Cognition seminars

Humans are biologically adapted for cultural life in ways that other primates are not. Humans have unique motivations and cognitive skills for sharing emotions, experience, and collaborative actions (shared intentionality). These motivations and skills first emerge in human ontogeny at around one year of age, as infants begin to participate with other persons in various kinds of collaborative and joint attentional activities, including linguistic communication. Our nearest primate relatives understand important aspects of intentional action - especially in competitive situations - but they do not seem to have the motivations and cognitive skills necessary to engage in activities involving collaboration, shared intentionality, and, in general, things cultural.

Humans are incredible learners, a talent supported by our ability to detect and transfer relational similarities between items and events. Spotting these common relations despite perceptual differences is challenging, yet there’s evidence that this ability begins early, with infants as young as 3 months discriminating same and different (Anderson et al., 2018; Ferry et al., 2015). How? To understand the underlying mechanisms, I examine how learning outcomes in the first year correspond with changes in input and in infant age. I discuss the commonalities in this process with that seen in older children and adults, as well as differences due to interactions with other maturing processes like language and visual attention.

Framing effects in individual decision-making have puzzled economists for decades because they are hard, if at all, to explain with rational choice theories. Why should mere changes in the description of a choice problem affect decision-making? Here, we examine the hypothesis that changes in framing cause changes in the allocation of attention to the different options – measured via eye-tracking – and give rise to changes in decision-making. We document that the framing of a sure alternative as a gain – as opposed to a loss – in a risk-taking task increases the attentional advantage of the sure option and induces a higher choice frequency of that option – a finding that is predicted by the attentional drift-diffusion model (aDDM). The model also correctly predicts other key findings such as that the increased attentional advantage of the sure option in the gain frame should also lead quicker decisions in this frame. In addition, the data reveal that increasing risk aversion at higher stake sizes may also be driven by attentional processes because the sure option receives significantly more attention – regardless of frame – at higher stakes. We also corroborate the causal impact of framing-induced changes of attention on choice with an additional experiment that manipulates attention exogenously. Finally, to study the precise mechanisms underlying the framing effect we structurally estimate an aDDM that allows for frame and option-dependent parameters. The estimation results indicate that – in addition to the direct effects of framing-induced changes in attention on choice – the gain frame also causes (i) an increase in the attentional discount of the gamble and (ii) an increased concavity of utility. Our findings suggest that the traditional explanation of framing effects in risky choice in terms of a more concave value function in the gain domain is seriously incomplete and that attentional mechanisms as hypothesized in the aDDM play a key role.

Classically, vision is seen as a cascade of local, feedforward computations. This framework has been tremendously successful, inspiring a wide range of ground-breaking findings in neuroscience and computer vision. Recently, feedforward Convolutional Neural Networks (ffCNNs), inspired by this classic framework, have revolutionized computer vision and been adopted as tools in neuroscience. However, despite these successes, there is much more to vision. I will present our work using visual crowding and related psychophysical effects as probes into visual processes that go beyond the classic framework. In crowding, perception of a target deteriorates in clutter. We focus on global aspects of crowding, in which perception of a small target is strongly modulated by the global configuration of elements across the visual field. We show that models based on the classic framework, including ffCNNs, cannot explain these effects for principled reasons and identify recurrent grouping and segmentation as a key missing ingredient. Then, we show that capsule networks, a recent kind of deep learning architecture combining the power of ffCNNs with recurrent grouping and segmentation, naturally explain these effects. We provide psychophysical evidence that humans indeed use a similar recurrent grouping and segmentation strategy in global crowding effects. In crowding, visual elements interfere across space. To study how elements interfere over time, we use the Sequential Metacontrast psychophysical paradigm, in which perception of visual elements depends on elements presented hundreds of milliseconds later. We psychophysically characterize the temporal structure of this interference and propose a simple computational model. Our results support the idea that perception is a discrete process. Together, the results presented here provide stepping-stones towards a fuller understanding of the visual system by suggesting architectural changes needed for more human-like neural computations.

Emotion processing is thought to be impaired in autism and linked to atypical visual exploration and arousal modulation to others faces and gaze, yet evidence is equivocal. We propose that, where observed, atypical socioemotional processing is due to alexithymia, a distinct but frequently co-occurring condition which affects emotional self-awareness and Interoception. In study 1 (N = 80), we tested this hypothesis by studying the spatio-temporal dynamics and entropy of eye-gaze during emotion processing tasks. Evidence from traditional and novel methods revealed that atypical eye-gaze and emotion recognition is best predicted by alexithymia in both autistic and non-autistic individuals. In Study 2 (N = 70), we assessed interoceptive and autonomic signals implicated in socioemotional processing, and found evidence for alexithymia (not autism) driven effects on gaze and arousal modulation to emotions. We also conducted two large-scale studies (N = 1300), using confirmatory factor-analytic and network modelling and found evidence that Alexithymia and Autism are distinct at both a latent level and their intercorrelations. We argue that: 1) models of socioemotional processing in autism should conceptualise difficulties as intrinsic to alexithymia, and 2) assessment of alexithymia is crucial for diagnosis and personalised interventions in autism.

Autobiographical memories are the ghosts of our past. Through them we visit places long departed, see faces once familiar, and hear voices now silent. These, often decades-old, personal experiences can be recalled on a whim or come unbidden into our everyday consciousness. Autobiographical memories are crucial to cognition because they facilitate almost everything we do, endow us with a sense of self and underwrite our capacity for autonomy. They are often compromised by common neurological and psychiatric pathologies with devastating effects. Despite autobiographical memories being central to everyday mental life, there is no agreed model of autobiographical memory retrieval, and we lack an understanding of the neural mechanisms involved. This precludes principled interventions to manage or alleviate memory deficits, and to test the efficacy of treatment regimens. This knowledge gap exists because autobiographical memories are challenging to study – they are immersive, multi-faceted, multi-modal, can stretch over long timescales and are grounded in the real world. One missing piece of the puzzle concerns the millisecond neural dynamics of autobiographical memory retrieval. Surprisingly, there are very few magnetoencephalography (MEG) studies examining such recall, despite the important insights this could offer into the activity and interactions of key brain regions such as the hippocampus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. In this talk I will describe a series of MEG studies aimed at uncovering the neural circuitry underpinning the recollection of autobiographical memories, and how this changes as memories age. I will end by describing our progress on leveraging an exciting new technology – optically pumped MEG (OP-MEG) which, when combined with virtual reality, offers the opportunity to examine millisecond neural responses from the whole brain, including deep structures, while participants move within a virtual environment, with the attendant head motion and vestibular inputs.

n natural vision, active vision refers to the changes in visual input resulting from self-initiated eye movements. In this talk, I will present studies that show that the stimulus-related activity during active vision differs substantially from that occurring during classical flashed-stimuli paradigms. Our results uncover novel and efficient mechanisms that improve visual perception. In a general way, the nervous system appears to engage in sensory modulation mechanisms, precisely timed to self-initiated stimulus changes, thus coordinating neural activity across different cortical areas and serving as a general mechanism for the global coordination of visual perception.

Global responses to the Covid-19 pandemic have resulted in various forms of “lockdown” being imposed on citizens. These lockdown measures have resulted in significant changes to all aspects of daily life for all those who live under them. Lockdowns have however, also provided a unique opportunity for psychologists to examine how changes in the structure of daily life influence our experience of time. This talk will review recent research examining the impact on covid-19 on real-world time experience. It will look to discuss whether the factors which influence “normal” time experience also influenced time experience during lockdown. Finally, it will try to highlight some potential future directions for enhancing our understanding of real-life time distortion.

Cognitive bias is a "subjective reality" that is uniquely created in the brain and affects our various behaviors. It may lead to what is widely called irrationality in behavioral economics, such as inaccurate judgment and illogical interpretation, but it also has an adaptive aspect in terms of mental hygiene. When such cognitive bias is regarded as a product of information processing in the brain, the approach to clarify the mechanism in the brain will play a part in finding the direct relations between the brain and the mind. In my talk, I will introduce our studies investigating the neural and molecular bases of cognitive biases, especially focusing on the role of dopamine.

Many regions of the human brain conduct highly specific functions, such as recognizing faces, understanding language, and thinking about other people’s thoughts. Why might this domain specific organization be a good design strategy for brains, and what is the origin of domain specificity in the first place? In this talk, I will present recent work testing whether the segregation of face and object perception in human brains emerges naturally from an optimization for both tasks. We trained artificial neural networks on face and object recognition, and found that networks were able to perform both tasks well by spontaneously segregating them into distinct pathways. Critically, networks neither had prior knowledge nor any inductive bias about the tasks. Furthermore, networks optimized on tasks which apparently do not develop specialization in the human brain, such as food or cars, and object categorization showed less task segregation. These results suggest that functional segregation can spontaneously emerge without a task-specific bias, and that the domain-specific organization of the cortex may reflect a computational optimization for the real-world tasks humans solve.

The hippocampus lies at the centre of a network of brain regions thought to support spatial and episodic memory. Place cells - the principal cell of the hippocampus, represent information about an animal’s spatial location. Yet, during rest and awake quiescence place cells spontaneously recapitulate past trajectories (‘replay’). Replay has been hypothesised to support systems consolidation – the stabilisation of new memories via maturation of complementary cortical memory traces. Indeed, in recent work we found place and grid cells, from the deep medial entorhinal cortex (dMEC, the principal cortical output region of the hippocampus), replayed coherently during rest periods. Importantly, dMEC grid cells lagged place cells by ~11ms; suggesting the coordination may reflect consolidation. Moreover, preliminary data shows that the dMEC-hippocampal coordination strengthens as an animal becomes familiar with a task and that it may be led by directionally modulated cells. Finally, on-going work, in my recently established lab, shows replay may represent the mechanism underlying the maturation of episodic/spatial memory in pre-weanling pups. Together, these results indicate replay may play a central role in ensuring the permanency of memories.

Humans and other primates exhibit rich and versatile behaviour, switching nimbly between tasks as the environmental context requires. I will discuss the neural coding patterns that make this possible in humans and deep networks. First, using deep network simulations, I will characterise two distinct solutions to task acquisition (“lazy” and “rich” learning) which trade off learning speed for robustness, and depend on the initial weights scale and network sparsity. I will chart the predictions of these two schemes for a context-dependent decision-making task, showing that the rich solution is to project task representations onto orthogonal planes on a low-dimensional embedding space. Using behavioural testing and functional neuroimaging in humans, we observe BOLD signals in human prefrontal cortex whose dimensionality and neural geometry are consistent with the rich learning regime. Next, I will discuss the problem of continual learning, showing that behaviourally, humans (unlike vanilla neural networks) learn more effectively when conditions are blocked than interleaved. I will show how this counterintuitive pattern of behaviour can be recreated in neural networks by assuming that information is normalised and temporally clustered (via Hebbian learning) alongside supervised training. Together, this work offers a picture of how humans learn to partition knowledge in the service of structured behaviour, and offers a roadmap for building neural networks that adopt similar principles in the service of multitask learning. This is work with Andrew Saxe, Timo Flesch, David Nagy, and others.

Bats are extreme aviators and amazing navigators. Many bat species nightly com-mute dozens of kilometres in search of food, and some bat species annually migrate over thousands of kilometres. Studying bats in their natural environment has al-ways been extremely challenging because of their small size (mostly <50 gr) and agile nature. We have recently developed novel miniature technology allowing us to GPS-tag small bats, thus opening a new window to document their behaviour in the wild. We have used this technology to track fruit-bats pups over 5 months from birth to adulthood. Following the bats’ full movement history allowed us to show that they use novel short-cuts which are typical for cognitive-map based naviga-tion. In a second study, we examined how nectar-feeding bats make foraging deci-sions under competition. We show that by relying on a simple reinforcement learn-ing strategy, the bats can divide the resource between them without aggression or communication. Together, these results demonstrate the power of the large scale natural approach for studying animal behavior.

Adolescence is a period of life characterised by heightened sensitivity to social stimuli, an increased need for peer interaction and peer acceptance, and development of the social brain. Lockdown and social distancing measures intended to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 are reducing the opportunity to engage in face-to-face social interaction with peers. The consequences of social distancing on human social brain and social cognitive development are unknown, but animal research has shown that social deprivation and isolation have unique effects on brain and behaviour in adolescence compared with other stages of life. It is possible that social distancing might have a disproportionate effect on an age group for whom peer interaction is a vital aspect of development.

It has long been known that when viewing a set of images, we misjudge individual elements as being closer to the mean than they are (Hollingworth, 1910) and recall seeing the (absent) set mean (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott (1995). Recent studies found that viewing sets of images, simultaneously or sequentially, leads to perception of set statistics (mean, range) with poor memory for individual elements. Ensemble perception was found for sets of simple images (e.g. circles varying in size or brightness; lines of varying orientation), complex objects (e.g. faces of varying emotion), as well as for objects belonging to the same category. When the viewed set does not include its mean or prototype, nevertheless, observers report and act as if they have seen this central image or object – a form of false memory. Physiologically, detailed sensory information at cortical input levels is processed hierarchically to form an integrated scene gist at higher levels. However, we are aware of the gist before the details. We propose that images and objects belonging to a set or category are represented as their gist, mean or prototype, plus individual differences from that gist. Under constrained viewing conditions, only the gist is perceived and remembered. This theory also provides a basis for compressed neural representation. Extending this theory to scenes and episodes supplies a generalized basis for false memories. They seem right, match generalized expectations, so are believable without challenging examination. This theory could be tested by analyzing the typicality of false memories, compared to rejected alternatives.