Symbolic Cognition
symbolic cognition
Beyond the binding problem: From basic affordances to symbolic thought
Human cognitive abilities seem qualitatively different from the cognitive abilities of other primates, a difference Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli (2008) attribute to role-based relational reasoning—inferences and generalizations based on the relational roles to which objects (and other relations) are bound, rather than just the features of the objects themselves. Role-based relational reasoning depends on the ability to dynamically bind arguments to relational roles. But dynamic binding cannot be sufficient for relational thinking: Some non-human animals solve the dynamic binding problem, at least in some domains; and many non-human species generalize affordances to completely novel objects and scenes, a kind of universal generalization that likely depends on dynamic binding. If they can solve the dynamic binding problem, then why can they not reason about relations? What are they missing? I will present simulations with the LISA model of analogical reasoning (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003) suggesting that the missing pieces are multi-role integration (the capacity to combine multiple role bindings into complete relations) and structure mapping (the capacity to map different systems of role bindings onto one another). When LISA is deprived of either of these capacities, it can still generalize affordances universally, but it cannot reason symbolically; granted both abilities, LISA enjoys the full power of relational (symbolic) thought. I speculate that one reason it may have taken relational reasoning so long to evolve is that it required evolution to solve both problems simultaneously, since neither multi-role integration nor structure mapping appears to confer any adaptive advantage over simple role binding on its own.
Abstraction and Analogy in Natural and Artificial Intelligence
In 1955, John McCarthy and colleagues proposed an AI summer research project with the following aim: “An attempt will be made to find how to make machines use language, form abstractions and concepts, solve kinds of problems now reserved for humans, and improve themselves.” More than six decades later, all of these research topics remain open and actively investigated in the AI community. While AI has made dramatic progress over the last decade in areas such as vision, natural language processing, and robotics, current AI systems still almost entirely lack the ability to form humanlike concepts and abstractions. Some cognitive scientists have proposed that analogy-making is a central mechanism for conceptual abstraction and understanding in humans. Douglas Hofstadter called analogy-making “the core of cognition”, and Hofstadter and co-author Emmanuel Sander noted, “Without concepts there can be no thought, and without analogies there can be no concepts.” In this talk I will reflect on the role played by analogy-making at all levels of intelligence, and on prospects for developing AI systems with humanlike abilities for abstraction and analogy.