Conscious experience

Christof Koch discusses scientific approaches to conscious experience, including integrated information theory. This series edition revisits an earlier conversation.

How our conscious experience materialize from our predictions is an open question in neuroscience and philosophy. Here we test the hypothesis that top-down predictions arise from a trio of domain-specific generative models (Fig 1a) within prefrontal (PFC) nodes of the Default-Mode Network (DMN), and integrate within its parietal nodes, forming the basis for our dynamic consciousness.Smoothed binary ratings of prediction updates for State changes, Agent beliefs, and Action sequences from an online sample were used as parametric regressors for the GLMs. These ratings indicating experience shifts

Anil Seth discusses the scientific study of subjective experience and why perception can be described as controlled hallucination. He and Steven Strogatz consider the visual ambiguity of the dress, the relationship between brain activity and conscious experience, and public participation in mapping the diversity of human perception.

…for studying temporality in conscious experience. Contrasting positions posit that temporal information is separately abstracted out like any other perceptual property, or that time is represented through representations having temporal properties themselves. To add to this debate, we investigated alterations in felt time in conditions where only conscious visual experience is altered while a bistable figure remains physically unchanged. In this talk, I will discuss two studies that we have done in relation to answering this quest

It is generally agreed upon that qualities of conscious experience instantiate structural properties, usually called relations. They furnish a representation of qualities (or qualia, in fact) in terms of a mathematical space Q (rather than a set), which is crucial to both modelling and measuring of conscious experience." "What is usually disregarded is that “only such structural properties generalize across individuals” (Austen Clark), but that qualities themselves as differentiated by stimulus specifications, behavior or reports do not. We show that this implies that only the part of Q which

Christof Koch discusses scientific investigations of conscious experience and integrated information theory. Conversation in English.