Cognition seminars

Biological neural networks can represent information in the collective action potential discharge of neurons, and store that information amongst the synaptic connections between the neurons that both comprise the network and govern its function. The strength and organization of synaptic connections adjust during learning, but many cognitive neural systems are multifunctional, making it unclear how continuous activity alternates between the transient and discrete cognitive functions like encoding current information and recollecting past information, without changing the connections amongst the neurons. This lecture will first summarize our investigations of the molecular and biochemical mechanisms that change synaptic function to persistently store spatial memory in the rodent hippocampus. I will then report on how entorhinal cortex-hippocampus circuit function changes during cognitive training that creates memory, as well as learning to learn in mice. I will then describe how the hippocampus system operates like a competitive winner-take-all network, that, based on the dominance of its current inputs, self organizes into either the encoding or recollection information processing modes. We find no evidence that distinct cells are dedicated to those two distinct functions, rather activation of the hippocampus information processing mode is controlled by a subset of dentate spike events within the network of learning-modified, entorhinal-hippocampus excitatory and inhibitory synapses.

Biological neural networks can represent information in the collective action potential discharge of neurons, and store that information amongst the synaptic connections between the neurons that both comprise the network and govern its function. The strength and organization of synaptic connections adjust during learning, but many cognitive neural systems are multifunctional, making it unclear how continuous activity alternates between the transient and discrete cognitive functions like encoding current information and recollecting past information, without changing the connections amongst the neurons. This lecture will first summarize our investigations of the molecular and biochemical mechanisms that change synaptic function to persistently store spatial memory in the rodent hippocampus. I will then report on how entorhinal cortex-hippocampus circuit function changes during cognitive training that creates memory, as well as learning to learn in mice. I will then describe how the hippocampus system operates like a competitive winner-take-all network, that, based on the dominance of its current inputs, self organizes into either the encoding or recollection information processing modes. We find no evidence that distinct cells are dedicated to those two distinct functions, rather activation of the hippocampus information processing mode is controlled by a subset of dentate spike events within the network of learning-modified, entorhinal-hippocampus excitatory and inhibitory synapses.

A striking range of individual differences has been reported in a variety of visual search tasks, which naturally leads to the idea that some people are better at finding things than others. However, this conclusion appears to be premature. We carried out a replication of three recent visual search experiments and found that each task showed a wide range of individual differences as predicted, and observed good test-retest reliability in all three. However, performance on any one task was not correlated with the performance in the others: participants who naturally adopt efficient search strategies in one paradigm may perform at chance in another! Furthermore, we also show that behaviour in different versions of the same paradigm can be radically different: When simple line segments are used for search items, a large range of search strategies are found. If we instead use more complex search items, all our participants effortlessly adopt an optimal strategy. These results suggest search strategies are stable over time, but context-specific. To understand visual search we, therefore, need to account not only for differences between individuals but also how individuals interact with the search task and context.

In this talk, I will present the results of two recent systematic reviews and meta-analyses related to analogical reasoning and metaphor processing in autism, together with the results of a study that investigated verbal analogical reasoning and metaphor processing in the same sample of participants. Both metaphors and analogies rely on exploiting similarities, and they necessitate contextual processing. Nevertheless, our findings relating to metaphor processing and analogical reasoning showed distinct patterns. Whereas analogical reasoning emerged as a relative strength in autism, metaphor processing was found to be a relative weakness. Additionally, both meta-analytic studies investigated the relations between the level of intelligence of participants included in the studies, and the effect size of group differences between the autistic and typically developing (TD) samples. These analyses suggested in the case of analogical reasoning that the relative advantage of ASD participants might only be present in the case of individuals with lower levels of intelligence. By contrast, impairments in metaphor processing appeared to be more pronounced in the case of individuals with relatively lower levels of (verbal) intelligence. In our experimental study, we administered both verbal analogies and metaphors to the same sample of high-functioning autistic participants and TD controls. The two groups were matched on age, verbal IQ, working memory and educational background. Our aim was to understand better the similarities and differences between processing analogies and metaphors, and to see whether the advantage in analogical reasoning and disadvantage in metaphor processing is universal in autism.

Nicole Rust is an Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania. Her research investigates how the brain gives rise to the mind and to behavior, with an emphasis on memory. Much of her work lies at the nexus of real and artificial intelligence, as well as experiment and theory.

When animals navigate on a two-dimensional (2D) surface, many neurons in the medial entorhinal cortex (MEC) are activated as the animal passes through multiple locations (‘firing fields’) arranged in a hexagonal lattice that tiles the locomotion-surface; these neurons are known as grid cells. However, although our world is three-dimensional (3D), the 3D volumetric representation in MEC remains unknown. Here we recorded MEC cells in freely-flying bats and found several classes of spatial neurons, including 3D border cells, 3D head-direction cells, and neurons with multiple 3D firing-fields. Many of these multifield neurons were 3D grid cells, whose neighboring fields were separated by a characteristic distance – forming a local order – but these cells lacked any global lattice arrangement of their fields. Thus, while 2D grid cells form a global lattice – characterized by both local and global order – 3D grid cells exhibited only local order, thus creating a locally ordered metric for space. We modeled grid cells as emerging from pairwise interactions between fields, which yielded a hexagonal lattice in 2D and local order in 3D – thus describing both 2D and 3D grid cells using one unifying model. Together, these data and model illuminate the fundamental differences and similarities between neural codes for 3D and 2D space in the mammalian brain.

The human visual system enables us to recognize objects (e.g., this is a cup) and act upon them (e.g., grasp the cup) with astonishing ease and accuracy. For decades, it was widely accepted that these different functions rely on two separated cortical pathways. The ventral occipitotemporal pathway subserves object recognition, while the dorsal occipitoparietal pathway promotes visually guided actions. In my talk, I will discuss recent evidence from a series of neuropsychological, developmental and neuroimaging studies that were aimed to explore the nature of object representations in the dorsal pathway. The results from these studies highlight the plausible role of the dorsal pathway in object perception and reveal an interplay between shape representations derived by the two pathways. Together, these findings challenge the binary distinction between the two pathways and are consistent with the view that object recognition is not the sole product of ventral pathway computations, but instead relies on a distributed network of regions.

Investigations of the neural systems mediating the processing of social groups defined by race, specifically Black and White race groups in American participants, reveals significant overlap with brain mechanisms involved in emotion. This talk will provide an overview of research on the neuroscience of race and emotion, focusing on implicit race attitudes. Implicit race attitudes are expressed without conscious effort and control, and contrast with explicit, conscious attitudes. In spite of sharp decline in the expression of explicit, negative attitudes towards outgroup race members over the last half century, negative implicit attitudes persist, even in the face of strong egalitarian goals and beliefs. Early research demonstrated that implicit, but not explicit, negative attitudes towards outgroup race members correlate with blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal in the amygdala – a region implicated in threat representations, as well as emotion’s influence on cognition. Building on this initial finding, we demonstrate how learning and decisions may be modulated by implicit race attitudes and involve neural systems mediating emotion, learning and choice. Finally, we discuss techniques that may diminish the unintentional expression of negative, implicit race attitudes.

Humans have a remarkable ability to figure out what happened and why. In this talk, I will shed light on this ability from multiple angles. I will present a computational framework for modeling causal explanations in terms of counterfactual simulations, and several lines of experiments testing this framework in the domain of intuitive physics. The model predicts people's causal judgments about a variety of physical scenes, including dynamic collision events, complex situations that involve multiple causes, omissions as causes, and causal responsibility for a system's stability. It also captures the cognitive processes underlying these judgments as revealed by spontaneous eye-movements. More recently, we have applied our computational framework to explain multisensory integration. I will show how people's inferences about what happened are well-accounted for by a model that integrates visual and auditory evidence through approximate physical simulations.