The idea that perception in humans relies on some form of probabilistic computations has become very popular over the last decades. It has been extremely difficult however to characterize the extent and the nature of the probabilistic representations and operations that are manipulated by neural populations in the human cortex. Several theoretical works suggest that probabilistic representations are present from low-level sensory areas to high-level areas. According to this view, the neural dynamics implements some forms of probabilistic message passing (i.e. neural sampling, probabilistic population coding, etc.) which solves the problem of perceptual inference. Here I will present recent experimental evidence that human and non-human primate perception implements some form of message passing. I will first review findings showing probabilistic integration of sensory evidence across space and time in primate visual cortex. Second, I will show that the confidence reports in a hierarchical task reveal that uncertainty is represented both at lower and higher levels, in a way that is consistent with probabilistic message passing both from lower to higher and from higher to lower representations. Finally, I will present behavioral and neural evidence that human perception takes into account pairwise correlations in sequences of sensory samples in agreement with the message passing hypothesis, and against standard accounts such as accumulation of sensory evidence or predictive coding.

Predictive coding represents a promising framework for understanding brain function, postulating that the brain continuously inhibits predictable sensory input, ensuring a preferential processing of surprising elements. A central aspect of this view on cortical computation is its hierarchical connectivity, involving recurrent message passing between excitatory bottom-up signals and inhibitory top-down feedback. Here we use computational modelling to demonstrate that such architectural hard-wiring is not necessary. Rather, predictive coding is shown to emerge as a consequence of energy efficiency, a fundamental requirement of neural processing. When training recurrent neural networks to minimise their energy consumption while operating in predictive environments, the networks self-organise into prediction and error units with appropriate inhibitory and excitatory interconnections and learn to inhibit predictable sensory input. We demonstrate that prediction units can reliably be identified through biases in their median preactivation, pointing towards a fundamental property of prediction units in the predictive coding framework. Moving beyond the view of purely top-down driven predictions, we demonstrate via virtual lesioning experiments that networks perform predictions on two timescales: fast lateral predictions among sensory units and slower prediction cycles that integrate evidence over time. Our results, which replicate across two separate data sets, suggest that predictive coding can be interpreted as a natural consequence of energy efficiency. More generally, they raise the question which other computational principles of brain function can be understood as a result of physical constraints posed by the brain, opening up a new area of bio-inspired, machine learning-powered neuroscience research.