Psychology seminars

One of the most common medical conditions you’ve (maybe) never heard of – functional neurological disorder – lays at the interface of neurology and psychiatry and offers a window into fundamental brain-mind-body processes. Across ancient and modern times, functional neurological disorder has had a long and tumultuous history, with an evolving debate and understanding of how biopsychosocial factors contribute to the manifestation of the disorder. A central issue in contemporary discussions has revolved around questioning the extent to which emotions play a mechanistic and aetiological role in functional neurological disorder. Critical in this context, however, is that this ongoing debate has largely omitted the question of what emotions are in the first place. This talk first brings together advances in the understanding of working principles of the brain fundamental to introducing a new understanding of what emotions are. Building on recent theoretical frameworks from affective neuroscience, the idea of how the predictive process of emotion construction can be an integral component of the pathophysiology of functional neurological disorder is discussed.

Voluntary actions are actions that agents choose to make. Volition is the set of cognitive processes that implement such choice and initiation. These processes are often held essential to modern societies, because they form the cognitive underpinning for concepts of individual autonomy and individual responsibility. Nevertheless, psychology and neuroscience have struggled to define volition, and have also struggled to study it scientifically. Laboratory experiments on volition, such as those of Libet, have been criticised, often rather naively, as focussing exclusively on meaningless actions, and ignoring the factors that make voluntary action important in the wider world. In this talk, I will first review these criticisms, and then look at extending scientific approaches to volition in three directions that may enrich scientific understanding of volition. First, volition becomes particularly important when the range of possible actions is large and unconstrained - yet most experimental paradigms involve minimal response spaces. We have developed a novel paradigm for eliciting de novo actions through verbal fluency, and used this to estimate the elusive conscious experience of generativity. Second, volition can be viewed as a mechanism for flexibility, by promoting adaptation of behavioural biases. This view departs from the tradition of defining volition by contrasting internally-generated actions with externally-triggered actions, and instead links volition to model-based reinforcement learning. By using the context of competitive games to re-operationalise the classic Libet experiment, we identified a form of adaptive autonomy that allows agents to reduce biases in their action choices. Interestingly, this mechanism seems not to require explicit understanding and strategic use of action selection rules, in contrast to classical ideas about the relation between volition and conscious, rational thought. Third, I will consider volition teleologically, as a mechanism for achieving counterfactual goals through complex problem-solving. This perspective gives a key role in mediating between understanding and planning on the one hand, and instrumental action on the other hand. Taken together, these three cognitive phenomena of generativity, flexibility, and teleology may partly explain why volition is such an important cognitive function for organisation of human behaviour and human flourishing. I will end by discussing how this enriched view of volition can relate to individual autonomy and responsibility.

Note: British 16.15 is the finishing time

Humans constantly make perceptual decisions on human faces and voices. These regularly come with the challenge of receiving only uncertain sensory evidence, resulting from noisy input and noisy neural processes. Efficiently adapting one’s internal decision system including prior expectations and subsequent metacognitive assessments to these challenges is crucial in everyday life. However, the exact decision mechanisms and whether these represent modifiable states remain unknown in the general population and clinical patients with psychosis. Using data from a laboratory-based sample of healthy controls and patients with psychosis as well as a complementary, large online sample of healthy controls, I will demonstrate how a combination of perceptual face and voice recognition decision fidelity, metacognitive ratings, and Bayesian computational modelling may be used as indicators to differentiate between non-clinical and clinical states in the future.

The sense of agency refers to the subjective feeling of controlling one's own behavior and, through them, external events. Why is this subjective feeling important for humans? Is it just a by-product of our actions? Previous studies have shown that the sense of agency can affect the intensity of sensory input because we predict the input from our motor intention. However, my research has found that the sense of agency plays more roles than just predictions. It enhances perceptual processes of sensory input and potentially helps to harvest more information about the link between the external world and the self. Furthermore, our recent research found both indirect and direct evidence that the sense of agency is important for people's exploratory behaviors, and this may be linked to proximal exploitations of one's control in the environment. In this talk, I will also introduce the paradigms we use to study the sense of agency as a result of perceptual processes, and our findings of individual differences in this sense and the implications.

Humans are natural teachers; learning through instruction is one of the most fundamental ways that we learn. Interactive Task Learning (ITL) is an emerging research agenda that studies the design of complex intelligent robots that can acquire new knowledge through natural human teacher-robot learner interactions. ITL methods are particularly useful for designing intelligent robots whose behavior can be adapted by humans collaborating with them. In this talk, I will summarize our recent findings on the structure that human instruction naturally has and motivate an intelligent system design that can exploit their structure. The system – AILEEN – is being developed using the common model of cognition. Architectures that implement the Common Model of Cognition - Soar, ACT-R, and Sigma - have a prominent place in research on cognitive modeling as well as on designing complex intelligent agents. However, they miss a critical piece of intelligent behavior – analogical reasoning and generalization. I will introduce a new memory – concept memory – that integrates with a common model of cognition architecture and supports ITL.

Visual working memory (VWM) is limited in capacity, but memorizing meaningful objects may refine this limitation. However, meaningless and meaningful stimuli usually differ perceptually and an object’s association with meaning is typically already established before the actual experiment. We applied a strict control over these potential confounds by asking observers (N=45) to actively learn associations of (initially) meaningless objects. To this end, a change detection task presented Chinese characters, which were meaningless to our observers. Subsequently, half of the characters were consistently paired with pictures of animals. Then, the initial change detection task was repeated. The results revealed enhanced VWM performance after learning, in particular for meaning-associated characters (though not quite reaching the accuracy level attained by N=20 native Chinese observers). These results thus provide direct experimental evidence that the short-term retention of objects benefits from active learning of an object’s association with meaning in long-term memory.

Metacognition has long been defined as “cognition about cognition”. One of its aspects is the error monitoring ability, which includes being aware of one’s own errors without external feedback. This ability is mostly investigated in two-alternative forced choice tasks, where the performance has all or none nature in terms of accuracy. The previous literature documents the effect of different influences on the error monitoring ability, such as working memory, feedback and sensorimotor involvement. However, these demonstrations fall short of generalizing to the real life scenarios where the errors often have a magnitude and a direction. To bridge this gap, recent studies showed that humans could keep track of the magnitude and the direction of their errors in temporal, spatial and numerical domains in two metrics: confidence and short-long/few-more judgements. This talk will cover how the documented effects that are obtained in the two alternative forced choices tasks apply to the temporal error monitoring ability. Finally, how magnitude and direction monitoring (i.e., confidence and short-long judgements) can be differentiated as the two indices of temporal error monitoring ability will be discussed.

Precisely estimating event timing is essential for survival, yet temporal distortions are ubiquitous in our daily sensory experience. Here, we tested whether the relative position, duration, and distance in time of two sequentially-organized events—standard S, with constant duration, and comparison C, with duration varying trial-by-trial—are causal factors in generating temporal distortions. We found that temporal distortions emerge when the first event is shorter than the second event. Importantly, a significant interaction suggests that a longer inter-stimulus interval (ISI) helps to counteract such serial distortion effect only when the constant S is in the first position, but not if the unpredictable C is in the first position. These results imply the existence of a perceptual bias in perceiving ordered event durations, mechanistically contributing to distortion in time perception. Our results clarify the mechanisms generating time distortions by identifying a hitherto unknown duration-dependent encoding inefficiency in human serial temporal perception, something akin to a strong prior that can be overridden for highly predictable sensory events but unfolds for unpredictable ones.

Explicit similarity judgments tend to emphasize relational information more than do difference judgments. In this talk, I propose and test the hypothesis that this asymmetry arises because human reasoners represent the relation different as the negation of the relation same (i.e., as not-same). This proposal implies that processing difference is more cognitively demanding than processing similarity. Both for verbal comparisons between word pairs, and for visual comparisons between sets of geometric shapes, participants completed a triad task in which they selected which of two options was either more similar to or more different from a standard. On unambiguous trials, one option was unambiguously more similar to the standard, either by virtue of featural similarity or by virtue of relational similarity. On ambiguous trials, one option was more featurally similar (but less relationally similar) to the standard, whereas the other was more relationally similar (but less featurally similar). Given the higher cognitive complexity of assessing relational similarity, we predicted that detecting relational difference would be particularly demanding. We found that participants (1) had more difficulty accurately detecting relational difference than they did relational similarity on unambiguous trials, and (2) tended to emphasize relational information more when judging similarity than when judging difference on ambiguous trials. The latter finding was captured by a computational model of comparison that weights relational information more heavily for similarity than for difference judgments. These results provide convergent evidence for a representational asymmetry between the relations same and different.

Analogical reasoning is a common reasoning tool for learning and problem-solving. Existing research has extensively studied children’s reasoning when comparing, or choosing from ready-made analogies. Relatively less is known about how children come up with analogies in authentic learning environments. Design education provides a suitable context to investigate how children generate analogies for creative learning purposes. Meanwhile, the frequent use of visual analogies in design provides an additional opportunity to understand the role of spatial reasoning in design-by-analogy. Spatial reasoning is one of the most studied human cognitive factors and is critical to the learning of science, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics (STEAM). There is growing interest in exploring the interplay between analogical reasoning and spatial reasoning. In this talk, I will share qualitative findings from a case study, where a class of 11-to-12-year-olds in the Netherlands participated in a biomimicry design project. These findings illustrate (1) practical ways to support children’s analogical reasoning in the ideation process and (2) the potential role of spatial reasoning as seen in children mapping form-function relationships in nature analogically and adaptively to those in human designs.

Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a prevalent and disabling condition that affects larger numbers of children and adolescents worldwide. Until recently, we have understood little about the nature of PTSD reactions in our youngest children (aged under 8 years old). This talk describes our work over the last 15 years working with this very young age group. It overviews how we need a markedly different PTSD diagnosis for very young children, data on the prevalence of this new diagnostic algorithm, and the development of a psychological intervention and its evaluation in a clinical trial.

Metaphor is a pervasive phenomenon in language and cognition. To date, the vast majority of psycholinguistic research on metaphor has focused on noun-noun metaphors of the form An X is a Y (e.g., My job is a jail). Yet there is evidence that verb metaphor (e.g., I sailed through my exams) is more common. Despite this, comparatively little work has examined how verb metaphors are processed. In this talk, I will propose a novel account for verb metaphor comprehension: verb metaphors are understood in the same way that analogies are—as comparisons processed via structure-mapping. I will discuss the predictions that arise from applying the analogical framework to verb metaphor and present a series of experiments showing that verb metaphoric extension is consistent with those predictions.

In cognitive development, learning more than the input provides is a central challenge. This challenge is especially evident in learning the meaning of numbers. Integers – and the quantities they denote – are potentially infinite, as are the fractional values between every integer. Yet children’s experiences of numbers are necessarily finite. Analogy is a powerful learning mechanism for children to learn novel, abstract concepts from only limited input. However, retrieving proper analogy requires cognitive supports. In this talk, I seek to propose and examine number lines as a mathematical schema of the number system to facilitate both the development of rational number understanding and analogical reasoning. To examine these hypotheses, I will present a series of educational intervention studies with third-to-fifth graders. Results showed that a short, unsupervised intervention of spatial alignment between integers and fractions on number lines produced broad and durable gains in fractional magnitudes. Additionally, training on conceptual knowledge of fractions – that fractions denote magnitude and can be placed on number lines – facilitates explicit analogical reasoning. Together, these studies indicate that analogies can play an important role in rational number learning with the help of number lines as schemas. These studies shed light on helpful practices in STEM education curricula and instructions.

The ‘quantification’ of perception is arguably both one of the most important and most difficult aspects of perception study. This is particularly true in visual perception, in which the evaluation of the perceptual threshold is a pillar of the experimental process. The choice of the correct adaptive psychometric procedure, as well as the selection of the proper parameters, is a difficult but key aspect of the experimental protocol. For instance, Bayesian methods such as QUEST, require the a priori choice of a family of functions (e.g. Gaussian), which is rarely known before the experiment, as well as the specification of multiple parameters. Importantly, the choice of an ill-fitted function or parameters will induce costly mistakes and errors in the experimental process. In this talk we discuss the existing methods and introduce a new adaptive procedure to solve this problem, named, ZOOM (Zooming Optimistic Optimization of Models), based on recent advances in optimization and statistical learning. Compared to existing approaches, ZOOM is completely parameter free and model-free, i.e. can be applied on any arbitrary psychometric problem. Moreover, ZOOM parameters are self-tuned, thus do not need to be manually chosen using heuristics (eg. step size in the Staircase method), preventing further errors. Finally, ZOOM is based on state-of-the-art optimization theory, providing strong mathematical guarantees that are missing from many of its alternatives, while being the most accurate and robust in real life conditions. In our experiments and simulations, ZOOM was found to be significantly better than its alternative, in particular for difficult psychometric functions or when the parameters when not properly chosen. ZOOM is open source, and its implementation is freely available on the web. Given these advantages and its ease of use, we argue that ZOOM can improve the process of many psychophysics experiments.

Previous studies have shown that blind individuals outperform sighted controls in a variety of auditory tasks; however, only few studies have investigated blind listeners’ speaker identification abilities. In addition, existing studies in the area show conflicting results. The presented empirical investigation with 153 blind (74 of them congenitally blind) and 153 sighted listeners is the first of its kind and scale in which long-term memory effects of blind listeners’ speaker identification abilities are examined. For the empirical investigation, all listeners were evenly assigned to one of nine subgroups (3 x 3 design) in order to investigate the influence of two parameters with three levels, respectively, on blind and sighted listeners’ speaker identification performance. The parameters were a) time interval; i.e. a time interval of 1, 3 or 6 weeks between the first exposure to the voice to be recognised (familiarisation) and the speaker identification task (voice lineup); and b) signal quality; i.e. voice recordings were presented in either studio-quality, mobile phone-quality or as recordings of whispered speech. Half of the presented voice lineups were target-present lineups in which the previously heard target voice was included. The other half consisted of target-absent lineups which contained solely distractor voices. Blind individuals outperformed sighted listeners only under studio quality conditions. Furthermore, for blind and sighted listeners no significant performance differences were found with regard to the three investigated time intervals of 1, 3 and 6 weeks. Blind as well as sighted listeners were significantly better at picking the target voice from target-present lineups than at indicating that the target voice was absent in target-absent lineups. Within the blind group, no significant correlations were found between identification performance and onset or duration of blindness. Implications for the field of forensic phonetics are discussed.