Embodied Cognition
embodied cognition
Ecological Psychology Today
Autopoiesis and Enaction in the Game of Life
Enaction plays a central role in the broader fabric of so-called 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognition. Although the origin of the enactive approach is widely dated to the 1991 publication of the book "The Embodied Mind" by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, many of the central ideas trace to much earlier work. Over 40 years ago, the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela put forward the notion of autopoiesis as a way to understand living systems and the phenomena that they generate, including cognition. Varela and others subsequently extended this framework to an enactive approach that places biological autonomy at the foundation of situated and embodied behavior and cognition. I will describe an attempt to place Maturana and Varela's original ideas on a firmer foundation by studying them within the context of a toy model universe, John Conway's Game of Life (GoL) cellular automata. This work has both pedagogical and theoretical goals. Simple concrete models provide an excellent vehicle for introducing some of the core concepts of autopoiesis and enaction and explaining how these concepts fit together into a broader whole. In addition, a careful analysis of such toy models can hone our intuitions about these concepts, probe their strengths and weaknesses, and move the entire enterprise in the direction of a more mathematically rigorous theory. In particular, I will identify the primitive processes that can occur in GoL, show how these can be linked together into mutually-supporting networks that underlie persistent bounded entities, map the responses of such entities to environmental perturbations, and investigate the paths of mutual perturbation that these entities and their environments can undergo.
What is Cognitive Neuropsychology Good For? An Unauthorized Biography
Abstract: There is no doubt that the study of brain damaged individuals has contributed greatly to our understanding of the mind/brain. Within this broad approach, cognitive neuropsychology accentuates the cognitive dimension: it investigates the structure and organization of perceptual, motor, cognitive, and language systems – prerequisites for understanding the functional organization of the brain – through the analysis of their dysfunction following brain damage. Significant insights have come specifically from this paradigm. But progress has been slow and enthusiasm for this approach has waned somewhat in recent years, and the use of existing findings to constrain new theories has also waned. What explains the current diminished status of cognitive neuropsychology? One reason may be failure to calibrate expectations about the effective contribution of different subfields of the study of the mind/brain as these are determined by their natural peculiarities – such factors as the types of available observations and their complexity, opportunity of access to such observations, the possibility of controlled experimentation, and the like. Here, I also explore the merits and limitations of cognitive neuropsychology, with particular focus on the role of intellectual, pragmatic, and societal factors that determine scientific practice within the broader domains of cognitive science/neuroscience. I conclude on an optimistic note about the continuing unique importance of cognitive neuropsychology: although limited to the study of experiments of nature, it offers a privileged window into significant aspects of the mind/brain that are not easily accessible through other approaches. Biography: Alfonso Caramazza's research has focussed extensively on how words and their meanings are represented in the brain. His early pioneering studies helped to reformulate our thinking about Broca's aphasia (not limited to production) and formalised the logic of patient-based neuropsychology. More recently he has been instrumental in reconsidering popular claims about embodied cognition.
Irruption theory of consciousness
Tom Froese is Assistant Professor at the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University (OIST), where he heads the Embodied Cognitive Science Unit. He is a cognitive scientist with a background in phenomenological philosophy, human-computer interaction, and complex systems theory. His interdisciplinary research centers on the role of agent-environment interaction in shaping cognition and consciousness, specifically when the interaction process involves sociality and technology. In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.