The critical brain hypothesis states that the brain can benefit from operating close to a second-order phase transition. While it has been shown that several computational aspects of sensory information processing (e.g., sensitivity to input) are optimal in this regime, it is still unclear whether these computational benefits of criticality can be leveraged by neural systems performing behaviorally relevant computations. To address this question, we investigate signatures of criticality in networks optimized to perform efficient encoding. We consider a network of leaky integrate-and-fire neurons with synaptic transmission delays and input noise. Previously, it was shown that the performance of such networks varies non-monotonically with the noise amplitude. Interestingly, we find that in the vicinity of the optimal noise level for efficient coding, the network dynamics exhibits signatures of criticality, namely, the distribution of avalanche sizes follows a power law. When the noise amplitude is too low or too high for efficient coding, the network appears either super-critical or sub-critical, respectively. This result suggests that two influential, and previously disparate theories of neural processing optimization—efficient coding, and criticality—may be intimately related

In this talk I will present an account of how an agent designed or evolved to be intelligent may come to enjoy subjective experiences. First, the agent is stipulated to be capable of (meta)representing subjective ‘qualitative’ sensory information, in the sense that it can easily assess how exactly similar a sensory signal is to all other possible sensory signals. This information is subjective in the sense that it concerns how the different stimuli can be distinguished by the agent itself, rather than how physically similar they are. For this to happen, sensory coding needs to satisfy sparsity and smoothness constraints, which are known to facilitate metacognition and generalization. Second, this qualitative information can under some specific circumstances acquire an ‘assertoric force’. This happens when a certain self-monitoring mechanism decides that the qualitative information reliably tracks the current state of the world, and informs a general symbolic reasoning system of this fact. I will argue that the having of subjective conscious experiences amounts to nothing more than having qualitative sensory information acquiring an assertoric status within one’s belief system. When this happens, the perceptual content presents itself as reflecting the state of the world right now, in ways that seem undeniably rational to the agent. At the same time, without effort, the agent also knows what the perceptual content is like, in terms of how subjectively similar it is to all other possible precepts. I will discuss the computational benefits of this architecture, for which consciousness might have arisen as a byproduct.