Consciousness Club Tokyo

Sleep is crucial for the continuity and development of life. Sleep-related problems can alter brain function, and cause potentially severe psychological and behavioral consequences. However, the role of sleep in our mind and behavior is far from clear. In this talk, I will present our research on how sleep may play a role in visual perceptual learning (VPL) by using simultaneous magnetic resonance spectroscopy and polysomnography in human subjects. We measured the concentrations of neurotransmitters in the early visual areas during sleep and obtained the excitation/inhibition (E/I) ratio which represents the amount of plasticity in the visual system. We found that the E/I ratio significantly increased during NREM sleep while it decreased during REM sleep. The E/I ratio during NREM sleep was correlated with offline performance gains by sleep, while the E/I ratio during REM sleep was correlated with the amount of learning stabilization. These suggest that NREM sleep increases plasticity, while REM sleep decreases it to solidify once enhanced learning. NREM and REM sleep may play complementary roles, reflected by significantly different neurochemical processing, in VPL.

Flow is defined as an altered state of consciousness with excessive attention and enormous sense of pleasure, when engaged in a challenging task, first postulated by a psychologist, the late M. Csikszentmihayli. The main focus of this talk will be “Team Flow,” but there were two lines of previous studies in our laboratory as its background. First is inter-body and inter-brain coordination/synchrony between individuals. Considering various rhythmic echoing/synchronization phenomena in animal behavior, it could be regarded as the biological, sub-symbolic and implicit origin of social interactions. The second line of precursor research is on the state of Solo Flow in game playing. We employed attenuation of AEP (Auditory Evoked Potential) to task-irrelevant sound probes as an objective-neural indicator of such a Flow status, and found that; 1) Mutual link between the ACC & the TP is critical, and 2) overall, top-down influence is enhanced while bottom-up causality is attenuated. Having these as the background, I will present our latest study of Team Flow in game playing. We found that; 3) the neural correlates of Team Flow is distinctively different from those of Solo Flow nor of non-flow social, 4) the left medial temporal cortex seems to form an integrative node for Team Flow, receiving input related to Solo Flow state from the right PFC and input related to social state from the right IFC, and 5) Intra-brain (dis)similarity of brain activity well predicts (dis)similarity of skills/cognition as well as affinity for inter-brain coherence.

In this talk I will present an account of how an agent designed or evolved to be intelligent may come to enjoy subjective experiences. First, the agent is stipulated to be capable of (meta)representing subjective ‘qualitative’ sensory information, in the sense that it can easily assess how exactly similar a sensory signal is to all other possible sensory signals. This information is subjective in the sense that it concerns how the different stimuli can be distinguished by the agent itself, rather than how physically similar they are. For this to happen, sensory coding needs to satisfy sparsity and smoothness constraints, which are known to facilitate metacognition and generalization. Second, this qualitative information can under some specific circumstances acquire an ‘assertoric force’. This happens when a certain self-monitoring mechanism decides that the qualitative information reliably tracks the current state of the world, and informs a general symbolic reasoning system of this fact. I will argue that the having of subjective conscious experiences amounts to nothing more than having qualitative sensory information acquiring an assertoric status within one’s belief system. When this happens, the perceptual content presents itself as reflecting the state of the world right now, in ways that seem undeniably rational to the agent. At the same time, without effort, the agent also knows what the perceptual content is like, in terms of how subjectively similar it is to all other possible precepts. I will discuss the computational benefits of this architecture, for which consciousness might have arisen as a byproduct.

Sleep is classically presented as an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Yet, there is increasing evidence showing that sleep and wakefulness can actually intermingle and that wake-like and sleep-like activity can be observed concomitantly in different brain regions. I will here explore the implications of this conception of sleep as a local phenomenon for cognition and consciousness. In the first part of my presentation, I will show how local modulations of sleep depth during sleep could support the processing of sensory information by sleepers. I will also how, under certain circumstances, sleepers can learn while sleeping but also how they can forget. In the second part, I will show how the reverse phenomenon, sleep intrusions during waking, can explain modulations of attention. I will focus in particular on modulations of subjective experience and how the local sleep framework can inform our understanding of everyday phenomena such as mind wandering and mind blanking. Through this presentation and the exploration of both sleep and wakefulness, I will seek to connect changes in neurophysiology with changes in behaviour and subjective experience.

In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.

As Socrates said that "I know that I know nothing," our mind's function to be aware of our ignorance is essential for abstract and conceptual reasoning. However, the biological mechanism to enable such a hierarchical thought, or meta-cognition, remained unknown. In the first part of the talk, I will demonstrate our studies on the neural mechanism for metacognition on memory in macaque monkeys. In reality, awareness of ignorance is essential not only for the retrospection of the past but also for the exploration of novel unfamiliar environments for the future. However, this proactive feature of metacognition has been understated in neuroscience. In the second part of the talk, I will demonstrate our studies on the neural mechanism for prospective metacognitive matching among uncertain options prior to perceptual decision making in humans and monkeys. These studies converge to suggest that higher-order processes to self-evaluate mental state either retrospectively or prospectively are implemented in the primate neural networks.

A major neuroscientific challenge is to identify the neural mechanisms that support consciousness. Though experimental studies have accumulated evidence about the location of the neural substrate of consciousness, we still lack a full understanding of why certain brain areas, but not others, can support consciousness. In this talk, I will give an overview of our approach, taking advantage of the theoretical framework provided by Integrated Information Theory (IIT). First, I will introduce results showing that a maximum of integrated information within the human brain matches our best evidence concerning the location of the NSC, supporting the IIT’s prediction. Furthermore, I will discuss the possibility that the NSC can change its location and even split into two depending on the task demand. Finally, based on some graph-theoretical analyses, I will argue that the ability of different brain regions to contribute or not to consciousness depends on specific properties of their anatomical connectivity, which determines their ability to support high integrated information.

A central issue in reinforcement learning (RL) is the ‘curse-of-dimensionality’, arising when the degrees-of-freedom are much larger than the number of training samples. In such circumstances, the learning process becomes too slow to be plausible. In the brain, higher cognitive functions (such as abstraction or metacognition) may be part of the solution by generating low dimensional representations on which RL can operate. In this talk I will discuss a series of studies in which we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and computational modeling to investigate the neuro-computational basis of efficient RL. We found that people can learn remarkably complex task structures non-consciously, but also that - intriguingly - metacognition appears tightly coupled to this learning ability. Furthermore, when people use an explicit (conscious) policy to select relevant information, learning is accelerated by abstractions. At the neural level, prefrontal cortex subregions are differentially involved in separate aspects of learning: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex pairs with metacognitive processes, while ventromedial prefrontal cortex with valuation and abstraction. I will discuss the implications of these findings, in particular new questions on the function of metacognition in adaptive behavior and the link with abstraction.

Recent years have seen a considerable surge of research on interest-based engagement, examining how and why people are engaged in activities without relying on extrinsic rewards. However, the field of inquiry has been somewhat segregated into three different research traditions which have been developed relatively independently --- research on curiosity, interest, and trait curiosity/interest. The current talk sets out an integrative perspective; the reward-learning framework of knowledge acquisition. This conceptual framework takes on the basic premise of existing reward-learning models of information seeking: that knowledge acquisition serves as an inherent reward, which reinforces people’s information-seeking behavior through a reward-learning process. However, the framework reveals how the knowledge-acquisition process is sustained and boosted over a long period of time in real-life settings, allowing us to integrate the different research traditions within reward-learning models. The framework also characterizes the knowledge-acquisition process with four distinct features that are not present in the reward-learning process with extrinsic rewards --- (1) cumulativeness, (2) selectivity, (3) vulnerability, and (4) under-appreciation. The talk describes some evidence from our lab supporting these claims.

Over the last fifteen years, Simona Ginsburg and I developed an evolutionary approach for studying basic consciousness, suggesting that the evolution of learning drove the evolutionary transition to from non-conscious to conscious animals. I present the rationale underlying this thesis, which has led to the identification of a capacity that we call the evolutionary transition marker, which, when we find evidence of it, we have evidence that the major evolutionary transition in which we are interested has gone to completion. I then put forward our proposal that the evolutionary marker of basic consciousness is a complex form of associative learning that we call unlimited associative learning (UAL), and that the evolution of this capacity drove the transition to consciousness. I discuss the implications of this thesis for questions pertaining to the neural dynamics that constitute conscious, to its taxonomic distribution and to the ecological context in which it first emerged. I end by pointing to some of the ways in which the relationship between UAL and consciousness can be experimentally tested in humans and in non-human animals.

The study of altered states of consciousness has long had the potential to provide important insight into the nature of consciousness. In recent years there has been a resurgence of research and public interest in atypical or altered states of consciousness. These have focused both on conditions in which consciousness is considered to be impaired due to brain trauma or enhanced in some way through mediation practices or ingestion of psychedelics. The talk will begin with a brief overview of recent scientific approaches to understanding these different types of altered consciousness. The remainder of the talk will focus on lab-based experiments conducted by myself and others looking at the effects of serotoninergic hallucinogens (i.e. psilocybin and LSD) on perceptual and cognitive function. Together this body of research provides important new insights for the scientific study of consciousness and an initial understanding of the neuropharmacological mechanisms underlying conscious experience.

In recent years, artificial neural networks have demonstrated human-like or super-human performance in many tasks including image or speech recognition, natural language processing (NLP), playing Go, chess, poker and video-games. One remarkable feature of the resulting models is that they can develop very intuitive latent representations of their inputs. In these latent spaces, simple linear operations tend to give meaningful results, as in the well-known analogy QUEEN-WOMAN+MAN=KING. We postulate that human brain representations share essential properties with these deep learning latent spaces. To verify this, we test whether artificial latent spaces can serve as a good model for decoding brain activity. We report improvements over state-of-the-art performance for reconstructing seen and imagined face images from fMRI brain activation patterns, using the latent space of a GAN (Generative Adversarial Network) model coupled with a Variational AutoEncoder (VAE). With another GAN model (BigBiGAN), we can decode and reconstruct natural scenes of any category from the corresponding brain activity. Our results suggest that deep learning can produce high-level representations approaching those found in the human brain. Finally, I will discuss whether these deep learning latent spaces could be relevant to the study of consciousness.

Having conscious experience is arguably the most important reason why it matters to us whether we are alive or dead. A powerful paradigm to identify neural correlates of consciousness is binocular rivalry, wherein a constant visual stimulus evokes a varying conscious percept. It has recently been suggested that activity modulations observed during rivalry may represent the act of report rather than the conscious percept itself. Here, we performed single-unit recordings from face patches in macaque inferotemporal (IT) cortex using a novel no-report paradigm in which the animal’s conscious percept was inferred from eye movements. These experiments reveal two new results concerning the neural correlates of consciousness. First, we found that high proportions of IT neurons represented the conscious percept even without active report. Using high-channel recordings, including a new 128-channel Neuropixels-like probe, we were able to decode the conscious percept on single trials. Second, we found that even on single trials, modulation to rivalrous stimuli was weaker than that to unambiguous stimuli, suggesting that cells may encode not only the conscious percept but also the suppressed stimulus. To test this hypothesis, we varied the identity of the suppressed stimulus during binocular rivalry; we found that indeed, we could decode not only the conscious percept but also the suppressed stimulus from neural activity. Moreover, the same cells that were strongly modulated by the conscious percept also tended to be strongly modulated by the suppressed stimulus. Together, our findings indicate that (1) IT cortex possesses a true neural correlate of consciousness even in the absence of report, and (2) this correlate consists of a population code wherein single cells multiplex representation of the conscious percept and veridical physical stimulus, rather than a subset of cells perfectly reflecting consciousness.

Despite undeniable progress in the science of consciousness, there is no consensus on even fundamental theoretical and empirical questions, such as whether ‘phenomenal consciousness’ is a scientifically respectable concept, whether phenomenal consciousness overflows access consciousness, or whether the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness are in the front or in the back of the cerebral cortex. Notably, disagreement also concerns proposed theories of consciousness. However, since not all theories are mutually incompatible, there have been attempts to make theoretical progress by integrating or unifying them. I shall argue that this is preferable over proposing yet another theory, but that one should not expect it to yield a complete theory of consciousness. Rather, theoretical work in consciousness research should focus on core hypotheses about consciousness that different theories of consciousness have in common. Such a ‘minimal unifying model’ of consciousness can then be used as a basis for formulating more specific hypotheses about consciousness.

During this talk, I will seek to reposition synaesthesia as model system for understanding variation in the construction of the human mind and brain. People with synaesthesia inhabit a remarkable mental world in which numbers can be coloured, words can have tastes, and music is a visual spectacle. Synaesthesia has now been documented for over two hundred years but key questions remain unanswered about why it exists, and what such conditions might mean for theories of the human mind. I will argue that we need to rethink synaesthesia as not just representing exceptional experiences, but as a product of an unusual neurodevelopmental cascade from genes to brain to cognition of which synaesthesia is only one outcome. Rather than synaesthesia being a kind of 'dangling qualia' (atypical experiences attached to a typical mind/brain) it should be thought of as unusual experiences that accompany an unusual mind/brain. Specifically, differences in the brains of synaesthetes support a distinctive way of thinking (enhanced memory, imagery etc.) and may also predispose towards particular clinical vulnerabilities. It is this neurodiverse phenotype that is an important object of study in its own right and may explain any adaptive value for having synaesthesia.

Consciousness is a phenomenon unlike any other studied in natural science. Yet when building theories and designing experiments, we often proceed as if this were not the case. In this talk, I present two recent investigations of mine which explore the implications of consciousness' unique epistemic context for scientific theory building and experimental design. The first investigation is concerned with falsifications of theories of consciousness and identifies a rather deep problem in the usual scheme of testing theories. The second is an axiomatization and subsequent formalization of some of consciousness' more problematic epistemic features that allows to precisely quantify where the usual scientific methodology ceases to be applicable. For both cases, I indicate ways to resolve the problem.

Cognitive bias is a "subjective reality" that is uniquely created in the brain and affects our various behaviors. It may lead to what is widely called irrationality in behavioral economics, such as inaccurate judgment and illogical interpretation, but it also has an adaptive aspect in terms of mental hygiene. When such cognitive bias is regarded as a product of information processing in the brain, the approach to clarify the mechanism in the brain will play a part in finding the direct relations between the brain and the mind. In my talk, I will introduce our studies investigating the neural and molecular bases of cognitive biases, especially focusing on the role of dopamine.

To organize various experiences in a coherent mental representation, we need to properly estimate the duration and temporal order of different events. Yet, our perception of time is noisy and vulnerable to various illusions. Studying these illusions can elucidate the mechanism by which the brain perceives time. In this talk, I will review a few studies on how the brain perceives duration of events and the temporal order between self-generated motion and sensory feedback. Combined with computational models at different levels, these experiments illustrated that the brain incorporates the prior knowledge of the statistical distribution of the duration of stimuli and the decay of memory when estimating duration of an individual event, and adjusts its perception of temporal order to changes in the statistics of the environment.