What happens to our ability to perceive multisensory information as we age?
Our ability to perceive the world around us can be affected by a number of factors including the nature of the external information, prior experience of the environment, and the integrity of the underlying perceptual system. A particular challenge for the brain is to maintain a coherent perception from information encoded by the peripheral sensory organs whose function is affected by typical, developmental changes across the lifespan. Yet, how the brain adapts to the maturation of the senses, as well as experiential changes in the multisensory environment, is poorly understood. Over the past few years, we have used a range of multisensory tasks to investigate the role of ageing on the brain’s ability to merge sensory inputs. In particular, we have embedded an audio-visual task based on the sound-induced flash illusion (SIFI) into a large-scale, longitudinal study of ageing. Our findings support the idea that the temporal binding window (TBW) is modulated by age and reveal important individual differences in this TBW that may have clinical implications. However, our investigations also suggest the TWB is experience-dependent with evidence for both long and short term behavioural plasticity. An overview of these findings, including recent evidence on how multisensory integration may be associated with higher order functions, will be discussed.
Refuting the unfolding-argument on the irrelevance of causal structure to consciousness
I will build from Niccolo's discussion of the Blockhead argument to argue that having an FeedForward Network (FN) responding like an recurrent network (RN) in a consciousness experiment is not enough to convince us the two are the same with regards to the posession of mental states and conscious experience. I will then argue that a robust functional equivalence between FFN and RN is akso not supported by the mathematical work on the Universal Approximator theorem, and is also unlikely to hold, as a conjecture, given data in cognitive neuroscience; I will argue that an equivalence of RN and FFN may only apply to static functions between input/output layers and not to the temporal patterns or to the network's reactions to structural perturbations. Finally, I review data indicating that consciousness has functional characteristics, such as a flexible control of behavior, and that cognitive/brain dynamics reveal interacting top-down and bottom-up processes, which are necessary for the mediation of such control processes.