IBRO-RIKEN CBS Summer Program

How does the brain decode the meaning of sound signals, such as music and courtship songs? We believe that the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster is an ideal model for answering this question, as it offers a comprehensive range of tools and assays which allow us to dissect the mechanisms underlying sound perception and evaluation in the brain. During the courtship behavior, male fruit flies emit “courtship songs” by vibrating their wings. Interestingly, the fly song has a species-specific rhythm, which indeed increases the female’s receptivity for copulation as well as male’s courtship behavior itself. How song signals, especially the species-specific sound rhythm, are evaluated in the fly brain? To tackle this question, we are exploring the features of the fly auditory system systematically. In this lecture, I will talk about our recent findings on the neural basis for song evaluation in fruit flies.

Coping with threatening situations requires both identifying stimuli predicting danger and selecting adaptive behavioral responses in order to survive. The dorso medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) is a critical structure involved in the regulation of threat-related behaviour, yet it is still largely unclear how threat-predicting stimuli and defensive behaviours are associated within prefrontal networks in order to successfully drive adaptive responses. To address these questions, we used a combination of extracellular recordings, neuronal decoding approaches, and optogenetic manipulations to show that threat representations and the initiation of avoidance behaviour are dynamically encoded in the overall population activity of dmPFC neurons. These data indicate that although dmPFC population activity at stimulus onset encodes sustained threat representations and discriminates threat- from non-threat cues, it does not predict action outcome. In contrast, transient dmPFC population activity prior to action initiation reliably predicts avoided from non-avoided trials. Accordingly, optogenetic inhibition of prefrontal activity critically constrained the selection of adaptive defensive responses in a time-dependent manner. These results reveal that the adaptive selection of active fear responses relies on a dynamic process of information linking threats with defensive actions unfolding within prefrontal networks.

Dysregulation of emotional processing and its integration with cognitive functions are central features of many mental/emotional disorders associated both with externalizing problems (aggressive, antisocial behaviors) and internalizing problems (anxiety, depression). As Dr. Joseph LeDoux, our invited speaker of this program, wrote in his famous book “Synaptic self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are”—the brain’s synapses—are the channels through which we think, act, imagine, feel, and remember. Synapses encode the essence of personality, enabling each of us to function as a distinctive, integrated individual from moment to moment. Thus, exploring the functioning of synapses leads to the understanding of the mechanism of (patho)physiological function of our brain. In this context, we have investigated the pathophysiology of psychiatric disorders, with particular emphasis on the synaptic function of model mice of various psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, autism, depression, and PTSD. Our current interest is how synaptic inputs are integrated to generate the action potential. Because the spatiotemporal organization of neuronal firing is crucial for information processing, but how thousands of inputs to the dendritic spines drive the firing remains a central question in neuroscience. We identified a distinct pattern of synaptic integration in the disease-related models, in which extra-large (XL) spines generate NMDA spikes within these spines, which was sufficient to drive neuronal firing. We experimentally and theoretically observed that XL spines negatively correlated with working memory. Our work offers a whole new concept for dendritic computation and network dynamics, and the understanding of psychiatric research will be greatly reconsidered. The second half of my talk is the development of a novel synaptic tool. Because, no matter how beautifully we can illuminate the spine morphology and how accurately we can quantify the synaptic integration, the links between synapse and brain function remain correlational. In order to challenge the causal relationship between synapse and brain function, we established AS-PaRac1, which is unique not only because it can specifically label and manipulate the recently potentiated dendritic spine (Hayashi-Takagi et al, 2015, Nature). With use of AS-PaRac1, we developed an activity-dependent simultaneous labeling of the presynaptic bouton and the potentiated spines to establish “functional connectomics” in a synaptic resolution. When we apply this new imaging method for PTSD model mice, we identified a completely new functional neural circuit of brain region A→B→C with a very strong S/N in the PTSD model mice. This novel tool of “functional connectomics” and its photo-manipulation could open up new areas of emotional/psychiatric research, and by extension, shed light on the neural networks that determine who we are.

Understanding how the brain uses information is a fundamental goal of neuroscience. Several human disorders (ranging from autism spectrum disorder to PTSD to Alzheimer’s disease) may stem from disrupted information processing. Therefore, this basic knowledge is not only critical for understanding normal brain function, but also vital for the development of new treatment strategies for these disorders. Memory may be defined as the retention over time of internal representations gained through experience, and the capacity to reconstruct these representations at later times. Long-lasting physical brain changes (‘engrams’) are thought to encode these internal representations. The concept of a physical memory trace likely originated in ancient Greece, although it wasn’t until 1904 that Richard Semon first coined the term ‘engram’. Despite its long history, finding a specific engram has been challenging, likely because an engram is encoded at multiple levels (epigenetic, synaptic, cell assembly). My lab is interested in understanding how specific neurons are recruited or allocated to an engram, and how neuronal membership in an engram may change over time or with new experience. Here I will describe both older and new unpublished data in our efforts to understand memories in mice.

At the foundation of human conscious experience lie basic embodied experiences of selfhood – experiences of simply ‘being alive’. In this talk, I will make the case that this central feature of human existence is underpinned by predictive regulation of the interior of the body, using the framework of predictive processing, or active inference. I start by showing how conscious experiences of the world around us can be understood in terms of perceptual predictions, drawing on examples from psychophysics and virtual reality. Then, turning the lens inwards, we will see how the experience of being an ‘embodied self’ rests on control-oriented predictive (allostatic) regulation of the body’s physiological condition. This approach implies a deep connection between mind and life, and provides a new way to understand the subjective nature of consciousness as emerging from systems that care intrinsically about their own existence. Contrary to the old doctrine of Descartes, we are conscious because we are beast machines.

Human society operates on large-scale cooperation and shared norms of fairness. However, individual differences in cooperation and incentives to free-riding on others’ cooperation make large-scale cooperation fragile and can lead to reduced social-welfare. Deciphering the neural codes representing potential rewards/costs for self and others is crucial for understanding social decision-making and cooperation. I will first talk about how we integrate computational modeling with functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the neural representation of social value and the modulation by oxytocin, a nine-amino acid neuropeptide, in participants evaluating monetary allocations to self and other (self-other allocations). Then I will introduce our recent studies examining the neurobiological mechanisms underlying intergroup decision-making using hyper-scanning, and share with you how we alter intergroup decisions using psychological manipulations and pharmacological challenge. Finally, I will share with you our on-going project that reveals how individual cooperation spreads through human social networks. Our results help to better understand the neurocomputational mechanism underlying interpersonal and intergroup decision-making.

Organisms face challenges to survival throughout life. When we freeze or flee in danger, we often feel fear. Tracing the deep history of danger gives a different perspective. The first cells living billions of years ago had to detect and respond to danger in order to survive. Life is about not being dead, and behavior is a major way that organisms hold death off. Although behavior does not require a nervous system, complex organisms have brain circuits for detecting and responding to danger, the deep roots of which go back to the first cells. But these circuits do not make fear, and fear is not the cause of why we freeze or flee. Fear a human invention; a construct we use to account for what happens in our minds when we become aware that we are in harm’s way. This requires a brain that can personally know that it existed in the past, that it is the entity that might be harmed in the present, and that it will cease to exist it the future. If other animals have conscious experiences, they cannot have the kinds of conscious experiences we have because they do not have the kinds of brains we have. This is not meant as a denial of animal consciousness; it is simply a statement about the fact that every species has a different brain. Nor is it a declaration about the wonders of the human brain, since we have done some wonderful, but also horrific, things with our brains. In fact, we are on the way to a climatic disaster that will not, as some suggest, destroy the Earth. But it will make it inhabitable for our kind, and other organisms with high energy demands. Bacteria have made it for billions of years and will likely be fine. The rest is up for grabs, and, in a very real sense, up to us.

For many animals, the sense of olfaction plays a major role in controlling sexual behaviors. Olfaction helps animals to detect mates, discriminate their status, and ultimately, decide on their behavioral output such as courtship behavior or aggression. Specific pheromone cues and receptors have provided a useful model to study how sensory inputs are converted into certain behavioral outputs. With the aid of recent advances in tools to record and manipulate genetically defined neurons, our understanding of the neural basis of sexual and social behavior has expanded substantially. I will discuss the current understanding of the neural processing of sex pheromones and the neural circuitry which controls sexual and social behaviors and ultimately reproduction, by focusing on rodent studies, mainly in mice, and the vomeronasal sensory system.

Interoception, the sense of internal bodily signals, is essential for physiological homeostasis, cognition, and emotions. While human insular cortex (InsCtx) is implicated in interoception, the cellular and circuit mechanisms remain unclear. I will describe our recent work imaging mouse InsCtx neurons during two physiological deficiency states – hunger and thirst. InsCtx ongoing activity patterns reliably tracked the gradual return to homeostasis, but not changes in behavior. Accordingly, while artificial induction of hunger/thirst in sated mice via activation of specific hypothalamic neurons (AgRP/SFOGLUT) restored cue-evoked food/water-seeking, InsCtx ongoing activity continued to reflect physiological satiety. During natural hunger/thirst, food/water cues rapidly and transiently shifted InsCtx population activity to the future satiety-related pattern. During artificial hunger/thirst, food/water cues further shifted activity beyond the current satiety-related pattern. Together with circuit-mapping experiments, these findings suggest that InsCtx integrates visceral-sensory inputs regarding current physiological state with hypothalamus-gated amygdala inputs signaling upcoming ingestion of food/water, to compute a prediction of future physiological state.

Transient changes in dopamine activity in response to reward and punishment have been known to regulate reward-related learning. However, the cellular basis that detects the transient dopamine signaling has long been unclear. Using two-photon microscopy and optogenetics, I have shown that transient increases and decreases of dopamine modulate plasticity of dopamine D1 and D2 receptor-expressing cells in the nucleus accumbens, respectively. At the behavioral level, I characterized that these D1 and D2 cells cooperatively tune learning by generalization and discrimination learning. Interestingly, disturbance of the dopamine signaling impaired D2 cell plasticity and discrimination learning, which was analogous to salience misattribution seen in subjects with schizophrenia.

The last decade in the field of neuroscience has been marked by intense debate on the meaning of the term fear. Whereas some have argued that fear (as well as other emotions) relies on cognitive capacities that are unique to humans, others view it as a negative state constructed from essential building blocks. This latter definition posits that fear states are associated with varying readouts that one could consider to be parallel processes or serial events tied to a specific hierarchy. Within this framework, innate defensive behaviors are considered to be common displays of fear states that lie under the control of hard-wired brain circuits. As a general rule, these defensive behaviors can be classified as either reactive or cognitive based on a thread imminence continuum. However, while evidence of the neuronal circuits that lead to these divergent behavioral strategies has accrued over the last decades, most literature has considered these responses in isolation. As a result, important misconceptions have arisen regarding how fear circuits are distributed in the brain and the contribution of specific nodes within these circuits to defensive behaviors. To mitigate the status quo, I will conduct a systematic comparison of brain circuits driving the expression of freezing and active avoidance behavior, which I will use as well-studied proxies of reactive and cognitive fear, respectively. In addition, I propose that by integrating associative information with interoceptive and exteroceptive signals the central nucleus of the amygdala plays a crucial role in biasing the selection of defensive behaviors.