Seminars

Subsecond timing underlies nearly all sensory and motor activities across species and is critical to survival. While subsecond temporal information has been found across cortical and subcortical regions, it is unclear if it is generated locally and intrinsically or if it is a read out of a centralized clock-like mechanism. Indeed, mechanisms of subsecond timing at the circuit level are largely obscure. Primary sensory areas are well-suited to address these question as they have early access to sensory information and provide minimal processing to it: if temporal information is found in these regions, it is likely to be generated intrinsically and locally. We test this hypothesis by training mice to perform an audio-visual temporal pattern sensory discrimination task as we use 2-photon calcium imaging, a technique capable of recording population level activity at single cell resolution, to record activity in primary visual cortex (V1). We have found significant changes in network dynamics through mice’s learning of the task from naive to middle to expert levels. Changes in network dynamics and behavioral performance are well accounted for by an intrinsic model of timing in which the trajectory of q network through high dimensional state space represents temporal sensory information. Conversely, while we found evidence of other temporal encoding models, such as oscillatory activity, we did not find that they accounted for increased performance but were in fact correlated with the intrinsic model itself. These results provide insight into how subsecond temporal information is encoded mechanistically at the circuit level.

The human middle temporal complex (hMT+) has a crucial biological relevance for the processing and detection of direction and speed of motion in visual stimuli. In both humans and monkeys, it has been extensively investigated in terms of its retinotopic properties and selectivity for direction of moving stimuli; however, only in recent years there has been an increasing interest in how neurons in MT encode the speed of motion. In this talk, I will explore the proposed mechanism of speed encoding questioning whether hMT+ neuronal populations encode the stimulus speed directly, or whether they separate motion into its spatial and temporal components. I will characterize how neuronal populations in hMT+ encode the speed of moving visual stimuli using electrocorticography ECoG and 7T fMRI. I will illustrate that the neuronal populations measured in hMT+ are not directly tuned to stimulus speed, but instead encode speed through separate and independent spatial and temporal frequency tuning. Finally, I will suggest that this mechanism may play a role in evaluating multisensory responses for visual, tactile and auditory stimuli in hMT+.

How does our brain generate consciousness, that is, the subjective experience of what it is like to see face or hear a sound? Do we become aware of a stimulus during early sensory processing or only later when information is shared in a wide-spread fronto-parietal network? Neural correlates of consciousness are typically identified by comparing brain activity when a constant stimulus (e.g., a face) is perceived versus not perceived. However, in most previous experiments, conscious perception was systematically confounded with post-perceptual processes such as decision-making and report. In this talk, I will present recent EEG and fMRI studies dissociating neural correlates of consciousness and task-related processing in visual and auditory perception. Our results suggest that consciousness emerges during early sensory processing, while late, fronto-parietal activity is associated with post-perceptual processes rather than awareness. These findings challenge predominant theories of consciousness and highlight the importance of considering task relevance as a confound across different neuroscientific methods, experimental paradigms and sensory modalities.

Episodic memory performance decreases with advancing age. According to theoretical models, such memory decline might be a consequence of age-related reductions in the ability to form distinct neural representations of our past. In this talk, I want to present our new age-comparative fMRI study investigating age-related neural dedifferentiation across different representational levels. By combining univariate analyses and searchlight pattern similarity analyses, we found that older adults show reduced category selective processing in higher visual areas, less specific item representations in occipital regions and less stable item representations. Dedifferentiation on all these representational levels was related to memory performance, with item specificity being the strongest contributor. Overall, our results emphasize that age-related dedifferentiation can be observed across the entire cortical hierarchy which may selectively impair memory performance depending on the memory task.

To date, neuroimaging research has had a limited focus on non-social features of autism. As a result, neurobiological explanations for atypical sensory perception in autism are lacking. To address this, we quantitively condensed findings from the non-social autism fMRI literature in line with the current best practices for neuroimaging meta-analyses. Using activation likelihood estimation (ALE), we conducted a series of robust meta-analyses across 83 experiments from 52 fMRI studies investigating differences between autistic (n = 891) and typical (n = 967) participants. We found that typical controls, compared to autistic people, show greater activity in the prefrontal cortex (BA9, BA10) during perception tasks. More refined analyses revealed that, when compared to typical controls, autistic people show greater recruitment of the extrastriate V2 cortex (BA18) during visual processing. Taken together, these findings contribute to our understanding of current theories of autistic perception, and highlight some of the challenges of cognitive neuroscience research in autism.

The human visual system enables us to recognize objects (e.g., this is a cup) and act upon them (e.g., grasp the cup) with astonishing ease and accuracy. For decades, it was widely accepted that these different functions rely on two separated cortical pathways. The ventral occipitotemporal pathway subserves object recognition, while the dorsal occipitoparietal pathway promotes visually guided actions. In my talk, I will discuss recent evidence from a series of neuropsychological, developmental and neuroimaging studies that were aimed to explore the nature of object representations in the dorsal pathway. The results from these studies highlight the plausible role of the dorsal pathway in object perception and reveal an interplay between shape representations derived by the two pathways. Together, these findings challenge the binary distinction between the two pathways and are consistent with the view that object recognition is not the sole product of ventral pathway computations, but instead relies on a distributed network of regions.

Initial social perceptions are often thought to reflect direct “read outs” of facial features. Instead, we outline a perspective whereby initial perceptions emerge from an automatic yet gradual process of negotiation between the perceptual cues inherent to a person (e.g., facial cues) and top-down social cognitive processes harbored within perceivers. This perspective argues that perceivers’ social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in perceptions, and thus how we think about social groups, emotions, or personality traits helps determine how we visually perceive them in other people. Integrative evidence from real-time behavioral paradigms (e.g., mouse-tracking), multivariate fMRI, and computational modeling will be discussed. Together, this work shows that the way we use facial cues to categorize other people into social groups (e.g., gender, race), perceive their emotion (e.g., anger), or infer their personality (e.g., trustworthiness) are all fundamentally shaped by prior social-conceptual knowledge and stereotypical assumptions. We find that these top-down impacts on initial perceptions are driven by the interplay of higher-order prefrontal regions involved in top-down predictions and lower-level fusiform regions involved in face processing. We argue that the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as resulting from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. In this system, both visual and social cognitive processes are in a close exchange, and initial social perceptions emerge in part out of the structure of social-conceptual knowledge.

We will start our talk with a short video of our research, illustrating methods (some old and new) and findings that have provided our current understanding of how visual capabilities develop in infancy and early childhood. However, our research poses some outstanding questions. We will briefly discuss three issues, which are linked by a common focus on the development of visual attentional processing: (1) How do recurrent cortical loops contribute to development? Cortical selectivity (e.g., to orientation, motion, and binocular disparity) develops in the early months of life. However, these systems are not purely feedforward but depend on parallel pathways, with recurrent feedback loops playing a critical role. The development of diverse networks, particularly for motion processing, may explain changes in dynamic responses and resolve developmental data obtained with different methodologies. One possible role for these loops is in top-down attentional control of visual processing. (2) Why do hyperopic infants become strabismic (cross-eyes)? Binocular interaction is a particularly sensitive area of development. Standard clinical accounts suppose that long-sighted (hyperopic) refractive errors require accommodative effort, putting stress on the accommodation-convergence link that leads to its breakdown and strabismus. Our large-scale population screening studies of 9-month infants question this: hyperopic infants are at higher risk of strabismus and impaired vision (amblyopia and impaired attention) but these hyperopic infants often under- rather than over-accommodate. This poor accommodation may reflect poor early attention processing, possibly a ‘soft sign’ of subtle cerebral dysfunction. (3) What do many neurodevelopmental disorders have in common? Despite similar cognitive demands, global motion perception is much more impaired than global static form across diverse neurodevelopmental disorders including Down and Williams Syndromes, Fragile-X, Autism, children with premature birth and infants with perinatal brain injury. These deficits in motion processing are associated with deficits in other dorsal stream functions such as visuo-motor co-ordination and attentional control, a cluster we have called ‘dorsal stream vulnerability’. However, our neuroimaging measures related to motion coherence in typically developing children suggest that the critical areas for individual differences in global motion sensitivity are not early motion-processing areas such as V5/MT, but downstream parietal and frontal areas for decision processes on motion signals. Although these brain networks may also underlie attentional and visuo-motor deficits , we still do not know when and how these deficits differ across different disorders and between individual children. Answering these questions provide necessary steps, not only increasing our scientific understanding of human visual brain development, but also in designing appropriate interventions to help each child achieve their full potential.

In many ways, cognitive neuroscience is the attempt to use physiological observation to clarify the mechanisms that shape behavior. Over the past 25 years, fMRI has provided a system-wide and yet somewhat spatially precise view of the response in human cortex evoked by a wide variety of stimuli and task contexts. The current talk focuses on the other direction of inference; the implications of this observed functional organization for behavior. To begin, we must interrogate the methodological and empirical frameworks underlying our derivation of this organization, partially by exploring its relationship to and predictability from gross neuroanatomy. Next, across a series of studies, the implications of two properties of functional organization for behavior will be explored: 1) the co-localization of visual working memory and perceptual processing and 2) implicit learning in the context of distributed responses. In sum, these results highlight the limitations of our current approach and hint at a new general mechanism for explaining observed behavior in context with the neural substrate.