In a first part of the talk, I will present Predictive Coding Light (PCL), a novel unsupervised learning architecture for spiking neural networks. In contrast to conventional predictive coding approaches, which only transmit prediction errors to higher processing stages, PCL learns inhibitory lateral and top-down connectivity to suppress the most predictable spikes and passes a compressed representation of the input to higher processing stages. We show that PCL reproduces a range of biological findings and exhibits a favorable tradeoff between energy consumption and downstream classification performance on challenging benchmarks. A second part of the talk will feature our lab’s efforts to explain how infants and toddlers might learn abstract object representations without supervision. I will present deep learning models that exploit the temporal and multimodal structure of their sensory inputs to learn representations of individual objects, object categories, or abstract super-categories such as „kitchen object“ in a fully unsupervised fashion. These models offer a parsimonious account of how abstract semantic knowledge may be rooted in children's embodied first-person experiences.

Web-based self-help interventions for coping with prolonged grief have established their efficacy. However, few programs address recent losses and investigate the effect of self-tailoring of the content. In an international project, the text-based self-help program LIVIA was adapted and complemented with an Embodied Conversational Agent, an initial risk assessment and a monitoring tool. The new program SOLENA was evaluated in three trials in Switzerland, the Netherlands and Portugal. The aim of the trials was to evaluate the clinical efficacy for reducing grief, depression and loneliness and to examine client satisfaction and technology acceptance. The talk will present the SOLENA program and report results of the Portuguese and Dutch trial as well as preliminary results of the Swiss RCT. The ongoing Swiss trial compares a standardised to a self-tailored delivery format and analyses clinical outcomes, the helpfulness of specific content and the working alliance. Finally, lessons learned in the development and evaluation of a web-based self-help intervention for older adults will be discusses.

Enaction plays a central role in the broader fabric of so-called 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognition. Although the origin of the enactive approach is widely dated to the 1991 publication of the book "The Embodied Mind" by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, many of the central ideas trace to much earlier work. Over 40 years ago, the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela put forward the notion of autopoiesis as a way to understand living systems and the phenomena that they generate, including cognition. Varela and others subsequently extended this framework to an enactive approach that places biological autonomy at the foundation of situated and embodied behavior and cognition. I will describe an attempt to place Maturana and Varela's original ideas on a firmer foundation by studying them within the context of a toy model universe, John Conway's Game of Life (GoL) cellular automata. This work has both pedagogical and theoretical goals. Simple concrete models provide an excellent vehicle for introducing some of the core concepts of autopoiesis and enaction and explaining how these concepts fit together into a broader whole. In addition, a careful analysis of such toy models can hone our intuitions about these concepts, probe their strengths and weaknesses, and move the entire enterprise in the direction of a more mathematically rigorous theory. In particular, I will identify the primitive processes that can occur in GoL, show how these can be linked together into mutually-supporting networks that underlie persistent bounded entities, map the responses of such entities to environmental perturbations, and investigate the paths of mutual perturbation that these entities and their environments can undergo.

Abstract: There is no doubt that the study of brain damaged individuals has contributed greatly to our understanding of the mind/brain. Within this broad approach, cognitive neuropsychology accentuates the cognitive dimension: it investigates the structure and organization of perceptual, motor, cognitive, and language systems – prerequisites for understanding the functional organization of the brain – through the analysis of their dysfunction following brain damage. Significant insights have come specifically from this paradigm. But progress has been slow and enthusiasm for this approach has waned somewhat in recent years, and the use of existing findings to constrain new theories has also waned. What explains the current diminished status of cognitive neuropsychology? One reason may be failure to calibrate expectations about the effective contribution of different subfields of the study of the mind/brain as these are determined by their natural peculiarities – such factors as the types of available observations and their complexity, opportunity of access to such observations, the possibility of controlled experimentation, and the like. Here, I also explore the merits and limitations of cognitive neuropsychology, with particular focus on the role of intellectual, pragmatic, and societal factors that determine scientific practice within the broader domains of cognitive science/neuroscience. I conclude on an optimistic note about the continuing unique importance of cognitive neuropsychology: although limited to the study of experiments of nature, it offers a privileged window into significant aspects of the mind/brain that are not easily accessible through other approaches. Biography: Alfonso Caramazza's research has focussed extensively on how words and their meanings are represented in the brain. His early pioneering studies helped to reformulate our thinking about Broca's aphasia (not limited to production) and formalised the logic of patient-based neuropsychology. More recently he has been instrumental in reconsidering popular claims about embodied cognition.

In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.

Tom Froese is Assistant Professor at the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University (OIST), where he heads the Embodied Cognitive Science Unit. He is a cognitive scientist with a background in phenomenological philosophy, human-computer interaction, and complex systems theory. His interdisciplinary research centers on the role of agent-environment interaction in shaping cognition and consciousness, specifically when the interaction process involves sociality and technology. In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.

At the foundation of human conscious experience lie basic embodied experiences of selfhood – experiences of simply ‘being alive’. In this talk, I will make the case that this central feature of human existence is underpinned by predictive regulation of the interior of the body, using the framework of predictive processing, or active inference. I start by showing how conscious experiences of the world around us can be understood in terms of perceptual predictions, drawing on examples from psychophysics and virtual reality. Then, turning the lens inwards, we will see how the experience of being an ‘embodied self’ rests on control-oriented predictive (allostatic) regulation of the body’s physiological condition. This approach implies a deep connection between mind and life, and provides a new way to understand the subjective nature of consciousness as emerging from systems that care intrinsically about their own existence. Contrary to the old doctrine of Descartes, we are conscious because we are beast machines.

Rapidly changing inputs such as visual scenes and auditory landscapes are transmitted over several synaptic interfaces and perceived with little loss of detail, but individual neurons are typically “noisy” and cortico-cortical connections are typically “weak”. To understand how information embodied in spike train is transmitted in a lossless manner, we focus on a single synaptic interface: between pyramidal cells and putative interneurons. Using arbitrary white noise patterns injected intra-cortically as photocurrents to freely-moving mice, we find that directly-activated cells exhibit precision of several milliseconds, but post-synaptic, indirectly-activated cells exhibit higher precision. Considering multiple identical messages, the reliability of directly-activated cells peaks at a timescale of dozens of milliseconds, whereas indirectly-activated cells exhibit an order-of-magnitude faster timescale. Using data-driven modelling, we find that error correction is consistent with non-linear amplification of coincident spikes.