Seminars

Memory is essential for shaping how we interpret the world, plan for the future, and understand ourselves, yet effective cognitive interventions for real-world episodic memory loss remain scarce. This talk introduces HippoCamera, a smartphone-based intervention inspired by how the brain supports memory, designed to enhance real-world episodic recollection by replaying high-fidelity autobiographical cues. It will showcase how our approach improves memory, mood, and hippocampal activity while uncovering links between memory distinctiveness, well-being, and the perception of time.

Decades of research on understanding the mechanisms of attentional selection have focused on identifying the units (representations) on which attention operates in order to guide prioritized sensory processing. These attentional units fit neatly to accommodate our understanding of how attention is allocated in a top-down, bottom-up, or historical fashion. In this talk, I will focus on attentional phenomena that are not easily accommodated within current theories of attentional selection – the “attentional platypuses,” as they allude to an observation that within biological taxonomies the platypus does not fit into either mammal or bird categories. Similarly, attentional phenomena that do not fit neatly within current attentional models suggest that current models need to be revised. I list a few instances of the ‘attentional platypuses” and then offer a new approach, the Dynamically Weighted Prioritization, stipulating that multiple factors impinge onto the attentional priority map, each with a corresponding weight. The interaction between factors and their corresponding weights determines the current state of the priority map which subsequently constrains/guides attention allocation. I propose that this new approach should be considered as a supplement to existing models of attention, especially those that emphasize categorical organizations.

In our rapidly evolving digital world, there is increasing concern about the impact of digital technologies and social media on the mental health of young people. Policymakers and the public are nervous. Psychologists are facing mounting pressures to deliver evidence that can inform policies and practices to safeguard both young people and society at large. However, research progress is slow while technological change is accelerating.My talk will reflect on this, both as a question of psychological science and metascience. Digital companies have designed highly popular environments that differ in important ways from traditional offline spaces. By revisiting the foundations of psychology (e.g. development and cognition) and considering digital changes' impact on theories and findings, we gain deeper insights into questions such as the following. (1) How do digital environments exacerbate developmental vulnerabilities that predispose young people to mental health conditions? (2) How do digital designs interact with cognitive and learning processes, formalised through computational approaches such as reinforcement learning or Bayesian modelling?However, we also need to face deeper questions about what it means to do science about new technologies and the challenge of keeping pace with technological advancements. Therefore, I discuss the concept of ‘fast science’, where, during crises, scientists might lower their standards of evidence to come to conclusions quicker. Might psychologists want to take this approach in the face of technological change and looming concerns? The talk concludes with a discussion of such strategies for 21st-century psychology research in the era of digitalization.

This webinar features presentations from SueYeon Chung (New York University) and Srinivas Turaga (HHMI Janelia Research Campus) on theoretical and computational approaches to sensory cognition. Chung introduced a “neural manifold” framework to capture how high-dimensional neural activity is structured into meaningful manifolds reflecting object representations. She demonstrated that manifold geometry—shaped by radius, dimensionality, and correlations—directly governs a population’s capacity for classifying or separating stimuli under nuisance variations. Applying these ideas as a data analysis tool, she showed how measuring object-manifold geometry can explain transformations along the ventral visual stream and suggested that manifold principles also yield better self-supervised neural network models resembling mammalian visual cortex. Turaga described simulating the entire fruit fly visual pathway using its connectome, modeling 64 key cell types in the optic lobe. His team’s systematic approach—combining sparse connectivity from electron microscopy with simple dynamical parameters—recapitulated known motion-selective responses and produced novel testable predictions. Together, these studies underscore the power of combining connectomic detail, task objectives, and geometric theories to unravel neural computations bridging from stimuli to cognitive functions.

In this talk, I will explore how social affective biases arise even in the absence of motivational factors as an emergent outcome of the basic structure of social learning. In several studies, we found that initial negative interactions with some members of a group can cause subsequent avoidance of the entire group, and that this avoidance perpetuates stereotypes. Additional cognitive modeling discovered that approach and avoidance behavior based on biased beliefs not only influences the evaluative (positive or negative) impressions of group members, but also shapes the depth of the cognitive representations available to learn about individuals. In other words, people have richer cognitive representations of members of groups that are not avoided, akin to individualized vs group level categories. I will end presenting a series of multi-agent reinforcement learning simulations that demonstrate the emergence of these social-structural feedback loops in the development and maintenance of affective biases.

Contrary to the original normative decision-making standpoint, empirical studies have repeatedly reported that risk preferences are affected by the disclosure of choice outcomes (feedback). Although no consensus has yet emerged regarding the properties and mechanisms of this effect, a widespread and intuitive hypothesis is that repeated feedback affects risk preferences by means of a learning effect, which alters the representation of subjective probabilities. Here, we ran a series of seven experiments (N= 538), tailored to decipher the effects of feedback on risk preferences. Our results indicate that the presence of feedback consistently increases risk-taking, even when the risky option is economically less advantageous. Crucially, risk-taking increases just after the instructions, before participants experience any feedback. These results challenge the learning account, and advocate for a dispositional effect, induced by the mere anticipation of feedback information. Epistemic curiosity and regret avoidance may drive this effect in partial and complete feedback conditions, respectively.

Many situations rely on the accurate identification of people with whom we are unfamiliar. For example, security at airports or in police investigations require the identification of individuals from photo-ID. Yet, the identification of unfamiliar faces is error prone, even for practitioners who routinely perform this task. Indeed, even training protocols often yield no discernible improvement. The challenge of unfamiliar face identification is often thought of as a perceptual problem; however, this assumption ignores the potential role of decision-making and its contributing factors (e.g., criterion placement). In this talk, I am going to present a series of experiments that investigate the role of decision-making in face identification.