Can non-random collapses of the wavefunction enable libertarian free will?
Agent-causal libertarian free will asserts that the conscious agent is the ultimate cause of her own voluntary behavior. A major reason to reject libertarian free will is that it seems incompatible with our current knowledge of physics. In this talk I will argue how quantum processes, specifically non-random collapses of the wavefunction in the human cortex, may enable libertarian free will. I will discuss how this account can be empirically tested.
The consequences and constraints of functional organization on behavior
In many ways, cognitive neuroscience is the attempt to use physiological observation to clarify the mechanisms that shape behavior. Over the past 25 years, fMRI has provided a system-wide and yet somewhat spatially precise view of the response in human cortex evoked by a wide variety of stimuli and task contexts. The current talk focuses on the other direction of inference; the implications of this observed functional organization for behavior. To begin, we must interrogate the methodological and empirical frameworks underlying our derivation of this organization, partially by exploring its relationship to and predictability from gross neuroanatomy. Next, across a series of studies, the implications of two properties of functional organization for behavior will be explored: 1) the co-localization of visual working memory and perceptual processing and 2) implicit learning in the context of distributed responses. In sum, these results highlight the limitations of our current approach and hint at a new general mechanism for explaining observed behavior in context with the neural substrate.
Domain Specificity in the Human Brain: What, Whether, and Why?
The last quarter century has provided extensive evidence that some regions of the human cortex are selectively engaged in processing a single specific domain of information, from faces, places, and bodies to language, music, and other people’s thoughts. This work dovetails with earlier theories in cognitive science highlighting domain specificity in human cognition, development, and evolution. But many questions remain unanswered about even the clearest cases of domain specificity in the brain, the selective engagement of the FFA, PPA, and EBA in the perception of faces, places, and bodies, respectively. First, these claims lack precision, saying little about what is computed and how, and relying on human judgements to decide what counts as a face, place, or body. Second, they provide no account of the reliably varying responses of these regions across different “preferred” images, or across different “nonpreferred” images for each category. Third, the category selectivity of each region is vulnerable to refutation if any of the vast set of as-yet-untested nonpreferred images turns out to produce a stronger response than preferred images for that region. Fourth, and most fundamentally, they provide no account of why, from a computational point of view, brains should exhibit this striking degree of functional specificity in the first place, and why we should have the particular visual specializations we do, for faces, places, and bodies, but not (apparently) for food or snakes. The advent of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to model visual processing in the ventral pathway has opened up many opportunities to address these long-standing questions in new ways. I will describe ongoing efforts in our lab to harness CNNs to do just that.