Our ability to recognize an object amongst many others is one of the most important features of the human mind. However, object recognition requires tremendous computational effort, as we need to solve a complex and recursive environment with ease and proficiency. This challenging feat is dependent on the implementation of an effective organization of knowledge in the brain. Here I put forth a novel understanding of how object knowledge is organized in the brain, by proposing that the organization of object knowledge follows key object-related dimensions, analogously to how sensory information is organized in the brain. Moreover, I will also put forth that this knowledge is topographically laid out in the cortical surface according to these object-related dimensions that code for different types of representational content – I call this contentopic mapping. I will show a combination of fMRI and behavioral data to support these hypotheses and present a principled way to explore the multidimensionality of object processing.

The basis of the mind, of mental states, and complex behaviors is the flow of energy through microscopic and macroscopic brain structures. Energy flow through brain circuits is powered by thousands of mitochondria populating the inside of every neuron, glial, and other nucleated cell across the brain-body unit. This seminar will cover emerging approaches to study the mind-mitochondria connection and present early attempts to map the distribution and diversity of mitochondria across brain tissue. In rodents, I will present convergent multimodal evidence anchored in enzyme activities, gene expression, and animal behavior that distinct behaviorally-relevant mitochondrial phenotypes exist across large-scale mouse brain networks. Extending these findings to the human brain, I will present a developing systematic biochemical and molecular map of mitochondrial variation across cortical and subcortical brain structures, representing a foundation to understand the origin of complex energy patterns that give rise to the human mind.

A fundamental question in affective sciences is how the human mind decides if, and in what intensity, to elicit an affective response. Appraisal theories assume that preceding the affective response, there is an evaluation stage in which dimensions of an event are being appraised. Common to most appraisal theories is the assumption that the evaluation phase involves the assessment of the stimulus’ relevance to the perceiver’s well-being. In this talk, I first discuss conceptual and methodological challenges in investigating relevance appraisal. Next, I present two lines of experiments that ask how the human mind uses information about objective and subjective probabilities in the decision about the intensity of the emotional response and how these are affected by the valence of the event. The potential contribution of the results to appraisal theory is discussed.

Tinbergen encouraged ethologists to address animal behaviour by answering four questions, covering physiology, adaptation, phylogeny, and development. This broad approach has implications for neuroscience and psychology, yet, questions about phylogeny are rarely considered in these fields. Here I describe how phylogeny can shed light on our understanding of brain structure and function. Further, I show that we now have or are developing the data and analytical methods necessary to study the natural history of the human mind.

The seminar will first outline the architecture of the human mind, specifying general and domain-specific mental processes. The place of causal reasoning and its relations with the other processes will be specified. Experimental, psychometric, developmental, and brain-based evidence will be summarized. The main message of the talk is that causal thought involves domain-specific core processes rooted in perception and served by special brain networks which capture interactions between objects. With development, causal reasoning is increasingly associated with a general abstraction system which generates general principles underlying inductive, analogical, and deductive reasoning and also heuristics for specifying causal relations. These associations are discussed in some detail. Possible implications for artificial intelligence and educational implications are also discussed.

Although animals can estimate numerical quantities, true counting and arithmetic abilities are unique to humans and are inextricably linked to symbolic competence. However, our unprecedented numerical skills are deeply rooted in our neuronal heritage as primates and vertebrates. I argue that numerical competence in humans is the result of three neural constraints. First, I propose that the neuronal mechanisms of quantity estimation are part of our evolutionary heritage and can be witnessed across primate and vertebrate phylogeny. Second, I suggest that a basic understanding of number, what numerical quantity means, is innately wired into the brain and gives rise to an intuitive number sense, or number instinct. Third and finally, I argue that symbolic counting and arithmetic in humans is rooted in an evolutionarily and ontogenetically primeval neural system for non-symbolic number representations. These three neural constraints jointly determine the basic processing of number concepts in the human mind.

During this talk, I will seek to reposition synaesthesia as model system for understanding variation in the construction of the human mind and brain. People with synaesthesia inhabit a remarkable mental world in which numbers can be coloured, words can have tastes, and music is a visual spectacle. Synaesthesia has now been documented for over two hundred years but key questions remain unanswered about why it exists, and what such conditions might mean for theories of the human mind. I will argue that we need to rethink synaesthesia as not just representing exceptional experiences, but as a product of an unusual neurodevelopmental cascade from genes to brain to cognition of which synaesthesia is only one outcome. Rather than synaesthesia being a kind of 'dangling qualia' (atypical experiences attached to a typical mind/brain) it should be thought of as unusual experiences that accompany an unusual mind/brain. Specifically, differences in the brains of synaesthetes support a distinctive way of thinking (enhanced memory, imagery etc.) and may also predispose towards particular clinical vulnerabilities. It is this neurodiverse phenotype that is an important object of study in its own right and may explain any adaptive value for having synaesthesia.