Cognition seminars

We are now clearly entering a new age in our relationship with machines. The power of AI natural language processors and image generators has rapidly exceeded the expectations of even those who developed them. Serious questions are now being asked about the extent to which machines could become — or perhaps already are — sentient or conscious. Do AI machines understand the instructions they are given and the answers they provide? In this talk I will consider the prospects for conscious machines, by which I mean machines that have feelings, know about their own existence, and about ours. I will suggest that the recent focus on information processing in models of consciousness, in which the brain is treated as a kind of digital computer, have mislead us about the nature of consciousness and how it is produced in biological systems. Treating the brain as an energy processing system is more likely to yield answers to these fundamental questions and help us understand how and when machines might become minds.

In popular media, there is often a connection drawn between the advent of awareness in artificial agents and those same agents simultaneously achieving human or superhuman level intelligence. In this talk, I will examine the validity and potential application of this seemingly intuitive link between consciousness and intelligence. I will do so by examining the cognitive abilities associated with three contemporary theories of conscious function: Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Information Generation Theory (IGT), and Attention Schema Theory (AST), and demonstrating that all three theories specifically relate conscious function to some aspect of domain-general intelligence in humans. With this insight, we will turn to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and find that, while still far from demonstrating general intelligence, many state-of-the-art deep learning methods have begun to incorporate key aspects of each of the three functional theories. Given this apparent trend, I will use the motivating example of mental time travel in humans to propose ways in which insights from each of the three theories may be combined into a unified model. I believe that doing so can enable the development of artificial agents which are not only more generally intelligent but are also consistent with multiple current theories of conscious function.

In this talk I will present an account of how an agent designed or evolved to be intelligent may come to enjoy subjective experiences. First, the agent is stipulated to be capable of (meta)representing subjective ‘qualitative’ sensory information, in the sense that it can easily assess how exactly similar a sensory signal is to all other possible sensory signals. This information is subjective in the sense that it concerns how the different stimuli can be distinguished by the agent itself, rather than how physically similar they are. For this to happen, sensory coding needs to satisfy sparsity and smoothness constraints, which are known to facilitate metacognition and generalization. Second, this qualitative information can under some specific circumstances acquire an ‘assertoric force’. This happens when a certain self-monitoring mechanism decides that the qualitative information reliably tracks the current state of the world, and informs a general symbolic reasoning system of this fact. I will argue that the having of subjective conscious experiences amounts to nothing more than having qualitative sensory information acquiring an assertoric status within one’s belief system. When this happens, the perceptual content presents itself as reflecting the state of the world right now, in ways that seem undeniably rational to the agent. At the same time, without effort, the agent also knows what the perceptual content is like, in terms of how subjectively similar it is to all other possible precepts. I will discuss the computational benefits of this architecture, for which consciousness might have arisen as a byproduct.