Psycholinguistics seminars

Socially Assistive Robots (SARs) have shown great potential to help children in therapeutic and healthcare contexts. SARs have been used for companionship, learning enhancement, social and communication skills rehabilitation for children with special needs (e.g., autism), and mood improvement. Robots can be used as novel tools to assess and rehabilitate children’s communication skills and mental well-being by providing affordable and accessible therapeutic and mental health services. In this talk, I will present the various studies I have conducted during my PhD and at the Cambridge Affective Intelligence and Robotics Lab to explore how robots can help assess and rehabilitate children’s communication skills and mental well-being. More specifically, I will provide both quantitative and qualitative results and findings from (i) an exploratory study with children with autism and global developmental disorders to investigate the use of intelligent personal assistants in therapy; (ii) an empirical study involving children with and without language disorders interacting with a physical robot, a virtual agent, and a human counterpart to assess their linguistic skills; (iii) an 8-week longitudinal study involving children with autism and language disorders who interacted either with a physical or a virtual robot to rehabilitate their linguistic skills; and (iv) an empirical study to aid the assessment of mental well-being in children. These findings can inform and help the child-robot interaction community design and develop new adaptive robots to help assess and rehabilitate linguistic skills and mental well-being in children.

What do people do when they comprehend language in discourse? According to many psychologists, they build and maintain cognitive representations of utterances in four complementary mental models for discourse that interact with each other: the surface text, the text base, the situation model, and the context model. When people encounter metaphors in these utterances, they need to incorporate them into each of these mental representations for the discourse. Since influential metaphor theories define metaphor as a form of (figurative) analogy, involving cross-domain mapping of a smaller or greater extent, the general expectation has been that metaphor comprehension is also based on analogizing. This expectation, however, has been partly borne out by the data, but not completely. There is no one-to-one relationship between metaphor as (conceptual) structure (analogy) and metaphor as (psychological) process (analogizing). According to Deliberate Metaphor Theory (DMT), only some metaphors are handled by analogy. Instead, most metaphors are presumably handled by lexical disambiguation. This is a hypothesis that brings together most metaphor research in a provocatively new way: it means that most metaphors are not processed metaphorically, which produces a paradox of metaphor. In this talk I will sketch out how this paradox arises and how it can be resolved by a new version of DMT, which I have described in my forthcoming book Slowing metaphor down: Updating Deliberate Metaphor Theory (currently under review). In this theory, the distinction between, but also the relation between, analogy in metaphorical structure versus analogy in metaphorical process is of central importance.

In this talk, I will present some data showing that people’s similarity judgments among word pairs reflect distinctions between abstract semantic relations like contrast, cause-effect, or part-whole. Further, the extent that individual participants’ similarity judgments discriminate between abstract semantic relations was linearly associated with both fluid and crystallized verbal intelligence, albeit more strongly with fluid intelligence. Finally, I will compare three models according to their ability to predict these similarity judgments. All models take as input vector representations of individual word meanings, but they differ in their representation of relations: one model does not represent relations at all, a second model represents relations implicitly, and a third model represents relations explicitly. Across the three models, the third model served as the best predictor of human similarity judgments suggesting the importance of explicit relation representation to fully account for human semantic cognition.