A major neuroscientific challenge is to identify the neural mechanisms that support consciousness. Though experimental studies have accumulated evidence about the location of the neural substrate of consciousness, we still lack a full understanding of why certain brain areas, but not others, can support consciousness. In this talk, I will give an overview of our approach, taking advantage of the theoretical framework provided by Integrated Information Theory (IIT). First, I will introduce results showing that a maximum of integrated information within the human brain matches our best evidence concerning the location of the NSC, supporting the IIT’s prediction. Furthermore, I will discuss the possibility that the NSC can change its location and even split into two depending on the task demand. Finally, based on some graph-theoretical analyses, I will argue that the ability of different brain regions to contribute or not to consciousness depends on specific properties of their anatomical connectivity, which determines their ability to support high integrated information.

Integrated information theory (IIT) takes as its starting point phenomenology, rather than behavioral, functional, or neural correlates of consciousness. The theory characterizes the essential properties of phenomenal existence—which is immediate and indubitable. These are translated into physical properties, expressed operationally as cause-effect power, which must be satisfied by the neural substrate of consciousness. On this basis, the theory can account for clinical and experimental data about the presence and absence of consciousness. Current work aims at accounting for specific qualities of different experiences, such as spatial extendedness and the flow of time. Several implications of IIT have ethical relevance. One is that functional equivalence does not imply phenomenal equivalence—computers may one day be able to do everything we do, but they will not experience anything. Another is that we do have free will in the fundamental, metaphysical sense—we have true alternatives and we, not our neurons, are the true cause of our willed actions.

Every day when we fall asleep we lose consciousness, we are not there. And then, every morning, when we wake up, we regain it. What mechanisms give rise to consciousness, and how can we explain consciousness in the realm of the physical world of atoms and matter? For centuries, philosophers and scientists have aimed to crack this mystery. Much progress has been made in the past decades to understand how consciousness is instantiated in the brain, yet critical questions remain: can we develop a consciousness meter? Are computers conscious? What about other animals and babies? We have embarked in a large-scale, multicenter project to test, in the context of an open science, adversarial collaboration, two of the most prominent theories: Integrated information theory (IIT) and Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) theory. We are collecting over 500 datasets including invasive and non-invasive recordings of the human brain, i.e.. fMRI, MEG and ECoG. We hope this project will enable theory-driven discoveries and further explorations that will help us better understand how consciousness fits inside the human brain.