Predictive processing offers a unifying view of neural computation, proposing that brains continuously anticipate sensory input and update internal models based on prediction errors. In this talk, I will present converging evidence for the computational mechanisms underlying this framework across human neuroscience and deep neural networks. I will begin with recent work showing that large-scale distributed prediction-error encoding in the human brain directly predicts how sensory representations reorganize through predictive learning. I will then turn to PredNet, a popular predictive coding inspired deep network that has been widely used to model real-world biological vision systems. Using dynamic stimuli generated with our Spatiotemporal Style Transfer algorithm, we demonstrate that PredNet relies primarily on low-level spatiotemporal structure and remains insensitive to high-level content, revealing limits in its generalization capacity. Finally, I will discuss new recurrent vision models that integrate top-down feedback connections with intrinsic neural variability, uncovering a dual mechanism for robust sensory coding in which neural variability decorrelates unit responses, while top-down feedback stabilizes network dynamics. Together, these results outline how prediction error signaling and top-down feedback pathways shape adaptive sensory processing in biological and artificial systems.

The brain is a prediction machine. Yet the world is never entirely predictable, for any animal. Unexpected events are surprising and this typically evokes prediction error signatures in animal brains. In humans such mismatched expectations are often associated with an emotional response as well. Appropriate emotional responses are understood to be important for memory consolidation, suggesting that valence cues more generally constitute an ancient mechanism designed to potently refine and generalize internal models of the world and thereby minimize prediction errors. On the other hand, abolishing error detection and surprise entirely is probably also maladaptive, as this might undermine the very mechanism that brains use to become better prediction machines. This paradoxical view of brain functions as an ongoing tug-of-war between prediction and surprise suggests a compelling new way to study and understand the evolution of consciousness in animals. I will present approaches to studying attention and prediction in the tiny brain of the fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster. I will discuss how an ‘active’ sleep stage (termed rapid eye movement – REM – sleep in mammals) may have evolved in the first animal brains as a mechanism for optimizing prediction in motile creatures confronted with constantly changing environments. A role for REM sleep in emotional regulation could thus be better understood as an ancient sleep function that evolved alongside selective attention to maintain an adaptive balance between prediction and surprise. This view of active sleep has some interesting implications for the evolution of subjective awareness and consciousness.

In human and non-human animals, conceptual knowledge is partially organized according to low-dimensional geometries that rely on brain structures and computations involved in spatial representations. Recently, two separate lines of research have investigated cognitive maps, that are associated with the hippocampal formation and are similar to world-centered representations of the environment, and image spaces, that are associated with the parietal cortex and are similar to self-centered spatial relationships. I will suggest that cognitive maps and image spaces may be two manifestations of a more general propensity of the mind to create low-dimensional internal models, and may play a role in analogical reasoning and metaphorical thinking. Finally, I will show some data suggesting that the metaphorical relationship between colors and emotions can be accounted for by the structural alignment of low-dimensional conceptual spaces.