proper parameters, is a difficult but key aspect of the experimental protocol. For instance, Bayesian methods such as QUEST, require the a priori choice of a family of functions (e.g. Gaussian), which is rarely known before the experiment, as well as the specification of multiple parameters. Importantly, the choice of an ill-fitted function or parameters will induce costly mistakes and errors in the experimental process. In this talk we discuss the existing methods and introduce a new adaptive procedure to solve this problem, named, ZOOM (Zooming Optimistic Optimization of Models), based on recent advances in optimization and statistical learning. Compared to existing approaches, ZOOM is completely parameter free and model-free, i.e. can be applied on any arbitrary psychometric problem. Moreover, ZOOM parameters are self-tuned, thus do not need to be manually chosen using heuristics (eg. step size in the Staircase method), preventing further errors. Finally, ZOOM is based on state-of-the-art optimization theory, providing strong mathematical guarantees that are missing from many of its alternatives, while being the most accurate and robust in real life conditions. In our experiments and simulations, ZOOM was found to be significantly better than its alternative, in particular for difficult psychometric functions or when the parameters when not properly chosen. ZOOM is open source, and its implementation is freely available on the web. Given these advantages and its ease of use, we argue that ZOOM can improve the process of many psychophysics experiments.

Can nonhuman animals perceive the relation-between-relations? This intriguing question has been studied over the last 40 years; nonetheless, the extent to which nonhuman species can do so remains controversial. Here, I review empirical evidence suggesting that pigeons, parrots, crows, and baboons join humans in reliably acquiring and transferring relational matching-to-sample (RMTS). Many theorists consider that RMTS captures the essence of analogy, because basic to analogy is appreciating the ‘relation between relations.’ Factors affecting RMTS performance include: prior training experience, the entropy of the sample stimulus, and whether the items that serve as sample stimuli can also serve as choice stimuli.

Gut-derived signals regulate metabolism, appetite, and behaviors important for mental health. We have performed a large-scale multidimensional screen to identify gut hormones and nutrient-sensing mechanisms in the intestine that regulate metabolism and behavior in the fruit fly Drosophila. We identified several gut hormones that affect fecundity, stress responses, metabolism, feeding, and sleep behaviors, many of which seem to act sex-specifically. We show that in response to nutrient intake, the enteroendocrine cells (EECs) of the adult Drosophila midgut release hormones that act via inter-organ relays to coordinate metabolism and feeding decisions. These findings suggest that crosstalk between the gut and other tissues regulates food choice according to metabolic needs, providing insight into how that intestine processes nutritional inputs and into the gut-derived signals that relay information regulating nutrient-specific hungers to maintain metabolic homeostasis.

It is critical for all animals to make appropriate, but also flexible, foraging decisions, especially when facing starvation. Sensing olfactory information is essential to evaluate food quality before ingestion. Previously, we found that <i>Drosophila</i> larvae switch their response to certain odors from aversion to attraction when food deprived. The neural mechanism underlying this switch in behavior involves serotonergic modulation and reconfiguration of odor processing in the early olfactory sensory system. We now investigate if a change in hunger state also influences other behavioral decisions. Since it had been shown that fly larvae can perform cannibalism, we investigate the effect of food deprivation on feeding on dead conspecifics. We find that fed fly larvae rarely use dead conspecifics as a food source. However, food deprivation largely enhances this behavior. We will now also investigate the underlying neural mechanisms that mediate this enhancement and compare it to the already described mechanism for a switch in olfactory choice behavior. Generally, this flexibility in foraging behavior enables the larva to explore a broader range of stimuli and to expand their feeding choices to overcome starvation.

Clinical assessment of consciousness is a significant issue, with recent research suggesting some brain-damaged patients who are assessed as unconscious are in fact conscious. Misdiagnosis of consciousness can also be detrimental when it comes to general anaesthesia, causing numerous psychological problems, including post-traumatic stress disorder. Avoiding awareness with overdose of anaesthetics, however, can also lead to cognitive impairment. Currently available objective assessment of consciousness is limited in accuracy or requires expensive equipment with major barriers to translation. In this talk, we will outline our recent theory-guided and data-driven approaches to develop new, optimized consciousness measures that will be robustly evaluated on an unprecedented breadth of high-quality neural data, recorded from the fly model system. We will overcome the subjective-choice problem in data-driven and theory-guided approaches with a comprehensive data analytic framework, which has never been applied to consciousness detection, integrating previously disconnected streams of research in consciousness detection to accelerate the translation of objective consciousness measures into clinical settings.

Fly Escape Behaviors: Flexible and Modular We have identified a set of escape maneuvers performed by a fly when confronted by a looming object. These escape responses can be divided into distinct behavioral modules. Some of the modules are very stereotyped, as when the fly rapidly extends its middle legs to jump off the ground. Other modules are more complex and require the fly to combine information about both the location of the threat and its own body posture. In response to an approaching object, a fly chooses some varying subset of these behaviors to perform. We would like to understand the neural process by which a fly chooses when to perform a given escape behavior. Beyond an appealing set of behaviors, this system has two other distinct advantages for probing neural circuitry. First, the fly will perform escape behaviors even when tethered such that its head is fixed and neural activity can be imaged or monitored using electrophysiology. Second, using Drosophila as an experimental animal makes available a rich suite of genetic tools to activate, silence, or image small numbers of cells potentially involved in the behaviors. Neural Circuits for Escape Until recently, visually induced escape responses have been considered a hardwired reflex in Drosophila. White-eyed flies with deficient visual pigment will perform a stereotyped middle-leg jump in response to a light-off stimulus, and this reflexive response is known to be coordinated by the well-studied giant fiber (GF) pathway. The GFs are a pair of electrically connected, large-diameter interneurons that traverse the cervical connective. A single GF spike results in a stereotyped pattern of muscle potentials on both sides of the body that extends the fly's middle pair of legs and starts the flight motor. Recently, we have found that a fly escaping a looming object displays many more behaviors than just leg extension. Most of these behaviors could not possibly be coordinated by the known anatomy of the GF pathway. Response to a looming threat thus appears to involve activation of numerous different neural pathways, which the fly may decide if and when to employ. Our goal is to identify the descending pathways involved in coordinating these escape behaviors as well as the central brain circuits, if any, that govern their activation. Automated Single-Fly Screening We have developed a new kind of high-throughput genetic screen to automatically capture fly escape sequences and quantify individual behaviors. We use this system to perform a high-throughput genetic silencing screen to identify cell types of interest. Automation permits analysis at the level of individual fly movements, while retaining the capacity to screen through thousands of GAL4 promoter lines. Single-fly behavioral analysis is essential to detect more subtle changes in behavior during the silencing screen, and thus to identify more specific components of the contributing circuits than previously possible when screening populations of flies. Our goal is to identify candidate neurons involved in coordination and choice of escape behaviors. Measuring Neural Activity During Behavior We use whole-cell patch-clamp electrophysiology to determine the functional roles of any identified candidate neurons. Flies perform escape behaviors even when their head and thorax are immobilized for physiological recording. This allows us to link a neuron's responses directly to an action.

Precise synaptic connectivity is a prerequisite for the function of neural circuits, yet individual neurons, taken out of their developmental context, readily form unspecific synapses. How does genetically encoded brain wiring deal with this apparent contradiction? Brain wiring is a developmental growth process that is not only characterized by precision, but also flexibility and robustness. As in any other growth process, cellular interactions are restricted in space and time. Correspondingly, molecular and cellular interactions are restricted to those that 'get to see' each other during development. This seminar will explore the question how neurons decide when and where to make synapses using the Drosophila visual system as a model. New findings reveal that pattern formation during growth and the kinetics of live neuronal interactions restrict synapse formation and partner choice for neurons that are not otherwise prevented from making incorrect synapses in this system. For example, cell biological mechanisms like autophagy as well as developmental temperature restrict inappropriate partner choice through a process of kinetic exclusion that critically contributes to wiring specificity. The seminar will explore these and other neuronal strategies when and where to make synapses during developmental growth that contribute to precise, flexible and robust outcomes in brain wiring.

While most experimental tasks aim at isolating simple cognitive processes to study their neural bases, naturalistic behaviour is often complex and multidimensional. I will present two studies revealing previously uncharacterised neural circuits for decision-making in macaques. This was possible thanks to innovative experimental tasks eliciting sophisticated behaviour, bridging the human and non-human primate research traditions. Firstly, I will describe a specialised medial frontal circuit for novel choice in macaques. Traditionally, monkeys receive extensive training before neural data can be acquired, while a hallmark of human cognition is the ability to act in novel situations. I will show how this medial frontal circuit can combine the values of multiple attributes for each available novel item on-the-fly to enable efficient novel choices. This integration process is associated with a hexagonal symmetry pattern in the BOLD response, consistent with a grid-like representation of the space of all available options. We prove the causal role played by this circuit by showing that focussed transcranial ultrasound neuromodulation impairs optimal choice based on attribute integration and forces the subjects to default to a simpler heuristic decision strategy. Secondly, I will present an ongoing project addressing the neural mechanisms driving behaviour shifts during an evidence accumulation task that requires subjects to trade speed for accuracy. While perceptual decision-making in general has been thoroughly studied, both cognitively and neurally, the reasons why speed and/or accuracy are adjusted, and the associated neural mechanisms, have received little attention. We describe two orthogonal dimensions in which behaviour can vary (traditional speed-accuracy trade-off and efficiency) and we uncover independent neural circuits concerned with changes in strategy and fluctuations in the engagement level. The former involves the frontopolar cortex, while the latter is associated with the insula and a network of subcortical structures including the habenula.

Humans and other animals make decisions in order to satisfy their goals. However, it remains unknown how neural circuits compute which of multiple possible goals should be pursued (e.g., when balancing hunger and thirst) and how to combine these signals with estimates of available reward alternatives. Here, humans undergoing fMRI accumulated two distinct assets over a sequence of trials. Financial outcomes depended on the minimum cumulate of either asset, creating a need to maintain “value equilibrium” by redressing any imbalance among the assets. Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signals in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) tracked the level of imbalance among goals, whereas the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) signaled the level of redress incurred by a choice rather than the overall amount received. These results suggest that a network of medial frontal brain regions compute a value signal that maintains value equilibrium among internal goals.

International organizations, governments and companies are increasingly committed to developing measures that encourage adoption of sustainable consumption patterns among the population. However, their success requires a deep understanding of the everyday purchasing decision process and the elements that shape it. Price is an element that stands out. Prior research concluded that the influence of price on purchase decisions varies across consumer profiles. Yet no consumer behavior study to date has assessed the differences of price processing among consumers adopting sustainable habits (prosocial) as opposed to those who have not (non-prosocial). This is the first study to resort to neuroimaging tools to explore the underlying neural mechanisms that reveal the effect of price on prosocial and non-prosocial consumers. Self-reported findings indicate that prosocial consumers place greater value on collective costs and benefits while non-prosocial consumers place a greater weight on price. The neural data gleaned from this analysis offers certain explanations as to the origin of the differences. Non-prosocial (vs. prosocial) consumers, in fact, exhibit a greater activation in brain areas involved with reward, valuation and choice when evaluating price information. These findings could steer managers to improve market segmentation and assist institutions in their design of campaigns fostering environmentally sustainable behaviors

Executing memory-guided behavior requires storage of information about experience and later recall of that information to inform choices. Awake hippocampal replay, when hippocampal neural ensembles briefly reactivate a representation related to prior experience, has been proposed to critically contribute to these memory-related processes. However, it remains unclear whether awake replay contributes to memory function by promoting the storage of past experiences, facilitating planning based on evaluation of those experiences, or both. We designed a dynamic spatial task that promotes replay before a memory-based choice and assessed how the content of replay related to past and future behavior. We found that replay content was decoupled from subsequent choice and instead was enriched for representations of previously rewarded locations and places that had not been visited recently, indicating a role in memory storage rather than in directly guiding subsequent behavior.

Inhibitory neurons take on many forms and functions. How this diversity contributes to memory function is not completely known. Previous formal studies indicate inhibition differentiated by local and global connectivity in associative memory networks functions to rescale the level of retrieval of excitatory assemblies. However, such studies lack biological details such as a distinction between types of neurons (excitatory and inhibitory), unrealistic connection schemas, and non-sparse assemblies. In this study, we present a rate-based cortical model where neurons are distinguished (as excitatory, local inhibitory, or global inhibitory), connected more realistically, and where memory items correspond to sparse excitatory assemblies. We use this model to study how local-global inhibition balance can alter memory retrieval in associative memory structures, including naturalistic and artificial structures. Experimental studies have reported inhibitory neurons and their sub-types uniquely respond to specific stimuli and can form sophisticated, joint excitatory-inhibitory assemblies. Our model suggests such joint assemblies, as well as a distribution and rebalancing of overall inhibition between two inhibitory sub-populations – one connected to excitatory assemblies locally and the other connected globally – can quadruple the range of retrieval across related memories. We identify a possible functional role for local-global inhibitory balance to, in the context of choice or preference of relationships, permit and maintain a broader range of memory items when local inhibition is dominant and conversely consolidate and strengthen a smaller range of memory items when global inhibition is dominant. This model therefore highlights a biologically-plausible and behaviourally-useful function of inhibitory diversity in memory.

Error monitoring refers to the ability to monitor one's own task performance without explicit feedback. This ability is studied typically in two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) paradigms. Recent research showed that humans can also keep track of the magnitude and direction of errors in different magnitude domains (e.g., numerosity, duration, length). Based on the evidence that suggests a shared mechanism for magnitude representations, we aimed to investigate whether metric error monitoring ability is commonly governed across different magnitude domains. Participants reproduced/estimated temporal, numerical, and spatial magnitudes after which they rated their confidence regarding first order task performance and judged the direction of their reproduction/estimation errors. Participants were also tested in a 2AFC perceptual decision task and provided confidence ratings regarding their decisions. Results showed that variability in reproductions/estimations and metric error monitoring ability, as measured by combining confidence and error direction judgements, were positively related across temporal, spatial, and numerical domains. Metacognitive sensitivity in these metric domains was also positively associated with each other but not with metacognitive sensitivity in the 2AFC perceptual decision task. In conclusion, the current findings point at a general metric error monitoring ability that is shared across different metric domains with limited generalizability to perceptual decision-making.

In a famous philosophical paradox, Buridan's ass perishes because he is equally hungry and thirsty, and cannot make up his mind whether to first drink or eat. We are faced daily with the need to pick between alternatives that are equally attractive (or not) to us. What are the processes that allow us to avoid paralysis and to rapidly select between such equal options when there are no preferences or rational reasons to rely on? One solution that was offered is that although on a higher cognitive level there is symmetry between the alternatives, on a neuronal level the symmetry does not maintain. What is the nature of this asymmetry of the neuronal level? In this talk I will present experiments addressing this important phenomenon using measures of human behavior, EEG, EMG and large scale neural network modeling, and discuss mechanisms involved in the process of intention formation and execution, in the face of alternatives to choose from. Specifically, I will show results revealing the temporal dynamics of rapid intention formation and, moreover, ‘change of intention’ in a free choice picking scenario, in which the alternatives are on a par for the participant. The results suggest that even in arbitrary choices, endogenous or exogenous biases that are present in the neural system for selecting one or another option may be implicitly overruled; thus creating an implicit and non-conscious ‘change of mind’. Finally, the question is raised: in what way do such rapid implicit ‘changes of mind’ help retain one’s self-control and free-will behavior?

In decision-making under risk (DMR) participants' choices are based on probability values systematically different from those that are objectively correct. Similar systematic distortions are found in tasks involving relative frequency judgments (JRF). These distortions limit performance in a wide variety of tasks and an evident question is, why do we systematically fail in our use of probability and relative frequency information? We propose a Bounded Log-Odds Model (BLO) of probability and relative frequency distortion based on three assumptions: (1) log-odds: probability and relative frequency are mapped to an internal log-odds scale, (2) boundedness: the range of representations of probability and relative frequency are bounded and the bounds change dynamically with task, and (3) variance compensation: the mapping compensates in part for uncertainty in probability and relative frequency values. We compared human performance in both DMR and JRF tasks to the predictions of the BLO model as well as eleven alternative models each missing one or more of the underlying BLO assumptions (factorial model comparison). The BLO model and its assumptions proved to be superior to any of the alternatives. In a separate analysis, we found that BLO accounts for individual participants’ data better than any previous model in the DMR literature. We also found that, subject to the boundedness limitation, participants’ choice of distortion approximately maximized the mutual information between objective task-relevant values and internal values, a form of bounded rationality.

It is clear that the cause of obesity is a result of eating more than you burn. It is physics. What is more complex to answer is why some people eat more than others? Differences in our genetic make-up mean some of us are slightly more hungry all the time and so eat more than others. We now know that the genetics of body-weight, on which obesity sits on one end of the spectrum, is in actuality the genetics of appetite control. In contrast to the prevailing view, body-weight is not a choice. People who are obese are not bad or lazy; rather, they are fighting their biology.

International organizations, governments and companies are increasingly committed to developing measures that encourage adoption of sustainable consumption patterns among the population. However, their success requires a deep understanding of the everyday purchasing decision process and the elements that shape it. Price is an element that stands out. Prior research concluded that the influence of price on purchase decisions varies across consumer profiles. Yet no consumer behavior study to date has assessed the differences of price processing among consumers adopting sustainable habits (prosocial) as opposed to those who have not (non-prosocial). This is the first study to resort to neuroimaging tools to explore the underlying neural mechanisms that reveal the effect of price on prosocial and non-prosocial consumers. Self-reported findings indicate that prosocial consumers place greater value on collective costs and benefits while non-prosocial consumers place a greater weight on price. The neural data gleaned from this analysis offers certain explanations as to the origin of the differences. Non-prosocial (vs. prosocial) consumers, in fact, exhibit a greater activation in brain areas involved with reward, valuation and choice when evaluating price information. These findings could steer managers to improve market segmentation and assist institutions in their design of campaigns fostering environmentally sustainable behaviors

Choosing among spatially distributed options is a central challenge for animals, from deciding among alternative potential food sources or refuges, to choosing with whom to associate. Here, using an integrated theoretical and experimental approach (employing immersive Virtual Reality), with both invertebrate and vertebrate models—the fruit fly, desert locust and zebrafish—we consider the recursive interplay between movement and collective vectorial integration in the brain during decision-making regarding options (potential ‘targets’) in space. We reveal that the brain repeatedly breaks multi-choice decisions into a series of abrupt (critical) binary decisions in space-time where organisms switch, spontaneously, from averaging vectorial information among, to suddenly excluding one of, the remaining options. This bifurcation process repeats until only one option—the one ultimately selected—remains. Close to each bifurcation the ‘susceptibility’ of the system exhibits a sharp increase, inevitably causing small differences among the remaining options to become amplified; a property that both comes ‘for free’ and is highly desirable for decision-making. This mechanism facilitates highly effective decision-making, and is shown to be robust both to the number of options available, and to context, such as whether options are static (e.g. refuges) or mobile (e.g. other animals). In addition, we find evidence that the same geometric principles of decision-making occur across scales of biological organisation, from neural dynamics to animal collectives, suggesting they are fundamental features of spatiotemporal computation.

In an ever-changing environment, uncertainty is omnipresent. To deal with this, organisms have evolved mechanisms that allow them to take advantage of environmental regularities in order to make decisions robustly and adjust their behavior efficiently, thus maximizing their chances of survival. In this talk, I will present behavioral evidence that animals perform model-based state inference to predict environmental state changes and adjust their behavior rapidly, rather than slowly updating choice values. This model-based inference process can be described using Bayesian change-point models. Furthermore, I will show that neural populations in the prefrontal cortex accurately predict behavioral switches, and that the activity of these populations is associated with Bayesian estimates. In addition, we will see that learning leads to the emergence of a high-dimensional representational subspace that can be reused when the animals re-learn a previously learned set of action-value associations. Altogether, these findings highlight the role of the PFC in representing a belief about the current state of the world.

Many animals are highly visual. They view their world through photoreceptors sensitive to different wavelengths of light. Animal survival and optimal behavioral performance may select for varying photoreceptor sensitivities depending on animal habitat or visual tasks. Our goal is to understand what drives visual diversity from both an evolutionary and molecular perspective. The group of more than 2000 cichlid fish species are an ideal system for examining such diversity. Cichlid are a colorful group of fresh water fishes. They have undergone adaptive radiation throughout Africa and the new world and occur in rivers and lakes that vary in water clarity. They are also behaviorally complex, having diverse behaviors for foraging, mate choice and even parental care. As a result, cichlids have highly diverse visual systems with cone sensitivities shifting by 30-90 nm between species. Although this group has seven cone opsin genes, individual species differ in which subset of the cone opsins they express. Some species show developmental shifts in opsin expression, switching from shorter to longer wavelength opsins through ontogeny. Other species modify that developmental program to express just one of the sets, causing the large sensitivity differences. Cichlids are therefore natural mutants for opsin expression. We have used cichlid diversity to explore the relationship between visual sensitivities and ecology. We have also exploited the genomic power of the cichlid system to identify genes and mutations that cause opsin expression shifts. Ultimately, our goal is to learn how different cichlid species see the world and whether differences matter. Behavioral experiments suggest they do indeed use color vision to survive and thrive. Cichlids therefore are a unique model for exploring how visual systems evolve in a changing world.

COVID-19 non-pharmaceutical intervention (NPI) policies have been one of the most important and contentious decisions of our time. Beyond even the "normal" inherent difficulties in impact evaluation with observational data, COVID-19 NPI policy evaluation is complicated by additional challenges related to infectious disease dynamics and lags, lack of direct observation of key outcomes, and a multiplicity of interventions occurring on an accelerated time scale. Randomized controlled trials also suffer from what is feasible and ethical to randomize as well as the sheer scale, scope, time, and resources required for an NPI trial to be informative (or at least not misinformative). In this talk, Dr. Haber will discuss the challenges in generating useful evidence for COVID-19 NPIs, the landscape of the literature, and highlight key controversies in several high profile studies over the course of the pandemic. Chasing after unknowables poses major problems for the metascience/replicability movement, institutional research science, and decision makers. If the only choices for informing an important topic are "weak study design" vs "do nothing," when is "do nothing" the best choice?

Motivational drives are internal states that can be different even in similar interactions with external stimuli. Curiosity as the motivational drive for novelty-seeking and investigating the surrounding environment is for survival as essential and intrinsic as hunger. Curiosity, hunger, and appetitive aggression drive three different goal-directed behaviors—novelty seeking, food eating, and hunting— but these behaviors are composed of similar actions in animals. This similarity of actions has made it challenging to study novelty seeking and distinguish it from eating and hunting in nonarticulating animals. The brain mechanisms underlying this basic survival drive, curiosity, and novelty-seeking behavior have remained unclear. In spite of having well-developed techniques to study mouse brain circuits, there are many controversial and different results in the field of motivational behavior. This has left the functions of motivational brain regions such as the zona incerta (ZI) still uncertain. Not having a transparent, nonreinforced, and easily replicable paradigm is one of the main causes of this uncertainty. Therefore, we chose a simple solution to conduct our research: giving the mouse freedom to choose what it wants—double freeaccess choice. By examining mice in an experimental battery of object free-access double-choice (FADC) and social interaction tests—using optogenetics, chemogenetics, calcium fiber photometry, multichannel recording electrophysiology, and multicolor mRNA in situ hybridization—we uncovered a cell type–specific cortico-subcortical brain circuit of the curiosity and novelty-seeking behavior. We found in mice that inhibitory neurons in the medial ZI (ZIm) are essential for the decision to investigate an object or a conspecific. These neurons receive excitatory input from the prelimbic cortex to signal the initiation of exploration. This signal is modulated in the ZIm by the level of investigatory motivation. Increased activity in the ZIm instigates deep investigative action by inhibiting the periaqueductal gray region. A subpopulation of inhibitory ZIm neurons expressing tachykinin 1 (TAC1) modulates the investigatory behavior.

Previous work with complex memory span tasks, in which simple choice decisions are imposed between presentations of to-be-remembered items, shows that these secondary tasks reduce memory span. It is less clear how reconfiguring and maintaining various amounts of information affects decision speeds. We documented and replicated a non-linear effect of accumulating memory items on concurrent processing judgments, showing that this pattern could be made linear by introducing "lead-in" processing judgments prior to the start of the memory list. With lead-in judgments, there was a large and consistent cost to processing response times with the introduction of the first item in the memory list, which increased gradually per item as the list accumulated. However, once presentation of the list was complete, decision responses sped rapidly: within a few seconds, decisions were at least as fast as when remembering a single item. This pattern of findings is inconsistent with the idea that merely holding information in mind conflicts with attention-demanding decision tasks. Instead, it is possible that reconfiguring memory items for responding provokes conflict between memory and processing in complex span tasks.

Our research investigates how processes of attention, visual working memory (VWM), and decision-making combine to translate perception into action. Within this framework, the role of VWM is to form stable representations of transient stimulus events that allow them to be identified by a decision process, which we model as a diffusion process. In psychophysical tasks, we find the capacity of VWM is well defined by a sample-size model, which attributes changes in VWM precision with set-size to differences in the number evidence samples recruited to represent stimuli. In the first part of the talk, I review evidence for the sample-size model and highlight the model's strengths: It provides a parameter-free characterization of the set-size effect; it has plausible neural and cognitive interpretations; an attention-weighted version of the model accounts for the power-law of VWM, and it accounts for the selective updating of VWM in multiple-look experiments. In the second part of the talk, I provide a characterization of the theoretical relationship between two-choice and continuous-outcome decision tasks using the circular diffusion model, highlighting their common features. I describe recent work characterizing the joint distributions of decision outcomes and response times in continuous-outcome tasks using the circular diffusion model and show that the model can clearly distinguish variable-precision and simple mixture models of the evidence entering the decision process. The ability to distinguish these kinds of processes is central to current VWM studies.

The neurobiology of decision-making is informed by neurons capable of representing information over time scales of seconds. Such neurons were initially characterized in studies of spatial working memory, motor planning (e.g., Richard Andersen lab) and spatial attention. For decision-making, such neurons emit graded spike rates, that represent the accumulated evidence for or against a choice. They establish the conduit between the formation of the decision and its completion, usually in the form of a commitment to an action, even if provisional. Indeed, many decisions appear to arise through an accumulation of noisy samples of evidence to a terminating threshold, or bound. Previous studies show that single neurons in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) represent the accumulation of evidence when monkeys make decisions about the direction of random dot motion (RDM) and express their decision with a saccade to the neuron’s preferred target. The mechanism of termination (the bound) is elusive. LIP is interconnected with other brain regions that also display decision-related activity. Whether these areas play roles in the decision process that are similar to or fundamentally different from that of LIP is unclear. I will present new unpublished experiments that begin to resolve these issues by recording from populations of neurons simultaneously in LIP and one of its primary targets, the superior colliculus (SC), while monkeys make difficult perceptual decisions.

Several studies have showed that face stimuli elicit extremely fast and involuntary saccadic responses toward them, relative to other categories of visual stimuli. In the talk, I will mainly focus on a quite recent research done in our team that investigated to what extent face stimuli influence the programming and execution of saccades. In this research, two experiments were performed using a saccadic choice task: two images (one with a face, one with a vehicle) were simultaneously displayed in the left and right visual fields of participants who had to execute a saccade toward the image (Experiment 1) or toward a cross added in the center of the image (Experiment 2) containing a target stimulus (a face or a vehicle). As expected participants were faster to execute a saccade toward a face than toward a vehicle and did less errors. We also observed shorter saccades toward vehicle than face targets, even if participants were explicitly asked to perform their saccades toward a specific location (Experiment 2). Further analyses, that I will detailed in the talk, showed that error saccades might be interrupted in mid-fight to initiate a concurrently programmed corrective saccade.

The ability to recognize someone’s voice spans a broad spectrum with phonagnosia on the low end and super recognition at the high end. Yet there is no standardized test to measure the individual ability to learn and recognize newly-learnt voices with samples of speech-like phonetic variability. We have developed the Jena Voice Learning and Memory Test (JVLMT), a 20 min-test based on item response theory and applicable across different languages. The JVLMT consists of three phases in which participants are familiarized with eight speakers in two stages and then perform a three-alternative forced choice recognition task, using pseudo sentences devoid of semantic content. Acoustic (dis)similarity analyses were used to create items with different levels of difficulty. Test scores are based on 22 Rasch-conform items. Items were selected and validated in online studies based on 232 and 454 participants, respectively. Mean accuracy is 0.51 with an SD of .18. The JVLMT showed high and moderate correlations with convergent validation tests (Bangor Voice Matching Test; Glasgow Voice Memory Test) and a weak correlation with a discriminant validation test (Digit Span). Empirical (marginal) reliability is 0.66. Four participants with super recognition (at least 2 SDs above the mean) and 7 participants with phonagnosia (at least 2 SDs below the mean) were identified. The JVLMT is a promising screen too for voice recognition abilities in a scientific and neuropsychological context.

Long-range projections link distant circuits in the brain, allowing efficient transfer of information between regions and synchronization of distributed patterns of neural activity. Understanding the functional roles of defined neuronal projection pathways requires temporally precise manipulation of their activity, and optogenetic tools appear to be an obvious choice for such experiments. However, we and others have previously shown that commonly-used inhibitory optogenetic tools have low efficacy and off-target effects when applied to presynaptic terminals. In my talk, I will present a new solution to this problem: a targeting-enhanced mosquito homologue of the vertebrate encephalopsin (eOPN3), which upon activation can effectively suppress synaptic transmission through the Gi/o signaling pathway. Brief illumination of presynaptic terminals expressing eOPN3 triggers a lasting suppression of synaptic output that recovers spontaneously within minutes in vitro and in vivo. The efficacy of eOPN3 in suppressing presynaptic release opens new avenues for functional interrogation of long-range neuronal circuits in vivo.