Seminars

Cognitive maps confer animals with flexible intelligence by representing spatial, temporal, and abstract relationships that can be used to shape thought, planning, and behavior. Cognitive maps have been observed in the hippocampus, but their algorithmic form and the processes by which they are learned remain obscure. Here, we employed large-scale, longitudinal two-photon calcium imaging to record activity from thousands of neurons in the CA1 region of the hippocampus while mice learned to efficiently collect rewards from two subtly different versions of linear tracks in virtual reality. The results provide a detailed view of the formation of a cognitive map in the hippocampus. Throughout learning, both the animal behavior and hippocampal neural activity progressed through multiple intermediate stages, gradually revealing improved task representation that mirrored improved behavioral efficiency. The learning process led to progressive decorrelations in initially similar hippocampal neural activity within and across tracks, ultimately resulting in orthogonalized representations resembling a state machine capturing the inherent struture of the task. We show that a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and a biologically plausible recurrent neural network trained using Hebbian learning can both capture core aspects of the learning dynamics and the orthogonalized representational structure in neural activity. In contrast, we show that gradient-based learning of sequence models such as Long Short-Term Memory networks (LSTMs) and Transformers do not naturally produce such orthogonalized representations. We further demonstrate that mice exhibited adaptive behavior in novel task settings, with neural activity reflecting flexible deployment of the state machine. These findings shed light on the mathematical form of cognitive maps, the learning rules that sculpt them, and the algorithms that promote adaptive behavior in animals. The work thus charts a course toward a deeper understanding of biological intelligence and offers insights toward developing more robust learning algorithms in artificial intelligence.

Psychology and neuroscience are increasingly looking to fine-grained analyses of decision-making behaviour, seeking to characterise not just the variation between subjects but also a subject's variability across time. When analysing the behaviour of each subject in a choice task, we ideally want to know not only when the subject has learnt the correct choice rule but also what the subject tried while learning. I introduce a simple but effective Bayesian approach to inferring the probability of different choice strategies at trial resolution. This can be used both for inferring when subjects learn, by tracking the probability of the strategy matching the target rule, and for inferring subjects use of exploratory strategies during learning. Applied to data from rodent and human decision tasks, we find learning occurs earlier and more often than estimated using classical approaches. Around both learning and changes in the rewarded rules the exploratory strategies of win-stay and lose-shift, often considered complementary, are consistently used independently. Indeed, we find the use of lose-shift is strong evidence that animals have latently learnt the salient features of a new rewarded rule. Our approach can be extended to any discrete choice strategy, and its low computational cost is ideally suited for real-time analysis and closed-loop control.

To understand subjective evaluation of an option, various disciplines have quantified the interaction between reward and effort during decision making, producing an estimate of economic utility, namely the subject ‘goodness’ of an option. However, those same variables that affect the utility of an option also influence the vigor (speed) of movements to acquire it. To better understand this, we have developed a mathematical framework demonstrating how utility can influence not only the choice of what to do, but also the speed of the movement follows. I will present results demonstrating that expectation of reward increases speed of saccadic eye and reaching movements, whereas expectation of effort expenditure decreases this speed. Intriguingly, when deliberating between two visual options, saccade vigor to each option increases differentially, encoding their relative value. These results and others imply that vigor may serve as a new, real-time metric with which to quantify subjective utility, and that the control of movements may be an implicit reflection of the brain’s economic evaluation of the expected outcome. Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2023-10-18. Recording duration: 00:45:32.

New tasks are often similar in structure to old ones. Animals that take advantage of such conserved or “abstract” task structures can master new tasks with minimal training. To understand the neural basis of this abstraction, we developed a novel behavioural paradigm for mice: the “ABCD” task, and recorded from their medial frontal neurons as they learned. Animals learned multiple tasks where they had to visit 4 rewarded locations on a spatial maze in sequence, which defined a sequence of four “task states” (ABCD). Tasks shared the same circular transition structure (… ABCDABCD …) but differed in the spatial arrangement of rewards. As well as improving across tasks, mice inferred that A followed D (i.e. completed the loop) on the very first trial of a new task. This “zero-shot inference” is only possible if animals had learned the abstract structure of the task. Across tasks, individual medial Frontal Cortex (mFC) neurons maintained their tuning to the phase of an animal’s trajectory between rewards but not their tuning to task states, even in the absence of spatial tuning. Intriguingly, groups of mFC neurons formed modules of coherently remapping neurons that maintained their tuning relationships across tasks. Such tuning relationships were expressed as replay/preplay during sleep, consistent with an internal organisation of activity into multiple, task-matched ring attractors. Remarkably, these modules were anchored to spatial locations: neurons were tuned to specific task space “distances” from a particular spatial location. These newly discovered “Spatially Anchored Task clocks” (SATs), suggest a novel algorithm for solving abstraction tasks. Using computational modelling, we show that SATs can perform zero-shot inference on new tasks in the absence of plasticity and guide optimal policy in the absence of continual planning. These findings provide novel insights into the Frontal mechanisms mediating abstraction and flexible behaviour.

Abstract concepts are a powerful tool to store information efficiently and to make wide-ranging predictions in new situations based on sparse data. Whereas looking-time studies point towards an early emergence of this ability in human infancy, other paradigms like the relational match to sample task often show a failure to detect abstract concepts like same and different until the late preschool years. Similarly, non-human animals have difficulties solving those tasks and often succeed only after long training regimes. Given the huge influence of small task modifications, there is an ongoing debate about the conclusiveness of these findings for the development and phylogenetic distribution of abstract reasoning abilities. Here, we applied the concept of “overhypotheses” which is well known in the infant and cognitive modeling literature to study the capabilities of 3 to 5-year-old children, chimpanzees, and capuchin monkeys in a unified and more ecologically valid task design. In a series of studies, participants themselves sampled reward items from multiple containers or witnessed the sampling process. Only when they detected the abstract pattern governing the reward distributions within and across containers, they could optimally guide their behavior and maximize the reward outcome in a novel test situation. We compared each species’ performance to the predictions of a probabilistic hierarchical Bayesian model capable of forming overhypotheses at a first and second level of abstraction and adapted to their species-specific reward preferences.

Decision-making in noisy environments with constant sensory evidence involves integrating sequentially-sampled evidence, a strategy formalized by diffusion models which is supported by decades behavioral and neural findings. By contrast, it is unknown whether this strategy is also used during decision-making when the underlying sensory evidence is expected to change. Here, we trained monkeys to identify the dominant color of a dynamically refreshed checkerboard pattern that doesn't become informative until after a variable delay. Animals' behavioral responses were briefly suppressed after an abrupt change in evidence, and many neurons in the frontal eye field displayed a corresponding dip in activity at this time, similar to the dip frequently observed after stimulus onset. Generalized drift-diffusion models revealed that behavior and neural activity were consistent with a brief suppression of motor output without a change in evidence accumulation itself, in contrast to the popular belief that evidence accumulation is paused or reset. These results suggest that a brief interruption in motor preparation is an important strategy for dealing with changing evidence during perceptual decision making.

I will begin by describing recent research taking a new, model-based approach to perceptual development. This approach uncovers fundamental changes in information processing underlying the protracted development of perception, action, and decision-making in childhood. For example, integration of multiple sensory estimates via reliability-weighted averaging – widely used by adults to improve perception – is often not seen until surprisingly late into childhood, as assessed by both behaviour and neural representations. This approach forms the basis for a newer question: the scope for the nervous system to deploy useful computations (e.g. reliability-weighted averaging) to optimise perception and action using newly-learned sensory signals provided by technology. Our initial model system is augmenting visual depth perception with devices translating distance into auditory or vibro-tactile signals. This problem has immediate applications to people with partial vision loss, but the broader question concerns our scope to use technology to tune in to any signal not available to our native biological receptors. I will describe initial progress on this problem, and our approach to operationalising what it might mean to adopt a new signal comparably to a native sense. This will include testing for its integration (weighted averaging) alongside the native senses, assessing the level at which this integration happens in the brain, and measuring the degree of ‘automaticity’ with which new signals are used, compared with native perception.

My research focuses, broadly speaking, on how emotions impact decision making. Specifically, I am interested in affective biases, a phenomenon known to be important in depression. Using a rodent decision-making task, combined with computational modelling I have investigated how different antidepressant and pro-depressant manipulations that are known to alter mood in humans alter judgement bias, and provided insight into the decision processes that underlie these behaviours. I will also highlight how the combination of behaviour and modelling can provide a truly translation approach, enabling comparison and interpretation of the same cognitive processes between animal and human research.

Classical models of perceptual decision-making assume that animals use a single, consistent strategy to integrate sensory evidence and form decisions during an experiment. In this talk, I aim to convince you that this common view is incorrect. I will show results from applying a latent variable framework, the “GLM-HMM”, to hundreds of thousands of trials of mouse choice data. Our analysis reveals that mice don’t lapse. Instead, mice switch back and forth between engaged and disengaged behavior within a single session, and each mode of behavior lasts tens to hundreds of trials.

Humans spend a lifetime learning, storing and refining a repertoire of motor memories. However, it is unknown what principle underlies the way our continuous stream of sensori-motor experience is segmented into separate memories and how we adapt and use this growing repertoire. Here we develop a principled theory of motor learning based on the key insight that memory creation, updating, and expression are all controlled by a single computation – contextual inference. Unlike dominant theories of single-context learning, our repertoire-learning model accounts for key features of motor learning that had no unified explanation and predicts novel phenomena, which we confirm experimentally. These results suggest that contextual inference is the key principle underlying how a diverse set of experiences is reflected in motor behavior.

Understanding what drives foraging decisions in animals requires careful manipulation of the value of available options while monitoring animal choices. Value-based decision-making tasks, in combination with formal learning models, have provided both an experimental and theoretical framework to study foraging decisions in lab settings. While these approaches were successfully used in the past to understand what drives choices in mammals, very little work has been done on fruit flies. This is even though fruit flies have served as a model organism for many complex behavioural paradigms. To fill this gap we developed a single-animal, trial-based decision-making task, where freely walking flies experienced optogenetic sugar-receptor neuron stimulation. We controlled the value of available options by manipulating the probabilities of optogenetic stimulation. We show that flies integrate a reward history of chosen options and forget value of unchosen options. We further discover that flies assign higher values to rewards experienced early in the behavioural session, consistent with formal reinforcement learning models. Finally, we show that the probabilistic rewards affect walking trajectories of flies, suggesting that accumulated value is controlling the navigation vector of flies in a graded fashion. These findings establish the fruit fly as a model organism to explore the genetic and circuit basis of value-based decisions.