Cognitive neuroscience has witnessed great progress since modern neuroimaging embraced an open science framework, with the adoption of shared principles (Wilkinson et al., 2016), standards (Gorgolewski et al., 2016), and ontologies (Poldrack et al., 2011), as well as practices of meta-analysis (Yarkoni et al., 2011; Dockès et al., 2020) and data sharing (Gorgolewski et al., 2015). However, while functional neuroimaging data provide correlational maps between cognitive functions and activated brain regions, its usefulness in determining causal link between specific brain regions and given behaviors or functions is disputed (Weber et al., 2010; Siddiqiet al 2022). On the contrary, neuropsychological data enable causal inference, highlighting critical neural substrates and opening a unique window into the inner workings of the brain (Price, 2018). Unfortunately, the adoption of Open Science practices in clinical settings is hampered by several ethical, technical, economic, and political barriers, and as a result, open platforms enabling access to and sharing clinical (meta)data are scarce (e.g., Larivière et al., 2021). We are working with clinicians, neuroimagers, and software developers to develop an open source platform for the storage, sharing, synthesis and meta-analysis of human clinical data to the service of the clinical and cognitive neuroscience community so that the future of neuropsychology can be transdiagnostic, open, and FAIR. We call it neurocausal (https://neurocausal.github.io).

In recent years, more and more evidence has accumulated showing that many studies in psychological research cannot be replicated, effects are often overestimated, and little is publicly known about unsuccessful studies. What are the mechanisms behind this crisis? In this talk, I will explain how we got there and why it is still difficult to break free from the current system. I will further explain which role Open Science plays within the replication crisis and how it can help to improve science. This might sound like a pessimistic, negative talk, but I will end it on a positive note, I promise!

Case-control comparisons are a gold standard method for diagnosing and researching neuropsychological deficits and dissociations at the single-case level. These statistical tests, developed by John Crawford and collaborators, provide quantitative criteria for the classical concepts of deficit, dissociation and double-dissociation. Much attention has been given to the control of Type I (false positive) errors for these tests, but far less to the avoidance of Type II (false negative) errors; that is, to statistical power. I will describe the origins and limits of statistical power for case-control comparisons, showing that there are hard upper limits on power, which have important implications for the design and interpretation of single-case studies. My aim is to stimulate discussion of the inferential status of single-case neuropsychological evidence, particularly with respect to contemporary ideals of open science and study preregistration.