Cognitive Psychology seminars

Recent advances in artificial intelligence have led to new forms of misinformation, including highly realistic “deepfake” synthetic media. We conduct three experiments to investigate how and why retail investors react to deepfake financial news. Results from the first two experiments provide evidence that investors use a “realism heuristic,” responding more intensely to audio and video deepfakes as their perceptual realism increases. In the third experiment, we introduce an intervention to prompt analytical thinking, varying whether participants make analytical judgments about credibility or intuitive investment judgments. When making intuitive investment judgments, investors are strongly influenced by both more and less realistic deepfakes. When making analytical credibility judgments, investors are able to discern the non-credibility of less realistic deepfakes but struggle with more realistic deepfakes. Thus, while analytical thinking can reduce the impact of less realistic deepfakes, highly realistic deepfakes are able to overcome this analytical scrutiny. Our results suggest that deepfake financial news poses novel threats to investors.

In this talk, I will explore how social affective biases arise even in the absence of motivational factors as an emergent outcome of the basic structure of social learning. In several studies, we found that initial negative interactions with some members of a group can cause subsequent avoidance of the entire group, and that this avoidance perpetuates stereotypes. Additional cognitive modeling discovered that approach and avoidance behavior based on biased beliefs not only influences the evaluative (positive or negative) impressions of group members, but also shapes the depth of the cognitive representations available to learn about individuals. In other words, people have richer cognitive representations of members of groups that are not avoided, akin to individualized vs group level categories. I will end presenting a series of multi-agent reinforcement learning simulations that demonstrate the emergence of these social-structural feedback loops in the development and maintenance of affective biases.

Within the last decade, Deep Artificial Neural Networks (DNNs) have emerged as powerful computer vision systems that match or exceed human performance on many benchmark tasks such as image classification. But whether current DNNs are suitable computational models of the human visual system remains an open question: While DNNs have proven to be capable of predicting neural activations in primate visual cortex, psychophysical experiments have shown behavioral differences between DNNs and human subjects, as quantified by error consistency. Error consistency is typically measured by briefly presenting natural or corrupted images to human subjects and asking them to perform an n-way classification task under time pressure. But for how long should stimuli ideally be presented to guarantee a fair comparison with DNNs? Here we investigate the influence of presentation time on error consistency, to test the hypothesis that higher-level processing drives behavioral differences. We systematically vary presentation times of backward-masked stimuli from 8.3ms to 266ms and measure human performance and reaction times on natural, lowpass-filtered and noisy images. Our experiment constitutes a fine-grained analysis of human image classification under both image corruptions and time pressure, showing that even drastically time-constrained humans who are exposed to the stimuli for only two frames, i.e. 16.6ms, can still solve our 8-way classification task with success rates way above chance. We also find that human-to-human error consistency is already stable at 16.6ms.

Using videos from the Deepfake Detection Challenge (cf. Groh et al., 2021), we investigated human deepfake detection performance (DDP) in two unique observer groups: Super-Recognizers (SRs) and "normal" officers from within the 18K members of the Berlin Police. SRs were identified either via previously proposed lab-based procedures (Ramon, 2021) or the only existing tool for SR identification involving increasingly challenging, authentic forensic material: beSure® (Berlin Test For Super-Recognizer Identification; Ramon & Rjosk, 2022). Across two experiments we examined deepfake detection performance (DDP) in participants who judged single videos and pairs of videos in a 2AFC decision setting. We explored speed-accuracy trade-offs in DDP, compared DDP between lab-identified SRs and non-SRs, and police officers whose face identity processing skills had been extensively tested using challenging. In this talk I will discuss our surprising findings and argue that further work is needed too determine whether face identity processing is related to DDP or not.

Vocabulary learning applications like Duolingo have millions of users around the world, but yet are based on very simple heuristics to choose teaching material to provide to their users. In this presentation, we will discuss the possibility to develop more advanced artificial teachers, which would be based on modeling of the learner’s inner characteristics. In the case of teaching vocabulary, understanding how the learner memorizes is enough. When it comes to picking grammar exercises, it becomes essential to assess how the learner reasons, in particular by analogy. This second application will illustrate how analogical and case-based reasoning can be employed in an alternative way in education: not as the teaching algorithm, but as a part of the learner’s model.

Human cognitive abilities seem qualitatively different from the cognitive abilities of other primates, a difference Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli (2008) attribute to role-based relational reasoning—inferences and generalizations based on the relational roles to which objects (and other relations) are bound, rather than just the features of the objects themselves. Role-based relational reasoning depends on the ability to dynamically bind arguments to relational roles. But dynamic binding cannot be sufficient for relational thinking: Some non-human animals solve the dynamic binding problem, at least in some domains; and many non-human species generalize affordances to completely novel objects and scenes, a kind of universal generalization that likely depends on dynamic binding. If they can solve the dynamic binding problem, then why can they not reason about relations? What are they missing? I will present simulations with the LISA model of analogical reasoning (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003) suggesting that the missing pieces are multi-role integration (the capacity to combine multiple role bindings into complete relations) and structure mapping (the capacity to map different systems of role bindings onto one another). When LISA is deprived of either of these capacities, it can still generalize affordances universally, but it cannot reason symbolically; granted both abilities, LISA enjoys the full power of relational (symbolic) thought. I speculate that one reason it may have taken relational reasoning so long to evolve is that it required evolution to solve both problems simultaneously, since neither multi-role integration nor structure mapping appears to confer any adaptive advantage over simple role binding on its own.

One challenge in exploring the internal representation of faces is the lack of controlled stimuli transformations. Researchers are often limited to verbalizable transformations in the creation of a dataset. An alternative approach to verbalization for interpretability is finding image-based measures that allow us to quantify image transformations. In this study, we explore whether PCA could be used to create controlled transformations to a face by testing the effect of these transformations on human perceptual similarity and on computational differences in Gabor, Pixel and DNN spaces. We found that perceptual similarity and the three image-based spaces are linearly related, almost perfectly in the case of the DNN, with a correlation of 0.94. This provides a controlled way to alter the appearance of a face. In experiment 2, the effect of familiarity on the perception of multidimensional transformations was explored. Our findings show that there is a positive relationship between the number of components transformed and both the perceptual similarity and the same three image-based spaces used in experiment 1. Furthermore, we found that familiar faces are rated more similar overall than unfamiliar faces. That is, a change to a familiar face is perceived as making less difference than the exact same change to an unfamiliar face. The ability to quantify, and thus control, these transformations is a powerful tool in exploring the factors that mediate a change in perceived identity.

Not all individuals are equally competent at recognizing the faces they interact with. Revealing how the brains of different individuals support variations in this ability is a crucial step to develop an understanding of real-world human visual behaviour. In this talk, I will present findings from a large high-density EEG dataset (>100k trials of participants processing various stimulus categories) and computational approaches which aimed to characterise the brain representations behind real-world proficiency of “super-recognizers”—individuals at the top of face recognition ability spectrum. Using decoding analysis of time-resolved EEG patterns, we predicted with high precision the trial-by-trial activity of super-recognizers participants, and showed that evidence for face recognition ability variations is disseminated along early, intermediate and late brain processing steps. Computational modeling of the underlying brain activity uncovered two representational signatures supporting higher face recognition ability—i) mid-level visual & ii) semantic computations. Both components were dissociable in brain processing-time (the first around the N170, the last around the P600) and levels of computations (the first emerging from mid-level layers of visual Convolutional Neural Networks, the last from a semantic model characterising sentence descriptions of images). I will conclude by presenting ongoing analyses from a well-known case of acquired prosopagnosia (PS) using similar computational modeling of high-density EEG activity.

Even young children seem to have an early understanding of the world around them, and the people in it. Before children can reliably say "ball", "wall", or "Saul", they expect balls to not go through walls, and for Saul to go right for a ball (if there's no wall). What is the formal conceptual structure underlying this commonsense reasoning about objects and agents? I will raise several possibilities for models underlying core intuitive physics as a way of talking about models of core knowledge and intuitive theories more generally. In particular, I will present some recent ML work trying to capture early expectations about object solidly, cohesion, and permanence, that relies on a rough-derendering approach.

Behavioural measurements are often overlooked by computational neuroscientists, who prefer to focus on electrophysiological recordings or neuroimaging data. This attitude is largely due to perceived lack of depth/richness in relation to behavioural datasets. I will show how contemporary psychophysics can deliver extremely rich and highly constraining datasets that naturally interface with computational modelling. More specifically, I will demonstrate how psychophysics can be used to guide/constrain/refine computational models, and how models can be exploited to design/motivate/interpret psychophysical experiments. Examples will span a wide range of topics (from feature detection to natural scene understanding) and methodologies (from cascade models to deep learning architectures).

Learning by analogy is a powerful tool children’s developmental repertoire, as well as in educational contexts such as mathematics, where the key knowledge base involves building flexible schemas. However, noticing and learning from analogies develops over time and is cognitively resource intensive. I review studies that provide insight into the relationship between mechanisms driving children’s developing analogy skills, highlighting environmental inputs (parent talk and prior experiences priming attention to relations) and neuro-cognitive factors (Executive Functions and brain injury). I then note implications for mathematics learning, reviewing experimental findings that show analogy can improve learning, but also that both individual differences in EFs and environmental factors that reduce available EFs such as performance pressure can predict student learning.

Cognitive architectures are attempts to build larger-scale models of minds. This talk will explore how structure-mapping models of analogical matching, retrieval, and generalization are used in the Companion cognitive architecture. Examples will include modeling conceptual change, learning by reading, and analogical Q/A training.