Seminars

Shannon Vallor examines how code both conceals things of value and provides access to them, using that dual role to investigate what computing hides or reveals about humanity. The lecture challenges the values and purposes embedded in contemporary algorithmic automation. It asks how those aims could be reshaped to support humane futures, bringing philosophical analysis to the design and use of computational systems.

Susan Athey examines how machine learning and digital interventions can help explain and improve workers’ transitions between jobs. One project uses Swedish administrative data to identify groups whose earnings and employment are less resilient after layoffs, revealing substantial differences among workers within the same firms and labour markets. A second line of work uses transformer models and large language models to represent careers and analyse gender wage gaps, identifying settings in which large unexplained differences persist. Two further projects develop and evaluate digital interventions intended to help disadvantaged workers enter expanding occupations in information technology and data science. The lecture connects new methods for measuring labour-market disadvantage with evidence about practical interventions.

Over the past thirty years or so, cognitive neuroscience has made spectacular progress understanding the biological mechanisms of consciousness. Consciousness science, as this field is now sometimes called, was not only inexistent thirty years ago, but its very name seemed like an oxymoron: how can there be a science of consciousness? And yet, despite this scepticism, we are now equipped with a rich set of sophisticated behavioural paradigms, with an impressive array of techniques making it possible to see the brain in action, and with an ever-growing collection of theories and speculations about the putative biological mechanisms through which information processing becomes conscious. This is all good and fine, even promising, but we also seem to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater, or at least to have forgotten it in the crib: consciousness is not just mechanisms, it’s what it feels like. In other words, while we know thousands of informative studies about access-consciousness, we have little in the way of phenomenal consciousness. But that — what it feels like — is truly what “consciousness” is about. Understanding why it feels like something to be me and nothing (panpsychists notwithstanding) for a stone to be a stone is what the field has always been after. However, while it is relatively easy to study access-consciousness through the contrastive approach applied to reports, it is much less clear how to study phenomenology, its structure and its function. Here, I first overview work on what consciousness does (the "how"). Next, I ask what difference feeling things makes and what function phenomenology might play. I argue that subjective experience has intrinsic value and plays a functional role in everything that we do.

Vulnerability to distraction varies across the general population and significantly affects one’s capacity to stay focused on and successfully complete the task at hand, whether at school, on the road, or at work. In this talk, I will begin by discussing how distractibility is typically assessed in the literature and introduce our innovative ERP approach to measuring it. Since distractibility is a cardinal symptom of ADHD, I will introduce its most widely used paper-and-pencil screening tool for the general population as external validation. Following that, I will present the Load Theory of Attention and explain how we used perceptual load to test the reliability of our neural marker of distractibility. Finally, I will highlight potential future applications of this marker in clinical and educational settings.

Brain Emulation Challenge workshop will tackle cutting-edge topics such as ground-truthing for validation, leveraging artificial datasets generated from virtual brain tissue, and the transformative potential of virtual brain platforms, such as applied to the forthcoming Brain Emulation Challenge.

Brain Emulation Challenge workshop will tackle cutting-edge topics such as ground-truthing for validation, leveraging artificial datasets generated from virtual brain tissue, and the transformative potential of virtual brain platforms, such as applied to the forthcoming Brain Emulation Challenge.

Brain Emulation Challenge workshop will tackle cutting-edge topics such as ground-truthing for validation, leveraging artificial datasets generated from virtual brain tissue, and the transformative potential of virtual brain platforms, such as applied to the forthcoming Brain Emulation Challenge.

Brain Emulation Challenge workshop will tackle cutting-edge topics such as ground-truthing for validation, leveraging artificial datasets generated from virtual brain tissue, and the transformative potential of virtual brain platforms, such as applied to the forthcoming Brain Emulation Challenge.

Digital Minds: Brain Development in the Age of Technology examines how our increasingly connected world shapes mental and cognitive health. From screen time and social media to virtual interactions, this seminar delves into the latest research on how technology influences brain development, relationships, and emotional well-being. Join us to explore strategies for harnessing technology's benefits while mitigating its potential challenges, empowering you to thrive in a digital age.

Memory is essential for shaping how we interpret the world, plan for the future, and understand ourselves, yet effective cognitive interventions for real-world episodic memory loss remain scarce. This talk introduces HippoCamera, a smartphone-based intervention inspired by how the brain supports memory, designed to enhance real-world episodic recollection by replaying high-fidelity autobiographical cues. It will showcase how our approach improves memory, mood, and hippocampal activity while uncovering links between memory distinctiveness, well-being, and the perception of time.

Dense Associative Memories (Dense AMs) are energy-based neural networks that share many desirable features of celebrated Hopfield Networks but have superior information storage capabilities. In contrast to conventional Hopfield Networks, which were popular in the 1980s, DenseAMs have a very large memory storage capacity - possibly exponential in the size of the network. This aspect makes them appealing tools for many problems in AI and neurobiology. In this talk I will describe two theories of how DenseAMs might be built in biological “hardware”. According to the first theory, DenseAMs arise as effective theories after integrating out a large number of neuronal degrees of freedom. According to the second theory, astrocytes, a particular type of glia cells, serve as core computational units enabling large memory storage capabilities. This second theory challenges a common point of view in the neuroscience community that astrocytes play the role of only passive house-keeping support structures in the brain. In contrast, it suggests that astrocytes might be actively involved in brain computation and memory storage and retrieval. This story is an illustration of how computational principles originating in physics may provide insights into novel AI architectures and brain computation. VVTNS New Year Opening Lecture. Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2025-01-08. Recording duration: 00:49:16.

Decades of research on understanding the mechanisms of attentional selection have focused on identifying the units (representations) on which attention operates in order to guide prioritized sensory processing. These attentional units fit neatly to accommodate our understanding of how attention is allocated in a top-down, bottom-up, or historical fashion. In this talk, I will focus on attentional phenomena that are not easily accommodated within current theories of attentional selection – the “attentional platypuses,” as they allude to an observation that within biological taxonomies the platypus does not fit into either mammal or bird categories. Similarly, attentional phenomena that do not fit neatly within current attentional models suggest that current models need to be revised. I list a few instances of the ‘attentional platypuses” and then offer a new approach, the Dynamically Weighted Prioritization, stipulating that multiple factors impinge onto the attentional priority map, each with a corresponding weight. The interaction between factors and their corresponding weights determines the current state of the priority map which subsequently constrains/guides attention allocation. I propose that this new approach should be considered as a supplement to existing models of attention, especially those that emphasize categorical organizations.

In our rapidly evolving digital world, there is increasing concern about the impact of digital technologies and social media on the mental health of young people. Policymakers and the public are nervous. Psychologists are facing mounting pressures to deliver evidence that can inform policies and practices to safeguard both young people and society at large. However, research progress is slow while technological change is accelerating.My talk will reflect on this, both as a question of psychological science and metascience. Digital companies have designed highly popular environments that differ in important ways from traditional offline spaces. By revisiting the foundations of psychology (e.g. development and cognition) and considering digital changes' impact on theories and findings, we gain deeper insights into questions such as the following. (1) How do digital environments exacerbate developmental vulnerabilities that predispose young people to mental health conditions? (2) How do digital designs interact with cognitive and learning processes, formalised through computational approaches such as reinforcement learning or Bayesian modelling?However, we also need to face deeper questions about what it means to do science about new technologies and the challenge of keeping pace with technological advancements. Therefore, I discuss the concept of ‘fast science’, where, during crises, scientists might lower their standards of evidence to come to conclusions quicker. Might psychologists want to take this approach in the face of technological change and looming concerns? The talk concludes with a discussion of such strategies for 21st-century psychology research in the era of digitalization.

This webinar convened researchers at the intersection of Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience to investigate how large language models (LLMs) can serve as valuable “model organisms” for understanding human language processing. Presenters showcased evidence that brain recordings (fMRI, MEG, ECoG) acquired while participants read or listened to unconstrained speech can be predicted by representations extracted from state-of-the-art text- and speech-based LLMs. In particular, text-based LLMs tend to align better with higher-level language regions, capturing more semantic aspects, while speech-based LLMs excel at explaining early auditory cortical responses. However, purely low-level features can drive part of these alignments, complicating interpretations. New methods, including perturbation analyses, highlight which linguistic variables matter for each cortical area and time scale. Further, “brain tuning” of LLMs—fine-tuning on measured neural signals—can improve semantic representations and downstream language tasks. Despite open questions about interpretability and exact neural mechanisms, these results demonstrate that LLMs provide a promising framework for probing the computations underlying human language comprehension and production at multiple spatiotemporal scales.