Intelligent Agents
intelligent agents
Analogical Reasoning and Generalization for Interactive Task Learning in Physical Machines
Humans are natural teachers; learning through instruction is one of the most fundamental ways that we learn. Interactive Task Learning (ITL) is an emerging research agenda that studies the design of complex intelligent robots that can acquire new knowledge through natural human teacher-robot learner interactions. ITL methods are particularly useful for designing intelligent robots whose behavior can be adapted by humans collaborating with them. In this talk, I will summarize our recent findings on the structure that human instruction naturally has and motivate an intelligent system design that can exploit their structure. The system – AILEEN – is being developed using the common model of cognition. Architectures that implement the Common Model of Cognition - Soar, ACT-R, and Sigma - have a prominent place in research on cognitive modeling as well as on designing complex intelligent agents. However, they miss a critical piece of intelligent behavior – analogical reasoning and generalization. I will introduce a new memory – concept memory – that integrates with a common model of cognition architecture and supports ITL.
From Machine Learning to Autonomous Intelligence
How could machines learn as efficiently as humans and animals? How could machines learn to reason and plan? How could machines learn representations of percepts and action plans at multiple levels of abstraction, enabling them to reason, predict, and plan at multiple time horizons? I will propose a possible path towards autonomous intelligent agents, based on a new modular cognitive architecture and a somewhat new self supervised training paradigm. The centerpiece of the proposed architecture is a configurable predictive world model that allows the agent to plan. Behavior and learning are driven by a set of differentiable intrinsic cost functions. The world model uses a new type of energy-based model architecture called H-JEPA (Hierarchical Joint Embedding Predictive Architecture). H-JEPA learns hierarchical abstract representations of the world that are simultaneously maximally informative and maximally predictable.
From Machine Learning to Autonomous Intelligence
How could machines learn as efficiently as humans and animals? How could machines learn to reason and plan? How could machines learn representations of percepts and action plans at multiple levels of abstraction, enabling them to reason, predict, and plan at multiple time horizons? I will propose a possible path towards autonomous intelligent agents, based on a new modular cognitive architecture and a somewhat new self-supervised training paradigm. The centerpiece of the proposed architecture is a configurable predictive world model that allows the agent to plan. Behavior and learning are driven by a set of differentiable intrinsic cost functions. The world model uses a new type of energy-based model architecture called H-JEPA (Hierarchical Joint Embedding Predictive Architecture). H-JEPA learns hierarchical abstract representations of the world that are simultaneously maximally informative and maximally predictable. The corresponding working paper is available here:https://openreview.net/forum?id=BZ5a1r-kVsf
Why Some Intelligent Agents are Conscious
In this talk I will present an account of how an agent designed or evolved to be intelligent may come to enjoy subjective experiences. First, the agent is stipulated to be capable of (meta)representing subjective ‘qualitative’ sensory information, in the sense that it can easily assess how exactly similar a sensory signal is to all other possible sensory signals. This information is subjective in the sense that it concerns how the different stimuli can be distinguished by the agent itself, rather than how physically similar they are. For this to happen, sensory coding needs to satisfy sparsity and smoothness constraints, which are known to facilitate metacognition and generalization. Second, this qualitative information can under some specific circumstances acquire an ‘assertoric force’. This happens when a certain self-monitoring mechanism decides that the qualitative information reliably tracks the current state of the world, and informs a general symbolic reasoning system of this fact. I will argue that the having of subjective conscious experiences amounts to nothing more than having qualitative sensory information acquiring an assertoric status within one’s belief system. When this happens, the perceptual content presents itself as reflecting the state of the world right now, in ways that seem undeniably rational to the agent. At the same time, without effort, the agent also knows what the perceptual content is like, in terms of how subjectively similar it is to all other possible precepts. I will discuss the computational benefits of this architecture, for which consciousness might have arisen as a byproduct.