The PhD project is focused on identifying the role of conscious perception through a neuroimaging and computational investigation. The project aims to characterise the neural correlates that support the formation of episodic memories and explain these findings with the Simultaneous Type/ Serial Token (STST) model, a neural network model of temporal attention. The project is competition-funded under the Midlands Integrative Biosciences Training Partnership, supported by the UK Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council.

Two postdoctoral research positions and three PhD positions are available at the Sussex Centre for Consciousness Science (SCCS). The postdoc positions are funded for 2 years with a possible extension for another 2, starting as soon as suitable candidates are identified. The PhD positions are fully funded for 3.5 years, starting in September 2024, with an earlier start being negotiable. The ERC-funded positions will focus on computational (neuro)phenomenology, exploring different applications of a predictive processing view of conscious perception. One of the ERC PhD positions will specifically focus on perceptual diversity, analyzing and extending the Perception Census project. The SCCS PhD position is flexible regarding project focus and supervisor, inviting proposals with a computational/informatics element.

Two postdoctoral research positions and three PhD positions are now available at the Sussex Centre for Consciousness Science (SCCS). The postdoc positions are funded for 2 years with a possible extension for another 2, starting as soon as suitable candidates are identified. The PhD positions are fully funded for 3.5 years, starting in September 2024 (earlier start may be negotiable). The ERC positions are within the broad remit of computational (neuro)phenomenology, exploring different applications of a predictive processing view of conscious perception. One of the ERC PhD positions will focus on perceptual diversity, analysing and extending the Perception Census project. The SCCS PhD is flexible in terms of project focus and supervisor, inviting PhD proposals that have a computational/informatics element.

The human medial temporal lobe contains neurons that respond selectively to the semantic contents of a presented stimulus. These "concept cells" may respond to very different pictures of a given person and even to their written or spoken name. Their response latency is far longer than necessary for object recognition, they follow subjective, conscious perception, and they are found in brain regions that are crucial for declarative memory formation. It has thus been hypothesized that they may represent the semantic "building blocks" of episodic memories. In this talk I will present data from single unit recordings in the hippocampus, entorhinal cortex, parahippocampal cortex, and amygdala during paradigms involving object recognition and conscious perception as well as encoding of episodic memories in order to characterize the role of concept cells in these cognitive functions.

Facial expressions are inherently dynamic, and our visual system is sensitive to subtle changes in their temporal sequence. However, researchers often use dynamic morphs of photographs—simplified, linear representations of motion—to study the neural correlates of dynamic face perception. To explore the brain's sensitivity to natural facial motion, we constructed a novel dynamic face database using generative neural networks, trained on a verified set of video-recorded emotional expressions. The resulting deepfakes, consciously indistinguishable from videos, enabled us to separate biological motion from photorealistic form. Results showed that conventional dynamic morphs elicit distinct responses in the brain compared to videos and photos, suggesting they violate expectations (n400) and have reduced social salience (late positive potential). This suggests that dynamic morphs misrepresent facial dynamism, resulting in misleading insights about the neural and behavioural correlates of face perception. Deepfakes and videos elicited largely similar neural responses, suggesting they could be used as a proxy for real faces in vision research, where video recordings cannot be experimentally manipulated. And yet, despite being consciously undetectable as fake, deepfakes elicited an expectation violation response in the brain. This points to a neural sensitivity to naturalistic facial motion, beyond conscious awareness. Despite some differences in neural responses, the realism and manipulability of deepfakes make them a valuable asset for research where videos are unfeasible. Using these stimuli, we proposed a novel marker for the conscious perception of naturalistic facial motion – Frontal delta activity – which was elevated for videos and deepfakes, but not for photos or dynamic morphs.

How does our brain generate consciousness, that is, the subjective experience of what it is like to see face or hear a sound? Do we become aware of a stimulus during early sensory processing or only later when information is shared in a wide-spread fronto-parietal network? Neural correlates of consciousness are typically identified by comparing brain activity when a constant stimulus (e.g., a face) is perceived versus not perceived. However, in most previous experiments, conscious perception was systematically confounded with post-perceptual processes such as decision-making and report. In this talk, I will present recent EEG and fMRI studies dissociating neural correlates of consciousness and task-related processing in visual and auditory perception. Our results suggest that consciousness emerges during early sensory processing, while late, fronto-parietal activity is associated with post-perceptual processes rather than awareness. These findings challenge predominant theories of consciousness and highlight the importance of considering task relevance as a confound across different neuroscientific methods, experimental paradigms and sensory modalities.

The tight relationship between attention and conscious perception has been extensively researched in the past decades. However, whether attentional modulation extended to unconscious processes remained largely unknown, particularly when it came to abstract and high-level processing. I will talk about a recent study where we utilized the Stroop paradigm to show that task load gates unconscious semantic processing. In a series of psychophysical experiments, the unconscious word semantics influenced conscious task performance only under the low task load condition, but not the high task load condition. Intriguingly, with enough practice in the high task load condition, the unconscious effect reemerged. These findings suggest a competition of attentional resources between unconscious and conscious processes, challenging the automaticity account of unconscious processing.

I will discuss the mechanisms that determine whether a weak visual stimulus will reach consciousness or not. If the stimulus is simple, early visual cortex acts as a relay station that sends the information to higher visual areas. If the stimulus arrives at a minimal strength, it will be stored in working memory and can be reported. However, during more complex visual perceptions, which for example depend on the segregation of a figure from the background, early visual cortex’ role goes beyond a simply relay. It now acts as a cognitive blackboard and conscious perception depends on it. Our results inspire new approaches to create a visual prosthesis for the blind, by creating a direct interface with the visual brain. I will discuss how high-channel-number interfaces with the visual cortex might be used to restore a rudimentary form of vision in blind individuals.

The cognitive neuroscience of conscious perception has seen considerable growth over the past few decades. Confirming an influential hypothesis driven by earlier studies of neuropsychological patients, we have found that the lateral and polar prefrontal cortices play important causal roles in the generation of subjective experiences. However, this basic empirical finding has been hotly contested by researchers with different theoretical commitments, and the differences are at times difficult to resolve. To address the controversies, I suggest one alternative venue may be to look for clinical applications derived from current theories. I outline an example in which we used closed-loop fMRI combined with machine learning to nonconsciously manipulate the physiological responses to threatening stimuli, such as spiders or snakes. A clinical trial involving patients with phobia is currently taking place. I also outline how this theoretical framework may be extended to other diseases. Ultimately, a truly meaningful understanding of the fundamental nature of our mental existence should lead to useful insights for our colleagues on the clinical frontlines. If we use this as a yardstick, whoever loses the esoteric theoretical debates, both science and the patients will always win.

I will discuss the mechanisms that determine whether a weak visual stimulus will reach consciousness or not. If the stimulus is simple, early visual cortex acts as a relay station that sends the information to higher visual areas. If the stimulus arrives at a minimal strength, it will be stored in working memory. However, during more complex visual perceptions, which for example depend on the segregation of a figure from the background, early visual cortex’ role goes beyond a simply relay. It now acts as a cognitive blackboard and conscious perception depends on it. Our results also inspire new approaches to create a visual prosthesis for the blind, by creating a direct interface with the visual cortex. I will discuss how high-channel-number interfaces with the visual cortex might be used to restore a rudimentary form of vision in blind individuals.

In a few months, human infants develop complex capacities in numerous cognitive domains. They learn their native language, recognize their parents, refine their numerical capacities and their perception of the world around them but are they conscious and how can we study consciousness when no verbal report is possible? One way to approach this question is to rely on the neural responses correlated with conscious perception in adults (i.e. a global increase of activity in notably frontal regions with top-down amplification of the sensory levels). We can thus study at what age the developing anatomical architecture might be mature enough to allow this type of responses, but moreover we can use similar experimental paradigms than in adults in which we expect to observe a similar pattern of functional responses.