Objection
objection
From Spiking Predictive Coding to Learning Abstract Object Representation
In a first part of the talk, I will present Predictive Coding Light (PCL), a novel unsupervised learning architecture for spiking neural networks. In contrast to conventional predictive coding approaches, which only transmit prediction errors to higher processing stages, PCL learns inhibitory lateral and top-down connectivity to suppress the most predictable spikes and passes a compressed representation of the input to higher processing stages. We show that PCL reproduces a range of biological findings and exhibits a favorable tradeoff between energy consumption and downstream classification performance on challenging benchmarks. A second part of the talk will feature our lab’s efforts to explain how infants and toddlers might learn abstract object representations without supervision. I will present deep learning models that exploit the temporal and multimodal structure of their sensory inputs to learn representations of individual objects, object categories, or abstract super-categories such as „kitchen object“ in a fully unsupervised fashion. These models offer a parsimonious account of how abstract semantic knowledge may be rooted in children's embodied first-person experiences.
Degrees of Consciousness
In the science of consciousness, it’s often assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. I'll (1) argue that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, and (2) develop an analysis of degrees of consciousness. On my view, whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I'll also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees.
A possible role of the posterior alpha as a railroad switcher between dorsal and ventral pathways
Suppose you are on your favorite touchscreen device consciously and deliberately deciding emails to read or delete. In other words, you are consciously and intentionally looking, tapping, and swiping. Now suppose that you are doing this while neuroscientists are recording your brain activity. Eventually, the neuroscientists are familiar enough with your brain activity and behavior that they run an experiment with subliminal cues which reveals that your looking, tapping, and swiping seem to be determined by a random switch in your brain. You are not aware of it, or its impact on your decisions or movements. Would these predictions undermine your sense of free will? Some have argued that it should. Although this inference from unreflective and/or random intention mechanisms to free will skepticism, may seem intuitive at first, there are already objections to it. So, even if this thought experiment is plausible, it may not actually undermine our sense of free will.