Psychology seminars

This talk will focus on the idea that the kind of similarity driving analogical retrieval is determined by the kind of features encoded regarding the source and the target cue situations. Emphasis will be put on educational perspectives in order to show the influence of world semantics on learners’ problem representations and solving strategies, as well as the difficulties arising from semantic incongruence between representations and strategies. Special attention will be given to the recoding of semantically incongruent representations, a crucial step that learners struggle with, in order to illustrate a promising path for going beyond informal strategies.

Previous work with complex memory span tasks, in which simple choice decisions are imposed between presentations of to-be-remembered items, shows that these secondary tasks reduce memory span. It is less clear how reconfiguring and maintaining various amounts of information affects decision speeds. We documented and replicated a non-linear effect of accumulating memory items on concurrent processing judgments, showing that this pattern could be made linear by introducing "lead-in" processing judgments prior to the start of the memory list. With lead-in judgments, there was a large and consistent cost to processing response times with the introduction of the first item in the memory list, which increased gradually per item as the list accumulated. However, once presentation of the list was complete, decision responses sped rapidly: within a few seconds, decisions were at least as fast as when remembering a single item. This pattern of findings is inconsistent with the idea that merely holding information in mind conflicts with attention-demanding decision tasks. Instead, it is possible that reconfiguring memory items for responding provokes conflict between memory and processing in complex span tasks.

At the foundation of human conscious experience lie basic embodied experiences of selfhood – experiences of simply ‘being alive’. In this talk, I will make the case that this central feature of human existence is underpinned by predictive regulation of the interior of the body, using the framework of predictive processing, or active inference. I start by showing how conscious experiences of the world around us can be understood in terms of perceptual predictions, drawing on examples from psychophysics and virtual reality. Then, turning the lens inwards, we will see how the experience of being an ‘embodied self’ rests on control-oriented predictive (allostatic) regulation of the body’s physiological condition. This approach implies a deep connection between mind and life, and provides a new way to understand the subjective nature of consciousness as emerging from systems that care intrinsically about their own existence. Contrary to the old doctrine of Descartes, we are conscious because we are beast machines.

Human society operates on large-scale cooperation and shared norms of fairness. However, individual differences in cooperation and incentives to free-riding on others’ cooperation make large-scale cooperation fragile and can lead to reduced social-welfare. Deciphering the neural codes representing potential rewards/costs for self and others is crucial for understanding social decision-making and cooperation. I will first talk about how we integrate computational modeling with functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the neural representation of social value and the modulation by oxytocin, a nine-amino acid neuropeptide, in participants evaluating monetary allocations to self and other (self-other allocations). Then I will introduce our recent studies examining the neurobiological mechanisms underlying intergroup decision-making using hyper-scanning, and share with you how we alter intergroup decisions using psychological manipulations and pharmacological challenge. Finally, I will share with you our on-going project that reveals how individual cooperation spreads through human social networks. Our results help to better understand the neurocomputational mechanism underlying interpersonal and intergroup decision-making.

Organisms face challenges to survival throughout life. When we freeze or flee in danger, we often feel fear. Tracing the deep history of danger gives a different perspective. The first cells living billions of years ago had to detect and respond to danger in order to survive. Life is about not being dead, and behavior is a major way that organisms hold death off. Although behavior does not require a nervous system, complex organisms have brain circuits for detecting and responding to danger, the deep roots of which go back to the first cells. But these circuits do not make fear, and fear is not the cause of why we freeze or flee. Fear a human invention; a construct we use to account for what happens in our minds when we become aware that we are in harm’s way. This requires a brain that can personally know that it existed in the past, that it is the entity that might be harmed in the present, and that it will cease to exist it the future. If other animals have conscious experiences, they cannot have the kinds of conscious experiences we have because they do not have the kinds of brains we have. This is not meant as a denial of animal consciousness; it is simply a statement about the fact that every species has a different brain. Nor is it a declaration about the wonders of the human brain, since we have done some wonderful, but also horrific, things with our brains. In fact, we are on the way to a climatic disaster that will not, as some suggest, destroy the Earth. But it will make it inhabitable for our kind, and other organisms with high energy demands. Bacteria have made it for billions of years and will likely be fine. The rest is up for grabs, and, in a very real sense, up to us.

In Europe, the number of people aged 65 and older is increasing dramatically, and research related to ageing is more crucial than ever. The main research dedicated to age-related changes concentrates on cognitive or sensory deficits. This is also the case in vision research. However, the majority of older adults ages without major cognitive or optical or deficits. These are foremost good news, but even in the absence of neurodegenerative or eye diseases changes in visual perception occur. It has been suggested that age-related changes are due to a general decline of cognitive, perceptual and sensory functions. However, more recent studies reveal large individual differences within the ageing population and whereas some functions show age-related deterioration, others are surprisingly unaffected. Overall, it becomes increasingly apparent that perceptual changes in healthy ageing cannot be attributed to one single underlying factor. I will present studies from various areas of visual perception that challenge the view that age-related changes are primarily related to decline. Instead, our findings suggest that age-related changes are the result of visual experience, such that the brain ages optimally given the input it receives.

In human and non-human animals, conceptual knowledge is partially organized according to low-dimensional geometries that rely on brain structures and computations involved in spatial representations. Recently, two separate lines of research have investigated cognitive maps, that are associated with the hippocampal formation and are similar to world-centered representations of the environment, and image spaces, that are associated with the parietal cortex and are similar to self-centered spatial relationships. I will suggest that cognitive maps and image spaces may be two manifestations of a more general propensity of the mind to create low-dimensional internal models, and may play a role in analogical reasoning and metaphorical thinking. Finally, I will show some data suggesting that the metaphorical relationship between colors and emotions can be accounted for by the structural alignment of low-dimensional conceptual spaces.

Monetary incentive delay task (MID) is a well-validated human functional MRI task widely used in probing affective-motivational processes in psychiatric disorders. We are developing a mouse version of the MID task in order to facilitate translations of findings from the wealth of human imaging studies. This talk presents our task design and behavioural data from the ongoing work.

Human participant research is somehow both antithetical and complementary to science. On the one hand, working with human participants provides incredibly rich and complex data with ‘real-world’ ecological validity. On the other, this richness is due to the incredible number of variables which uncontrollably become intertwined with your research interest, potentially limiting the conclusions you can draw from your work. Historical over-representation of white men as research participants, coupled with often overly-stringent exclusion criteria has led to a diversity crisis in human participant research. For our research to be truly inclusive, representative and generalisable to the rest of the population, our data must be collected from diverse individuals. This session will explore common barriers to diversity in studies with human participants, and will provide guidance on how to make sure your own research is accessible and inclusive.

Visual working memory (VWM) allows us to maintain a small amount of task-relevant information in mind so that we can use them to guide our behavior. Although past studies have successfully characterized its capacity limit and representational quality during maintenance, the consequence of its usage for task-relevant behaviors has been largely unknown. In this talk, I will demonstrate that VWM representations get distorted when they are used for perceptual comparisons with new visual inputs, especially when the inputs are subjectively similar to the VWM representations. Furthermore, I will show that this similarity-induced memory bias (SIMB) occurs for both simple (e.g. , color, shape) and complex stimuli (e.g., real world objects, faces) that are perceptually encoded and retrieved from long-term memory. Given the observed versatility of the SIMB, its implication for other memory distortion phenomena (e.g., distractor-induced distortion, misinformation effect) will be discussed.

Recent years have seen a considerable surge of research on interest-based engagement, examining how and why people are engaged in activities without relying on extrinsic rewards. However, the field of inquiry has been somewhat segregated into three different research traditions which have been developed relatively independently --- research on curiosity, interest, and trait curiosity/interest. The current talk sets out an integrative perspective; the reward-learning framework of knowledge acquisition. This conceptual framework takes on the basic premise of existing reward-learning models of information seeking: that knowledge acquisition serves as an inherent reward, which reinforces people’s information-seeking behavior through a reward-learning process. However, the framework reveals how the knowledge-acquisition process is sustained and boosted over a long period of time in real-life settings, allowing us to integrate the different research traditions within reward-learning models. The framework also characterizes the knowledge-acquisition process with four distinct features that are not present in the reward-learning process with extrinsic rewards --- (1) cumulativeness, (2) selectivity, (3) vulnerability, and (4) under-appreciation. The talk describes some evidence from our lab supporting these claims.

Our research investigates how processes of attention, visual working memory (VWM), and decision-making combine to translate perception into action. Within this framework, the role of VWM is to form stable representations of transient stimulus events that allow them to be identified by a decision process, which we model as a diffusion process. In psychophysical tasks, we find the capacity of VWM is well defined by a sample-size model, which attributes changes in VWM precision with set-size to differences in the number evidence samples recruited to represent stimuli. In the first part of the talk, I review evidence for the sample-size model and highlight the model's strengths: It provides a parameter-free characterization of the set-size effect; it has plausible neural and cognitive interpretations; an attention-weighted version of the model accounts for the power-law of VWM, and it accounts for the selective updating of VWM in multiple-look experiments. In the second part of the talk, I provide a characterization of the theoretical relationship between two-choice and continuous-outcome decision tasks using the circular diffusion model, highlighting their common features. I describe recent work characterizing the joint distributions of decision outcomes and response times in continuous-outcome tasks using the circular diffusion model and show that the model can clearly distinguish variable-precision and simple mixture models of the evidence entering the decision process. The ability to distinguish these kinds of processes is central to current VWM studies.

The successful recognition of familiar persons is critical for social interactions. Despite extensive research on the neural representations of familiar faces, we know little about how such representations unfold as someone becomes familiar. In three EEG experiments, we elucidated how representations of face familiarity and identity emerge from different qualities of familiarization: brief perceptual exposure (Experiment 1), extensive media familiarization (Experiment 2) and real-life personal familiarization (Experiment 3). Time-resolved representational similarity analysis revealed that familiarization quality has a profound impact on representations of face familiarity: they were strongly visible after personal familiarization, weaker after media familiarization, and absent after perceptual familiarization. Across all experiments, we found no enhancement of face identity representation, suggesting that familiarity and identity representations emerge independently during face familiarization. Our results emphasize the importance of extensive, real-life familiarization for the emergence of robust face familiarity representations, constraining models of face perception and recognition memory.

Optimally interacting with a changeable and uncertain world requires estimating and representing uncertainty. Psychiatric and neurodevelopmental conditions such as anxiety and autism are characterized by an altered response to uncertainty. I will review the evidence for these phenomena from computational modelling, and outline the planned experiments from our lab to add further weight to these ideas. If time allows, I will present results from a control sample in a novel task interrogating a particular type of uncertainty and their associated transdiagnostic psychiatric traits.

Recent years have seen a considerable surge of research on interest-based engagement, examining how and why people are engaged in activities without relying on extrinsic rewards. However, the field of inquiry has been somewhat segregated into three different research traditions which have been developed relatively independently -- research on curiosity, interest, and trait curiosity/interest. The current talk sets out an integrative perspective; the reward-learning framework of knowledge acquisition. This conceptual framework takes on the basic premise of existing reward-learning models of information seeking: that knowledge acquisition serves as an inherent reward, which reinforces people’s information-seeking behavior through a reward-learning process. However, the framework reveals how the knowledge-acquisition process is sustained and boosted over a long period of time in real-life settings, allowing us to integrate the different research traditions within reward-learning models. The framework also characterizes the knowledge-acquisition process with four distinct features that are not present in the reward-learning process with extrinsic rewards -- (1) cumulativeness, (2) selectivity, (3) vulnerability, and (4) under-appreciation. The talk describes some evidence from our lab supporting these claims.

Several studies have showed that face stimuli elicit extremely fast and involuntary saccadic responses toward them, relative to other categories of visual stimuli. In the talk, I will mainly focus on a quite recent research done in our team that investigated to what extent face stimuli influence the programming and execution of saccades. In this research, two experiments were performed using a saccadic choice task: two images (one with a face, one with a vehicle) were simultaneously displayed in the left and right visual fields of participants who had to execute a saccade toward the image (Experiment 1) or toward a cross added in the center of the image (Experiment 2) containing a target stimulus (a face or a vehicle). As expected participants were faster to execute a saccade toward a face than toward a vehicle and did less errors. We also observed shorter saccades toward vehicle than face targets, even if participants were explicitly asked to perform their saccades toward a specific location (Experiment 2). Further analyses, that I will detailed in the talk, showed that error saccades might be interrupted in mid-fight to initiate a concurrently programmed corrective saccade.

The last two decades have seen a rise in online projects such as Wikipedia or OpenStreetMap in which people collaborate to create a common product. Contributors in such projects often work together sequentially. Essentially, the first contributor generates an entry (e.g., a Wikipedia article) independently which is then adjusted in the following by other contributors by adding or correcting information. We refer to this way of working together as sequential collaboration. This process has not yet been studied in the context of judgment and decision making even though research has demonstrated that Wikipedia and OpenStreetMap yield very accurate information. In this talk, I give first insights into the structure of sequential collaboration, how adjusting each other’s judgments can yield more accurate final estimates, which boundary conditions need to be met, and which underlying mechanisms may be responsible for successful collaboration. A preprint is available at https://psyarxiv.com/w4xdk/