Cognition seminars

Drug addiction is a chronically relapsing disorder characterized by compulsive drug use despite catastrophic personal consequences (e.g., loss of family, job) and even when the substance is no longer perceived as pleasurable. In this talk, I will present results of human neuroimaging studies, utilizing a multimodal approach (neuropsychology, functional magnetic resonance imaging, event-related potentials recordings), to explore the neurobiology underlying the core psychological impairments in drug addiction (impulsivity, drive/motivation, insight/awareness) as associated with its clinical symptomatology (intoxication, craving, bingeing, withdrawal). The focus of this talk is on understanding the role of the dopaminergic mesocorticolimbic circuit, and especially the prefrontal cortex, in higher-order executive dysfunction (e.g., disadvantageous decision-making such as trading a car for a couple of cocaine hits) in drug addicted individuals. The theoretical model that guides the presented research is called iRISA (Impaired Response Inhibition and Salience Attribution), postulating that abnormalities in the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex, as related to dopaminergic dysfunction, contribute to the core clinical symptoms in drug addiction. Specifically, our multi-modality program of research is guided by the underlying working hypothesis that drug addicted individuals disproportionately attribute reward value to their drug of choice at the expense of other potentially but no-longer-rewarding stimuli, with a concomitant decrease in the ability to inhibit maladaptive drug use. In this talk I will also explore whether treatment (as usual) and 6-month abstinence enhance recovery in these brain-behavior compromises in treatment seeking cocaine addicted individuals. Promising neuroimaging studies, which combine pharmacological (i.e., oral methylphenidate, or RitalinTM) and salient cognitive tasks or functional connectivity during resting-state, will be discussed as examples for using neuroimaging for empirically guiding the development of effective neurorehabilitation strategies (encompassing cognitive reappraisal and transcranial direct current stimulation) in drug addiction.

Cases with visuospatial abnormalities provide opportunities for understanding the underlying cognitive mechanisms. Three cases of visual mirror-reversal have been reported: AH (McCloskey, 2009), TM (McCloskey, Valtonen, & Sherman, 2006) and PR (Pflugshaupt et al., 2007). This research reports a fourth case, BS -- with focal occipital cortical dysgenesis -- who displays highly unusual visuospatial abnormalities. They initially produced mirror reversal errors similar to those of AH, who -- like the patient in question -- showed a selective developmental deficit. Extensive examination of BS revealed phenomena such as: mirror reversal errors (sometimes affecting only parts of the visual fields) in both horizontal and vertical planes; subjective representation of visual objects and words in distinct left and right visual fields; subjective duplication of objects of visual attention (not due to diplopia); uncertainty regarding the canonical upright orientation of everyday objects; mirror reversals during saccadic eye movements on oculomotor tasks; and failure to integrate visual with other sensory inputs (e.g., they feel themself moving backwards when visual information shows they are moving forward). Fewer errors are produced under conditions of certain visual variables. These and other findings have led the researchers to conclude that BS draws upon a subjective representation of visual space that is structured phenomenally much as it is anatomically in early visual cortex (i.e., rotated through 180 degrees, split into left and right fields, etc.). Despite this, BS functions remarkably well in their everyday life, apparently due to extensive compensatory mechanisms deployed at higher (executive) processing levels beyond the visual modality.

Humans continuously need to learn to make good choices – be it using a new video-conferencing set up, figuring out what questions to ask to successfully secure a reliable babysitter, or just selecting which location in a house is least likely to be interrupted by toddlers during work calls. However, the goals we seek to attain – such as using zoom successfully – are often vaguely defined and previously unexperienced, and in that sense cannot be known by us as being rewarding. We hypothesized that learning to make good choices in such situations nevertheless leverages reinforcement learning processes, and that executive functions in general, and working memory in particular, play a crucial role in defining the reward function for arbitrary outcomes in such a way that they become reinforcing. I will show results from a novel behavioral protocol, as well as preliminary computational and imaging evidence supporting our hypothesis.

The world confronts our senses with a continuous stream of rapidly changing information. Yet, we experience life as a series of episodes or events, and in memory these pieces seem to become even further organized. How do we recall and give structure to this complex information? Recent studies have begun to examine these questions using naturalistic stimuli and behavior: subjects view audiovisual movies and then freely recount aloud their memories of the events. We find brain activity patterns that are unique to individual episodes, and which reappear during verbal recollection; robust generalization of these patterns across people; and memory effects driven by the structure of links between events in a narrative. These findings construct a picture of how we comprehend and recall real-world events that unfold continuously across time.

Although electroencephalography (EEG) has been used in clinical and research studies for almost a century, recent technological advances have made the equipment and processing tools more accessible outside laboratory settings. These low-cost alternatives can achieve satisfactory results in experiments such as detecting event-related potentials and classifying cognitive states. In our research, we use low-cost single-channel EEG to classify brain activity during the presentation of images of opposite emotional valence from the OASIS database. Emotional classification has already been achieved using research-grade and commercial-grade equipment, but our approach pioneers the use of educational-grade equipment for said task. EEG data is collected with a Backyard Brains SpikerBox, a low-cost and open-source bioamplifier that can record a single-channel electric signal from a pair of electrodes placed on the scalp, and used to train machine learning classifiers.

In many ways, cognitive neuroscience is the attempt to use physiological observation to clarify the mechanisms that shape behavior. Over the past 25 years, fMRI has provided a system-wide and yet somewhat spatially precise view of the response in human cortex evoked by a wide variety of stimuli and task contexts. The current talk focuses on the other direction of inference; the implications of this observed functional organization for behavior. To begin, we must interrogate the methodological and empirical frameworks underlying our derivation of this organization, partially by exploring its relationship to and predictability from gross neuroanatomy. Next, across a series of studies, the implications of two properties of functional organization for behavior will be explored: 1) the co-localization of visual working memory and perceptual processing and 2) implicit learning in the context of distributed responses. In sum, these results highlight the limitations of our current approach and hint at a new general mechanism for explaining observed behavior in context with the neural substrate.

Temporal lobe epilepsy is associated with memory deficits but the circuit mechanisms underlying these cognitive disabilities are not understood. We used electrophysiological recordings, open-source wire-free miniaturized microscopy and computational modeling to probe these deficits in a model of temporal lobe epilepsy. We find desynchronization of dentate gyrus interneurons with CA1 interneurons during theta oscillations and a loss of precision and stability of place fields. We also find that emergence of place cell dysfunction is delayed, providing a potential temporal window for treatments. Computation modeling shows that desynchronization rather than interneuron cell loss can drive place cell dysfunction. Future studies will uncover cell types driving these changes and transcriptional changes that may be driving dysfunction.

People frequently interpret the same information differently, based on their prior beliefs and views. This may occur in everyday settings, as when two friends are watching the same movie, but also in more consequential circumstances, such as when people interpret the same news differently based on their political views. The role of subjective knowledge in altering how the brain processes narratives has been explored mainly in controlled settings. I will present two projects that examines neural mechanisms underlying narrative interpretation “in the wild” -- how responses differ between two groups of people who interpret the same narrative in two coherent, but opposing ways. In the first project we manipulated participant’s prior knowledge to make them interpret the narrative differently, and found that responses in high-order areas, including the default mode network, language areas and subsets of the mirror neuron system, tend to be similar among people who share the same interpretation, but different from people with an opposing interpretation. In contrast to the active manipulation of participants’ interpretation in the first study, in the second (ongoing) project we examine these processes in a more ecological setting. Taking advantage of people’s natural tendencies to interpret the world through their own (political) filters, we examine these mechanisms while measuring their brain response to political movie clips. These studies are intended to deepen our understanding of the differences in subjective construal processes, by mapping their underlying brain mechanisms.

Over the past decade, the domain of face identity processing has seen a surging interest in inter-individual differences, with a focus on individuals with superior skills, so-called Super-Recognizers (SRs; Ramon et al., 2019; Russell et al., 2009). Their study can provide valuable insights into brain-behavior relationships and advance our understanding of neural functioning. Despite a decade of research, and similarly to the field of developmental prosopagnosia, a consensus on diagnostic criteria for SR identification is lacking. Consequently, SRs are currently identified either inconsistently, via suboptimal individual tests, or via undocumented collections of tests. This state of the field has two major implications. Firstly, our scientific understanding of SRs will remain at best limited. Secondly, the needs of government agencies interested in deploying SRs for real-life identity verification (e.g., policing) are unlikely to be met. To counteract these issues, I suggest the following action points. Firstly, based on our and others’ work suggesting novel and challenging tests of face cognition (Bobak et al., 2019; Fysh et al., in press; Stacchi et al., 2019), and my collaborations with international security agencies, I recommend novel diagnostic criteria for SR identification. These are currently being used to screen the Berlin State Police’s >25K employees before identifying SRs via bespoke testing procedures we have collaboratively developed over the past years. Secondly, I introduce a cohort of SRs identified using these criteria, which is being studied in-depth using behavioral methods, psychophysics, eye-tracking, and neuroimaging. Finally, I suggest data acquired for these individuals should be curated to develop and share best practices with researchers and practitioners, and to gain an accurate and transparent description of SR cases to exploit their informative value.

The hippocampus is implicated in memory formation, and neurons in the hippocampus take part in replay sequences, time-compressed reactivations of trajectories through space the animal has previously explored. These replay sequences have been proposed to be a form of memory for previously experienced places. I will present work exploring how these replays appear and change with experience. By recording from large ensembles of hippocampal neurons as rats explored novel and familiar linear tracks in various experiments, we found that hippocampal replays appear after a single experience and slow down with subsequent experience as greater detail is incorporated. We also investigated hover-and-jump dynamics within replays that are associated with the slow gamma (25-50Hz) oscillation in the LFP and found that replays slow down by adding more hover locations, corresponding to depiction of the behavioral trajectory with increased resolution. Thus, replays can reflect single experiences, and be rapidly modified by subsequent experience to incorporate more detail, consistent with their proposed role as a basic mechanism of hippocampally dependent memory.

David Chalmers’s (1995) hard problem famously states: “It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises.” Thomas Nagel (1974) wrote something similar: “If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue about how this could be done.” This presentation will point the way towards the long-sought “good explanation” -- or at least it will provide “a clue”. I will make three points: (1) It is unfortunate that cognitive science took vision as its model example when looking for a ‘neural correlate of consciousness’ because cortical vision (like most cognitive processes) is not intrinsically conscious. There is not necessarily ‘something it is like’ to see. (2) Affective feeling, by contrast, is conscious by definition. You cannot feel something without feeling it. Moreover, affective feeling, generated in the upper brainstem, is the foundational form of consciousness: prerequisite for all the higher cognitive forms. (3) The functional mechanism of feeling explains why and how it cannot go on ‘in the dark’, free of any inner feel. Affect enables the organism to monitor deviations from its expected self-states in uncertain situations and thereby frees homeostasis from the limitations of automatism. As Nagel says, “An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism.” Affect literally constitutes the sentient subject.

Understanding what drives foraging decisions in animals requires careful manipulation of the value of available options while monitoring animal choices. Value-based decision-making tasks, in combination with formal learning models, have provided both an experimental and theoretical framework to study foraging decisions in lab settings. While these approaches were successfully used in the past to understand what drives choices in mammals, very little work has been done on fruit flies. This is even though fruit flies have served as a model organism for many complex behavioural paradigms. To fill this gap we developed a single-animal, trial-based decision-making task, where freely walking flies experienced optogenetic sugar-receptor neuron stimulation. We controlled the value of available options by manipulating the probabilities of optogenetic stimulation. We show that flies integrate a reward history of chosen options and forget value of unchosen options. We further discover that flies assign higher values to rewards experienced early in the behavioural session, consistent with formal reinforcement learning models. Finally, we show that the probabilistic rewards affect walking trajectories of flies, suggesting that accumulated value is controlling the navigation vector of flies in a graded fashion. These findings establish the fruit fly as a model organism to explore the genetic and circuit basis of value-based decisions.

I will present work on a novel fMRI analysis method that allows us to investigate sequential reactivation in the hippocampus. Our method focuses on analysing the time courses of probabilistic multivariate classifiers and allows us to infer the presence and frequency of fast sequential reactivation events. Using a paradigm in which we controlled the speed of sequential visually elicited activations, we validated the method in visual cortex for event sequences with only 32 ms between items. We show that detectability remains possible if low signal-to-noise ratio and when sequence events occur at unknown times. In a preliminary analysis, we show that even the exposure to our visual paradigm elicits reactivations in visual cortex at rest following the task. I then present work in which we tested how representations influence replay by asking whether transitions between task-state representations are reactivated at rest during hippocampal replay events. Participants learned to make decisions about ambiguous stimuli that depended on past events and attentionally filtered stimulus processing. FMRI signals during rest periods following this task indicated sequential reactivation of task states. These results indicate that adaptive task state representations are computed and replayed at different cortical sites. In combination with other methods, fMRI may allow us to unravel this coordinated nature of replay.

50 years ago it was found that sleep somehow made memories better and more permanent, but neither sleep nor memory researchers knew enough about sleep and memory to devise robust, effective tests. Today the fields of sleep and memory have grown and what is now understood is astounding. Still, great mysteries remain. What is the functional difference between the subtly different slow oscillation vs the slow wave of sleep and do they really have opposite memory consolidation effects? How do short spindles (e.g. <0.5 s as in schizophrenia) differ in function from longer ones and are longer spindles key to integrating new memories with old? Is the nesting of slow oscillations together with sleep spindles and hippocampal ripples necessary? What happens if all else is fine but the neurochemical environment is altered? Does sleep become maladaptive and “cement” memories into the hippocampal warehouse where they are assembled, together with all of their emotional baggage? Does maladaptive sleep underlie post-traumatic stress disorder and other stress-related disorders? How do we optimize sleep characteristics for top emotional and cognitive function? State of the art findings and current hypotheses will be presented.