The sense of agency refers to the subjective feeling of controlling one's own behavior and, through them, external events. Why is this subjective feeling important for humans? Is it just a by-product of our actions? Previous studies have shown that the sense of agency can affect the intensity of sensory input because we predict the input from our motor intention. However, my research has found that the sense of agency plays more roles than just predictions. It enhances perceptual processes of sensory input and potentially helps to harvest more information about the link between the external world and the self. Furthermore, our recent research found both indirect and direct evidence that the sense of agency is important for people's exploratory behaviors, and this may be linked to proximal exploitations of one's control in the environment. In this talk, I will also introduce the paradigms we use to study the sense of agency as a result of perceptual processes, and our findings of individual differences in this sense and the implications.

In this talk I will introduce the central notions of the theory of autonomy, as it is being currently developed in biology and cognitive science. The theory of autonomy puts forward the capacity of self-determination of organisms as whole systems, and constitutes thereby an alternative to more reductionist and mechanistic approaches. I will discuss how the theory of autonomy provides a justification for the scientific use of notions as function, norm, agency and teleology, whose epistemological legitimacy is highly debated. I will conclude by describing the difficult challenges that poses the transition from biological to cognitive autonomy.

Natural perception relies inherently on inferring causal structure in the environment. However, the neural mechanisms and functional circuits that are essential for representing and updating the hidden causal structure during multisensory processing are unknown. To address this, monkeys were trained to infer the probability of a potential common source from visual and proprioceptive signals on the basis of their spatial disparity in a virtual reality system. The proprioceptive drift reported by monkeys demonstrated that they combined historical information and current multisensory signals to estimate the hidden common source and subsequently updated both the causal structure and sensory representation. Single-unit recordings in premotor and parietal cortices revealed that neural activity in premotor cortex represents the core computation of causal inference, characterizing the estimation and update of the likelihood of integrating multiple sensory inputs at a trial-by-trial level. In response to signals from premotor cortex, neural activity in parietal cortex also represents the causal structure and further dynamically updates the sensory representation to maintain consistency with the causal inference structure. Thus, our results indicate how premotor cortex integrates historical information and sensory inputs to infer hidden variables and selectively updates sensory representations in parietal cortex to support behavior. This dynamic loop of frontal-parietal interactions in the causal inference framework may provide the neural mechanism to answer long-standing questions regarding how neural circuits represent hidden structures for body-awareness and agency.

The digital kickoff of NeurotechRI will take place on the 26th from 13:00 to 16:00 (CET). Come and join us as we discuss our plans for the Graduate School and our research and innovation roadmap! The programme can be downloaded here. Don’t miss out on our Board of Governors presentation of the project and the synergies with NeurotechEU, meet with our keynote speakers from the European Research Executive Agency: Mr Stijn Delaure (DG R&I, Unit A3 “R&I Actors and Research Careers”) and Ms Marta Truco Calbet (DG R&I, Unit C.4 "Reforming European R&I and Research Infrastructures''). Last but not least, the day will finish with a roundtable discussion organised by our students society. The roundtable will be an open space and an opportunity for all students to discuss their needs in education. Registration is open: www.crowdcast.io/e/neurotechri-kickoff

Self-control is a central aspect of free will. Because self-control is often described in terms of resisting temptations, research on the cognitive neuroscience of free will often focuses on mechanisms of top-down regulation. We argue that this obscures a crucial temporal dimension of free will: now-then regulation. We distinguish now-then regulation from top-down regulation, and situate now-then regulation within a broader account of temporally extended agency. In highlighting this temporal dimension of control, we aim to provide a more nuanced account of how motivation informs action over time, different kinds of regulatory processes underlying the planning and execution of action, and the temporal components of reasons-responsiveness.

In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.

Voluntary control of behavior requires the ability to dynamically integrate internal states and external evidence to achieve one’s goals. However, neuroscientific studies of intentional action and critical philosophical commentary of that research have taken a rather narrow turn in recent years, focussing on the neural precursors of spontaneous simple actions as potential realizers of intentions. In this session, we show how the debate can benefit from incorporating other types of experimental approaches, focussing on agency in dynamic contexts.

Tom Froese is Assistant Professor at the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University (OIST), where he heads the Embodied Cognitive Science Unit. He is a cognitive scientist with a background in phenomenological philosophy, human-computer interaction, and complex systems theory. His interdisciplinary research centers on the role of agent-environment interaction in shaping cognition and consciousness, specifically when the interaction process involves sociality and technology. In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.

I will offer a broad-brush account of what explains the emergence of agents from a physics perspective, what sorts of conditions have to be in place for them to arise, and the essential features of agents when they are viewed through the lenses of physics. One implication will be a tight link to informational asymmetries associated with the thermodynamic gradient. Another will be a reversal of the direction of explanation from the one that is usually assumed in physical discussions. In in an evolved system, while it is true in some sense that the macroscopic behavior is the way it is because of the low-level dynamics, there is another sense in which the low-level dynamics is the way that it is because of the high-level behavior it supports. (More precisely and accurately, the constraints on the configuration of its components that define system as the kind of system it is are the way they are to exploit the low-level dynamics to produce the emergent behavior.) Another will be some insight into what might make human agency special.

Body motion is a fundamental signal of social communication. This includes facial as well as full-body movements. Combining advanced methods from computer animation with motion capture in humans and monkeys, we synthesized highly-realistic monkey avatar models. Our face avatar is perceived by monkeys as almost equivalent to a real animal, and does not induce an ‘uncanny valley effect’, unlike all other previously used avatar models in studies with monkeys. Applying machine-learning methods for the control of motion style, we were able to investigate how species-specific shape and dynamic cues influence the perception of human and monkey facial expressions. Human observers showed very fast learning of monkey expressions, and a perceptual encoding of expression dynamics that was largely independent of facial shape. This result is in line with the fact that facial shape evolved faster than the neuromuscular control in primate phylogenesis. At the same time, it challenges popular neural network models of the recognition of dynamic faces that assume a joint encoding of facial shape and dynamics. We propose an alternative physiologically-inspired neural model that realizes such an orthogonal encoding of facial shape and expression from video sequences. As second example, we investigated the perception of social interactions from abstract stimuli, similar to the ones by Heider & Simmel (1944), and also from more realistic stimuli. We developed and validated a new generative model for the synthesis of such social interaction, which is based on a modification of human navigation model. We demonstrate that the recognition of such stimuli, including the perception of agency, can be accounted for by a relatively elementary physiologically-inspired hierarchical neural recognition model, that does not require the assumption of sophisticated inference mechanisms, as postulated by some cognitive theories of social recognition. Summarizing, this suggests that essential phenomena in social cognition might be accounted for by a small set of simple neural principles that can be easily implemented by cortical circuits. The developed technologies for stimulus control form the basis of electrophysiological studies that can verify specific neural circuits, as the ones proposed by our theoretical models.

The stream of consciousness refers to ideas, images, and memories that meander across the mind when we are otherwise unoccupied. The standard view is that these thoughts are associationistic in character and they arise from subpersonal processes—we are for the most part passive observers of them. Drawing on a series of laboratory studies we have conducted as well as Buddhist models of mind, I argue that these views are importantly incorrect. On the alternative view I put forward, these thoughts arise from minimal decision processes, which lie in a grey zone: They are both manifestations of agency as well as obstacles to it.