Seminars

How does our brain generate consciousness, that is, the subjective experience of what it is like to see face or hear a sound? Do we become aware of a stimulus during early sensory processing or only later when information is shared in a wide-spread fronto-parietal network? Neural correlates of consciousness are typically identified by comparing brain activity when a constant stimulus (e.g., a face) is perceived versus not perceived. However, in most previous experiments, conscious perception was systematically confounded with post-perceptual processes such as decision-making and report. In this talk, I will present recent EEG and fMRI studies dissociating neural correlates of consciousness and task-related processing in visual and auditory perception. Our results suggest that consciousness emerges during early sensory processing, while late, fronto-parietal activity is associated with post-perceptual processes rather than awareness. These findings challenge predominant theories of consciousness and highlight the importance of considering task relevance as a confound across different neuroscientific methods, experimental paradigms and sensory modalities.

Multisensory perception is often studied through the effects of inter-sensory conflict, such as in the McGurk effect, the Ventriloquist illusion, and the Rubber Hand Illusion. Moreover, Bayesian approaches to cue fusion and causal inference overwhelmingly draw on cross-modal conflict to measure and to model multisensory perception. Given the prevalence of conflict, it is remarkable that accounts of multisensory perception have so far neglected the theory of conflict monitoring and cognitive control, established about twenty years ago. I hope to make a case for the role of conflict monitoring and resolution during multisensory perception. To this end, I will present EEG and fMRI data showing that cross-modal conflict in speech, resulting in either integration or segregation, triggers neural mechanisms of conflict detection and resolution. I will also present data supporting a role of these mechanisms during perceptual conflict in general, using Binocular Rivalry, surrealistic imagery, and cinema. Based on this preliminary evidence, I will argue that it is worth considering the potential role of conflict in multisensory perception and its incorporation in a causal inference framework. Finally, I will raise some potential problems associated with this proposal.

Dysregulation of emotional processing and its integration with cognitive functions are central features of many mental/emotional disorders associated both with externalizing problems (aggressive, antisocial behaviors) and internalizing problems (anxiety, depression). As Dr. Joseph LeDoux, our invited speaker of this program, wrote in his famous book “Synaptic self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are”—the brain’s synapses—are the channels through which we think, act, imagine, feel, and remember. Synapses encode the essence of personality, enabling each of us to function as a distinctive, integrated individual from moment to moment. Thus, exploring the functioning of synapses leads to the understanding of the mechanism of (patho)physiological function of our brain. In this context, we have investigated the pathophysiology of psychiatric disorders, with particular emphasis on the synaptic function of model mice of various psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, autism, depression, and PTSD. Our current interest is how synaptic inputs are integrated to generate the action potential. Because the spatiotemporal organization of neuronal firing is crucial for information processing, but how thousands of inputs to the dendritic spines drive the firing remains a central question in neuroscience. We identified a distinct pattern of synaptic integration in the disease-related models, in which extra-large (XL) spines generate NMDA spikes within these spines, which was sufficient to drive neuronal firing. We experimentally and theoretically observed that XL spines negatively correlated with working memory. Our work offers a whole new concept for dendritic computation and network dynamics, and the understanding of psychiatric research will be greatly reconsidered. The second half of my talk is the development of a novel synaptic tool. Because, no matter how beautifully we can illuminate the spine morphology and how accurately we can quantify the synaptic integration, the links between synapse and brain function remain correlational. In order to challenge the causal relationship between synapse and brain function, we established AS-PaRac1, which is unique not only because it can specifically label and manipulate the recently potentiated dendritic spine (Hayashi-Takagi et al, 2015, Nature). With use of AS-PaRac1, we developed an activity-dependent simultaneous labeling of the presynaptic bouton and the potentiated spines to establish “functional connectomics” in a synaptic resolution. When we apply this new imaging method for PTSD model mice, we identified a completely new functional neural circuit of brain region A→B→C with a very strong S/N in the PTSD model mice. This novel tool of “functional connectomics” and its photo-manipulation could open up new areas of emotional/psychiatric research, and by extension, shed light on the neural networks that determine who we are.