“Brain theory, what is it or what should it be?”
n the neurosciences the need for some 'overarching' theory is sometimes expressed, but it is not always obvious what is meant by this. One can perhaps agree that in modern science observation and experimentation is normally complemented by 'theory', i.e. the development of theoretical concepts that help guiding and evaluating experiments and measurements. A deeper discussion of 'brain theory' will require the clarification of some further distictions, in particular: theory vs. model and brain research (and its theory) vs. neuroscience. Other questions are: Does a theory require mathematics? Or even differential equations? Today it is often taken for granted that the whole universe including everything in it, for example humans, animals, and plants, can be adequately treated by physics and therefore theoretical physics is the overarching theory. Even if this is the case, it has turned out that in some particular parts of physics (the historical example is thermodynamics) it may be useful to simplify the theory by introducing additional theoretical concepts that can in principle be 'reduced' to more complex descriptions on the 'microscopic' level of basic physical particals and forces. In this sense, brain theory may be regarded as part of theoretical neuroscience, which is inside biophysics and therefore inside physics, or theoretical physics. Still, in neuroscience and brain research, additional concepts are typically used to describe results and help guiding experimentation that are 'outside' physics, beginning with neurons and synapses, names of brain parts and areas, up to concepts like 'learning', 'motivation', 'attention'. Certainly, we do not yet have one theory that includes all these concepts. So 'brain theory' is still in a 'pre-newtonian' state. However, it may still be useful to understand in general the relations between a larger theory and its 'parts', or between microscopic and macroscopic theories, or between theories at different 'levels' of description. This is what I plan to do.
Neural architectures: what are they good for anyway?
The brain has a highly complex structure in terms of cell types and wiring between different regions. What is it for, if anything? I'll start this talk by asking what might an answer to this question even look like given that we can't run an alternative universe where our brains are structured differently. (Preview: we can do this with models!) I'll then talk about some of our work in two areas: (1) does the modular structure of the brain contribute to specialisation of function? (2) how do different cell types and architectures contribute to multimodal sensory processing?
Controversial stimuli: Optimizing experiments to adjudicate among computational hypotheses
NMC4 Short Talk: Neural Representation: Bridging Neuroscience and Philosophy
We understand the brain in representational terms. E.g., we understand spatial navigation by appealing to the spatial properties that hippocampal cells represent, and the operations hippocampal circuits perform on those representations (Moser et al., 2008). Philosophers have been concerned with the nature of representation, and recently neuroscientists entered the debate, focusing specifically on neural representations. (Baker & Lansdell, n.d.; Egan, 2019; Piccinini & Shagrir, 2014; Poldrack, 2020; Shagrir, 2001). We want to know what representations are, how to discover them in the brain, and why they matter so much for our understanding of the brain. Those questions are framed in a traditional philosophical way: we start with explanations that use representational notions, and to more deeply understand those explanations we ask, what are representations — what is the definition of representation? What is it for some bit of neural activity to be a representation? I argue that there is an alternative, and much more fruitful, approach. Rather than asking what representations are, we should ask what the use of representational *notions* allows us to do in neuroscience — what thinking in representational terms helps scientists do or explain. I argue that this framing offers more fruitful ground for interdisciplinary collaboration by distinguishing the philosophical concerns that have a place in neuroscience from those that don’t (namely the definitional or metaphysical questions about representation). And I argue for a particular view of representational notions: they allow us to impose the structure of one domain onto another as a model of its causal structue. So, e.g., thinking about the hippocampus as representing spatial properties is a way of taking structures in those spatial properties, and projecting those structures (and algorithms that would implement them) them onto the brain as models of its causal structure.
NMC4 Panel: The Contribution of Models vs Data
Biology is “messy”. So how can we take theory in biology seriously and plot predictions and experiments on the same axes?
Many of us came to biology from physics. There we have been trained on such classic examples as muon g-2, where experimental data and theoretical predictions agree to many significant digits. Now, working in biology, we routinely hear that it is messy, most details matter, and that the best hope for theory in biology is to be semi-qualitative, predict general trends, and to forgo the hope of ever making quantitative predictions with the precision that we are used to in physics. Colloquially, we should be satisfied even if data and models differ so much that plotting them on the same plot makes little sense. However, some of us won’t be satisfied by this. So can we take theory in biology seriously and predict experimental outcomes within (small) error bars? Certainly, we won’t be able to predict everything, but this is never required, even in traditional physics. But we should be able to choose some features of data that are nontrivial and interesting, and focus on them. We also should be able to find different classes of models --- maybe even null models --- that match biology better, and thus allow for a better agreement. It is even possible that large-dimensional datasets of modern high-throughput experiments, and the ensuing “more is different” statistical physics style models will make quantitative, precise theory easier. To explore the role of quantitative theory in biology, in this workshop, eight speakers will address some of the following general questions based on their specific work in different corners of biology: Which features of biological data are predictable? Which types of models are best suited to making quantitative predictions in different fields? Should theorists interested in quantitative predictions focus on different questions, not typically asked by biologists? Do large, multidimensional datasets make theories (and which theories?) more or less likely to succeed? This will be an unapologetically theoretical physics workshop — we won’t focus on a specific subfield of biology, but will explore these questions across the fields, hoping that the underlying theoretical frameworks will help us find the missing connections.