Cognition seminars

Precisely estimating event timing is essential for survival, yet temporal distortions are ubiquitous in our daily sensory experience. Here, we tested whether the relative position, duration, and distance in time of two sequentially-organized events—standard S, with constant duration, and comparison C, with duration varying trial-by-trial—are causal factors in generating temporal distortions. We found that temporal distortions emerge when the first event is shorter than the second event. Importantly, a significant interaction suggests that a longer inter-stimulus interval (ISI) helps to counteract such serial distortion effect only when the constant S is in the first position, but not if the unpredictable C is in the first position. These results imply the existence of a perceptual bias in perceiving ordered event durations, mechanistically contributing to distortion in time perception. Our results clarify the mechanisms generating time distortions by identifying a hitherto unknown duration-dependent encoding inefficiency in human serial temporal perception, something akin to a strong prior that can be overridden for highly predictable sensory events but unfolds for unpredictable ones.

Explicit similarity judgments tend to emphasize relational information more than do difference judgments. In this talk, I propose and test the hypothesis that this asymmetry arises because human reasoners represent the relation different as the negation of the relation same (i.e., as not-same). This proposal implies that processing difference is more cognitively demanding than processing similarity. Both for verbal comparisons between word pairs, and for visual comparisons between sets of geometric shapes, participants completed a triad task in which they selected which of two options was either more similar to or more different from a standard. On unambiguous trials, one option was unambiguously more similar to the standard, either by virtue of featural similarity or by virtue of relational similarity. On ambiguous trials, one option was more featurally similar (but less relationally similar) to the standard, whereas the other was more relationally similar (but less featurally similar). Given the higher cognitive complexity of assessing relational similarity, we predicted that detecting relational difference would be particularly demanding. We found that participants (1) had more difficulty accurately detecting relational difference than they did relational similarity on unambiguous trials, and (2) tended to emphasize relational information more when judging similarity than when judging difference on ambiguous trials. The latter finding was captured by a computational model of comparison that weights relational information more heavily for similarity than for difference judgments. These results provide convergent evidence for a representational asymmetry between the relations same and different.

Neurons in the rodent hippocampus appear to encode the position of the animal in physical space during movement. Individual ``place cells'' fire in restricted sub-regions of an environment, a feature often taken as evidence that the hippocampus encodes a map of space that subserves navigation. But these same neurons exhibit complex responses to many other variables that defy explanation by position alone, and the hippocampus is known to be more broadly critical for memory formation. Here we elaborate and test a theory of hippocampal coding which produces place cells as a general consequence of efficient memory coding. We constructed neural networks that actively exploit the correlations between memories in order to learn compressed representations of experience. Place cells readily emerged in the trained model, due to the correlations in sensory input between experiences at nearby locations. Notably, these properties were highly sensitive to the compressibility of the sensory environment, with place field size and population coding level in dynamic opposition to optimally encode the correlations between experiences. The effects of learning were also strongly biphasic: nearby locations are represented more similarly following training, while locations with intermediate similarity become increasingly decorrelated, both distance-dependent effects that scaled with the compressibility of the input features. Using virtual reality and 2-photon functional calcium imaging in head-fixed mice, we recorded the simultaneous activity of thousands of hippocampal neurons during virtual exploration to test these predictions. Varying the compressibility of sensory information in the environment produced systematic changes in place cell properties that reflected the changing input statistics, consistent with the theory. We similarly identified representational plasticity during learning, which produced a distance-dependent exchange between compression and pattern separation. These results motivate a more domain-general interpretation of hippocampal computation, one that is naturally compatible with earlier theories on the circuit's importance for episodic memory formation. Work done in collaboration with James Priestley, Lorenzo Posani, Marcus Benna, Attila Losonczy.

Enaction plays a central role in the broader fabric of so-called 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognition. Although the origin of the enactive approach is widely dated to the 1991 publication of the book "The Embodied Mind" by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, many of the central ideas trace to much earlier work. Over 40 years ago, the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela put forward the notion of autopoiesis as a way to understand living systems and the phenomena that they generate, including cognition. Varela and others subsequently extended this framework to an enactive approach that places biological autonomy at the foundation of situated and embodied behavior and cognition. I will describe an attempt to place Maturana and Varela's original ideas on a firmer foundation by studying them within the context of a toy model universe, John Conway's Game of Life (GoL) cellular automata. This work has both pedagogical and theoretical goals. Simple concrete models provide an excellent vehicle for introducing some of the core concepts of autopoiesis and enaction and explaining how these concepts fit together into a broader whole. In addition, a careful analysis of such toy models can hone our intuitions about these concepts, probe their strengths and weaknesses, and move the entire enterprise in the direction of a more mathematically rigorous theory. In particular, I will identify the primitive processes that can occur in GoL, show how these can be linked together into mutually-supporting networks that underlie persistent bounded entities, map the responses of such entities to environmental perturbations, and investigate the paths of mutual perturbation that these entities and their environments can undergo.

What do nonhuman primates know about each other and their social environment, how do they allocate their attention, and what are the functional consequences of social decisions in natural settings? Addressing these questions is crucial to hone in on the co-evolution of cognition, social behaviour and communication, and ultimately the evolution of intelligence in the primate order. I will present results from field experimental and observational studies on free-ranging baboons, which tap into the cognitive abilities of these animals. Baboons are particularly valuable in this context as different species reveal substantial variation in social organization and degree of despotism. Field experiments revealed considerable variation in the allocation of social attention: while the competitive chacma baboons were highly sensitive to deviations from the social order, the highly tolerant Guinea baboons revealed a confirmation bias. This bias may be a result of the high gregariousness of the species, which puts a premium on ignoring social noise. Variation in despotism clearly impacted the use of signals to regulate social interactions. For instance, male-male interactions in chacma baboons mostly comprised dominance displays, while Guinea baboon males evolved elaborate greeting rituals that serve to confirm group membership and test social bonds. Strikingly, the structure of signal repertoires does not differ substantially between different baboon species. In conclusion, the motivational disposition to engage in affiliation or aggressiveness appears to be more malleable during evolution than structural elements of the behavioral repertoire; this insight is crucial for understanding the dynamics of social evolution.

The ability to build, store, and manipulate semantic representations lies at the core of all our (inter)actions. Combining evidence from cognitive neuroimaging and experimental neuropsychology, I study the neurocognitive correlates of semantic knowledge in relation to other cognitive functions, chiefly language. In this talk, I will start by reviewing neuroimaging findings supporting the idea that semantic representations are encoded in distributed yet specialized cortical areas (1), and rapidly recovered (2) according to the requirement of the task at hand (3). I will then focus on studies conducted in neurodegenerative patients, offering a unique window on the key role played by a structurally and functionally heterogeneous piece of cortex: the anterior temporal lobe (4,5). I will present pathological, neuroimaging, cognitive, and behavioral data illustrating how damages to language-related networks can affect or spare semantic knowledge as well as possible paths to functional compensation (6,7). Time permitting, we will discuss the neurocognitive dissociation between nouns and verbs (8) and how verb production is differentially impacted by specific language impairments (9).

Analogical reasoning is a common reasoning tool for learning and problem-solving. Existing research has extensively studied children’s reasoning when comparing, or choosing from ready-made analogies. Relatively less is known about how children come up with analogies in authentic learning environments. Design education provides a suitable context to investigate how children generate analogies for creative learning purposes. Meanwhile, the frequent use of visual analogies in design provides an additional opportunity to understand the role of spatial reasoning in design-by-analogy. Spatial reasoning is one of the most studied human cognitive factors and is critical to the learning of science, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics (STEAM). There is growing interest in exploring the interplay between analogical reasoning and spatial reasoning. In this talk, I will share qualitative findings from a case study, where a class of 11-to-12-year-olds in the Netherlands participated in a biomimicry design project. These findings illustrate (1) practical ways to support children’s analogical reasoning in the ideation process and (2) the potential role of spatial reasoning as seen in children mapping form-function relationships in nature analogically and adaptively to those in human designs.

Many insect species maintain a nest around which their foraging behaviour is centered, and can use path integration to maintain an accurate estimate of their distance and direction (a vector) to their nest. Some species, such as bees and ants, can also store the vector information for multiple salient locations in the world, such as food sources, in a common coordinate system. They can also use remembered views of the terrain around salient locations or along travelled routes to guide return. Recent modelling of these abilities shows convergence on a small set of algorithms and assumptions that appear sufficient to account for a wide range of behavioural data, and which can be mapped to specific insect brain circuits. Notably, this does not include any significant topological knowledge: the insect does not need to recover the information (implicit in their vector memory) about the relationships between salient places; nor to maintain any connectedness or ordering information between view memories; nor to form any associations between views and vectors. However, there remains some experimental evidence not fully explained by these algorithms that may point towards the existence of a more complex or integrated mental map in insects.

Humans are very good at visually recognizing materials and inferring their properties. Without touching surfaces, we can usually tell what they would feel like, and we enjoy vivid visual intuitions about how they typically behave. This is impressive because the retinal image that the visual system receives as input is the result of complex interactions between many physical processes. Somehow the brain has to disentangle these different factors. I will present some recent work in which we show that an unsupervised neural network trained on images of surfaces spontaneously learns to disentangle reflectance, lighting and shape. However, the disentanglement is not perfect, and we find that as a result the network not only predicts the broad successes of human gloss perception, but also the specific pattern of errors that humans exhibit on an image-by-image basis. I will argue this has important implications for thinking about appearance and vision more broadly.