Join us for the Memory Decoding Journal Club, a collaboration between the Carboncopies Foundation and BPF Aspirational Neuroscience. This month, we're diving into a groundbreaking paper: 'Reconstructing a new hippocampal engram for systems reconsolidation and remote memory updating' by Bo Lei, Bilin Kang, Yuejun Hao, Haoyu Yang, Zihan Zhong, Zihan Zhai, and Yi Zhong from Tsinghua University, Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence, IDG/McGovern Institute of Brain Research, and Peking Union Medical College. Dr. Randal Koene will guide us through an engaging discussion on these exciting findings and their implications for neuroscience and memory research.

What do people do when they comprehend language in discourse? According to many psychologists, they build and maintain cognitive representations of utterances in four complementary mental models for discourse that interact with each other: the surface text, the text base, the situation model, and the context model. When people encounter metaphors in these utterances, they need to incorporate them into each of these mental representations for the discourse. Since influential metaphor theories define metaphor as a form of (figurative) analogy, involving cross-domain mapping of a smaller or greater extent, the general expectation has been that metaphor comprehension is also based on analogizing. This expectation, however, has been partly borne out by the data, but not completely. There is no one-to-one relationship between metaphor as (conceptual) structure (analogy) and metaphor as (psychological) process (analogizing). According to Deliberate Metaphor Theory (DMT), only some metaphors are handled by analogy. Instead, most metaphors are presumably handled by lexical disambiguation. This is a hypothesis that brings together most metaphor research in a provocatively new way: it means that most metaphors are not processed metaphorically, which produces a paradox of metaphor. In this talk I will sketch out how this paradox arises and how it can be resolved by a new version of DMT, which I have described in my forthcoming book Slowing metaphor down: Updating Deliberate Metaphor Theory (currently under review). In this theory, the distinction between, but also the relation between, analogy in metaphorical structure versus analogy in metaphorical process is of central importance.

Several species of insects have been observed to perform accurate path integration, constantly updating a vector memory of their location relative to a starting position, which they can use to take a direct return path. Foraging insects such as bees and ants are also able to store and recall the vectors to return to food locations, and to take novel shortcuts between these locations. Other insects, such as dung beetles, are observed to integrate multimodal directional cues in a manner well described by vector addition. All these processes appear to be functions of the Central Complex, a highly conserved and strongly structured circuit in the insect brain. Modelling this circuit, at the single neuron level, suggests it has general capabilities for vector encoding, vector memory, vector addition and vector rotation that can support a wide range of directed and navigational behaviours.

Many decisions under uncertainty entail dynamic belief updating: multiple pieces of evidence informing about the state of the environment are accumulated across time to infer the environmental state, and choose a corresponding action. Traditionally, this process has been conceptualized as a linear and perfect (i.e., without loss) integration of sensory information along purely feedforward sensory-motor pathways. Yet, natural environments can undergo hidden changes in their state, which requires a non-linear accumulation of decision evidence that strikes a tradeoff between stability and flexibility in response to change. How this adaptive computation is implemented in the brain has remained unknown. In this talk, I will present an approach that my laboratory has developed to identify evidence accumulation signatures in human behavior and neural population activity (measured with magnetoencephalography, MEG), across a large number of cortical areas. Applying this approach to data recorded during visual evidence accumulation tasks with change-points, we find that behavior and neural activity in frontal and parietal regions involved in motor planning exhibit hallmarks signatures of adaptive evidence accumulation. The same signatures of adaptive behavior and neural activity emerge naturally from simulations of a biophysically detailed model of a recurrent cortical microcircuit. The MEG data further show that decision dynamics in parietal and frontal cortex are mirrored by a selective modulation of the state of early visual cortex. This state modulation is (i) specifically expressed in the alpha frequency-band, (ii) consistent with feedback of evolving belief states from frontal cortex, (iii) dependent on the environmental volatility, and (iv) amplified by pupil-linked arousal responses during evidence accumulation. Together, our findings link normative decision computations to recurrent cortical circuit dynamics and highlight the adaptive nature of decision-related long-range feedback processing in the brain.

Natural perception relies inherently on inferring causal structure in the environment. However, the neural mechanisms and functional circuits that are essential for representing and updating the hidden causal structure during multisensory processing are unknown. To address this, monkeys were trained to infer the probability of a potential common source from visual and proprioceptive signals on the basis of their spatial disparity in a virtual reality system. The proprioceptive drift reported by monkeys demonstrated that they combined historical information and current multisensory signals to estimate the hidden common source and subsequently updated both the causal structure and sensory representation. Single-unit recordings in premotor and parietal cortices revealed that neural activity in premotor cortex represents the core computation of causal inference, characterizing the estimation and update of the likelihood of integrating multiple sensory inputs at a trial-by-trial level. In response to signals from premotor cortex, neural activity in parietal cortex also represents the causal structure and further dynamically updates the sensory representation to maintain consistency with the causal inference structure. Thus, our results indicate how premotor cortex integrates historical information and sensory inputs to infer hidden variables and selectively updates sensory representations in parietal cortex to support behavior. This dynamic loop of frontal-parietal interactions in the causal inference framework may provide the neural mechanism to answer long-standing questions regarding how neural circuits represent hidden structures for body-awareness and agency.

During our everyday lives, much of what we experience is familiar and predictable. We typically follow the same morning routine, take the same route to work, and encounter the same colleagues. However, every once in a while, we encounter a surprising event that violates our expectations. When we encounter such violations of our expectations, it is adaptive to update our internal model of the world in order to make better predictions in the future. The hippocampus is thought to support both the learning of the predictable structure of our environment, as well as the detection and encoding of violations. However, the hippocampus is a complex and heterogeneous structure, composed of different subfields that are thought to subserve different functions. As such, it is not yet known how the hippocampus accomplishes the learning and updating of structured knowledge. Using behavioral methods and high-resolution fMRI, I'll show that during learning of repeated and predicted events, hippocampal subfields differentially integrate and separate event representations, thus learning the structure of ongoing experience. I then move on to discuss how when events violate our predictions, there is a shift in communication between hippocampal subfields, potentially allowing for efficient encoding of the novel and surprising information. If time permits, I'll present an additional behavioral study showing that violations of predictions promote detailed memories. Together, these studies advance our understanding of how we adaptively learn and update our knowledge.

In an ever-changing environment, uncertainty is omnipresent. To deal with this, organisms have evolved mechanisms that allow them to take advantage of environmental regularities in order to make decisions robustly and adjust their behavior efficiently, thus maximizing their chances of survival. In this talk, I will present behavioral evidence that animals perform model-based state inference to predict environmental state changes and adjust their behavior rapidly, rather than slowly updating choice values. This model-based inference process can be described using Bayesian change-point models. Furthermore, I will show that neural populations in the prefrontal cortex accurately predict behavioral switches, and that the activity of these populations is associated with Bayesian estimates. In addition, we will see that learning leads to the emergence of a high-dimensional representational subspace that can be reused when the animals re-learn a previously learned set of action-value associations. Altogether, these findings highlight the role of the PFC in representing a belief about the current state of the world.

We must constantly adapt the rules we use to guide our attention. To understand how the brain learns these rules, we designed a novel task that required monkeys to learn which color is the most rewarded at a given time (the current rule). However, just as in real life, the monkey was never explicitly told the rule. Instead, they had to learn it through trial and error by choosing a color, receiving feedback (amount of reward), and then updating their internal rule. After the monkeys reached a behavioral criterion, the rule changed. This change was not cued but could be inferred based on reward feedback. Behavioral modeling found monkeys used rewards to learn the rules. After the rule changed, animals adopted one of two strategies. If the change was small, reflected in a small reward prediction error, the animals continuously updated their rule. However, for large changes, monkeys ‘reset’ their belief about the rule and re-learned the rule from scratch. To understand the neural correlates of learning new rules, we recorded neurons simultaneously from the prefrontal and parietal cortex. We found that the strength of the rule representation increased with the certainty about the current rule, and that the certainty about the rule was represented both implicitly and explicitly in the population.

Our research investigates how processes of attention, visual working memory (VWM), and decision-making combine to translate perception into action. Within this framework, the role of VWM is to form stable representations of transient stimulus events that allow them to be identified by a decision process, which we model as a diffusion process. In psychophysical tasks, we find the capacity of VWM is well defined by a sample-size model, which attributes changes in VWM precision with set-size to differences in the number evidence samples recruited to represent stimuli. In the first part of the talk, I review evidence for the sample-size model and highlight the model's strengths: It provides a parameter-free characterization of the set-size effect; it has plausible neural and cognitive interpretations; an attention-weighted version of the model accounts for the power-law of VWM, and it accounts for the selective updating of VWM in multiple-look experiments. In the second part of the talk, I provide a characterization of the theoretical relationship between two-choice and continuous-outcome decision tasks using the circular diffusion model, highlighting their common features. I describe recent work characterizing the joint distributions of decision outcomes and response times in continuous-outcome tasks using the circular diffusion model and show that the model can clearly distinguish variable-precision and simple mixture models of the evidence entering the decision process. The ability to distinguish these kinds of processes is central to current VWM studies.

Foraging research aims at describing, understanding, and predicting resource-gathering behaviour. Optimal Foraging Theory (OFT) is a sub-discipline that emphasises that these aims can be aided by segmenting foraging behaviour into discrete problems that can be formally described and examined with mathematical maximization techniques. Examples of such segmentation are found in the isolated treatment of issues such as patch residence time, prey selection, information gathering, risky choice, intertemporal decision making, resource allocation, competition, memory updating, group structure, and so on. Since foragers face these problems simultaneously rather than in isolation, it is unsurprising that OFT models are ‘always wrong but sometimes useful’. I will argue that a progressive optimal foraging research program should have a defined strategy for dealing with predictive failure of models. Further, I will caution against searching for brain structures responsible for solving isolated foraging problems.

Humans spend a lifetime learning, storing and refining a repertoire of motor memories. However, it is unknown what principle underlies the way our continuous stream of sensori-motor experience is segmented into separate memories and how we adapt and use this growing repertoire. Here we develop a principled theory of motor learning based on the key insight that memory creation, updating, and expression are all controlled by a single computation – contextual inference. Unlike dominant theories of single-context learning, our repertoire-learning model accounts for key features of motor learning that had no unified explanation and predicts novel phenomena, which we confirm experimentally. These results suggest that contextual inference is the key principle underlying how a diverse set of experiences is reflected in motor behavior.

In the last 500 million years, the dorsal telencephalon changed like no other region of the vertebrate brain. Differences range from the six-layered neocortex of mammals, to the small three-layered cortex of reptiles, and the complete absence of lamination in birds. These anatomical differences have prompted endless discussions on the origins and evolution of the cerebral cortex. We have approached this problem from a cell type and transcriptomics perspective. This reveals a more granular picture, where different cell types and classes have followed independent trajectories of evolutionary change. In this presentation, I will discuss how the molecular analysis of cell types in the brains of turtles, lizards and amphibians is updating our views on the evolution of the cerebral cortex, and the new questions emerging from these results.