Psycholinguistics seminars

Metaphor is a pervasive phenomenon in language and cognition. To date, the vast majority of psycholinguistic research on metaphor has focused on noun-noun metaphors of the form An X is a Y (e.g., My job is a jail). Yet there is evidence that verb metaphor (e.g., I sailed through my exams) is more common. Despite this, comparatively little work has examined how verb metaphors are processed. In this talk, I will propose a novel account for verb metaphor comprehension: verb metaphors are understood in the same way that analogies are—as comparisons processed via structure-mapping. I will discuss the predictions that arise from applying the analogical framework to verb metaphor and present a series of experiments showing that verb metaphoric extension is consistent with those predictions.

Learning verbs is difficult and critical to learning one's native language. Children appear to benefit from seeing multiple events and comparing them to each other, and structural alignment theory provides a good theoretical framework to guide research into how preschool children may be comparing events as they learn new verbs. The talk will include 6 studies of early verb learning that make use of eye-tracking procedures as well as other behavioral (pointing) procedures, and that test key predictions from SA theory including the prediction that seeing similar examples before more varied examples helps observers learn how to compare (progressive alignment) and the prediction that when events have very low alignability with other events, that is one cue that the events should be ignored. Whether or how statistical learning may also be at work will be considered.

What do people do when they comprehend language in discourse? According to many psychologists, they build and maintain cognitive representations of utterances in four complementary mental models for discourse that interact with each other: the surface text, the text base, the situation model, and the context model. When people encounter metaphors in these utterances, they need to incorporate them into each of these mental representations for the discourse. Since influential metaphor theories define metaphor as a form of (figurative) analogy, involving cross-domain mapping of a smaller or greater extent, the general expectation has been that metaphor comprehension is also based on analogizing. This expectation, however, has been partly borne out by the data, but not completely. There is no one-to-one relationship between metaphor as (conceptual) structure (analogy) and metaphor as (psychological) process (analogizing). According to Deliberate Metaphor Theory (DMT), only some metaphors are handled by analogy. Instead, most metaphors are presumably handled by lexical disambiguation. This is a hypothesis that brings together most metaphor research in a provocatively new way: it means that most metaphors are not processed metaphorically, which produces a paradox of metaphor. In this talk I will sketch out how this paradox arises and how it can be resolved by a new version of DMT, which I have described in my forthcoming book Slowing metaphor down: Updating Deliberate Metaphor Theory (currently under review). In this theory, the distinction between, but also the relation between, analogy in metaphorical structure versus analogy in metaphorical process is of central importance.

Children need inference in order to learn the meanings of words. They must infer the referent from the situation in which a target word is said. Furthermore, to be able to use the word in other situations, they also need to infer what other referents the word can be generalized to. As verbs refer to relations between arguments, verb learning requires relational analogical inference, something which is challenging to young children. To overcome this difficulty, young children recruit a diverse range of cues in their inference of verb meanings, including, but not limited to, syntactic cues and social and pragmatic cues as well as statistical cues. They also utilize perceptual similarity (object similarity) in progressive alignment to extract relational verb meanings and further to gain insights about relational verb meanings. However, just having a list of these cues is not useful: the cues must be selected, combined, and coordinated to produce the optimal interpretation in a particular context. This process involves abductive reasoning, similar to what scientists do to form hypotheses from a range of facts or evidence. In this talk, I discuss how children use a chain of inferences to learn meanings of verbs. I consider not only the process of analogical mapping and progressive alignment, but also how children use abductive inference to find the source of analogy and gain insights into the general principles underlying verb learning. I also present recent findings from my laboratory that show that prelinguistic human infants use a rudimentary form of abductive reasoning, which enables the first step of word learning.

In this talk, I will present some data showing that people’s similarity judgments among word pairs reflect distinctions between abstract semantic relations like contrast, cause-effect, or part-whole. Further, the extent that individual participants’ similarity judgments discriminate between abstract semantic relations was linearly associated with both fluid and crystallized verbal intelligence, albeit more strongly with fluid intelligence. Finally, I will compare three models according to their ability to predict these similarity judgments. All models take as input vector representations of individual word meanings, but they differ in their representation of relations: one model does not represent relations at all, a second model represents relations implicitly, and a third model represents relations explicitly. Across the three models, the third model served as the best predictor of human similarity judgments suggesting the importance of explicit relation representation to fully account for human semantic cognition.