Where do problem spaces come from? On metaphors and representational change
The challenges of problem solving do not exclusively lie in how to perform heuristic search, but they begin with how we understand a given task: How to cognitively represent the task domain and its components can determine how quickly someone is able to progress towards a solution, whether advanced strategies can be discovered, or even whether a solution is found at all. While this challenge of constructing and changing representations has been acknowledged early on in problem solving research, for the most part it has been sidestepped by focussing on simple, well-defined problems whose representation is almost fully determined by the task instructions. Thus, the established theory of problem solving as heuristic search in problem spaces has little to say on this. In this talk, I will present a study designed to explore this issue, by virtue of finding and refining an adequate problem representation being its main challenge. In this exploratory case study, it was investigated how pairs of participants acquaint themselves with a complex spatial transformation task in the domain of iterated mental paper folding over the course of several days. Participants have to understand the geometry of edges which occurs when repeatedly mentally folding a sheet of paper in alternating directions without the use of external aids. Faced with the difficulty of handling increasingly complex folds in light of limited cognitive capacity, participants are forced to look for ways in which to represent folds more efficiently. In a qualitative analysis of video recordings of the participants' behaviour, the development of their conceptualisation of the task domain was traced over the course of the study, focussing especially on their use of gesture and the spontaneous occurrence and use of metaphors in the construction of new representations. Based on these observations, I will conclude the talk with several theoretical speculations regarding the roles of metaphor and cognitive capacity in representational change.
A role for cognitive maps in metaphors and analogy?
In human and non-human animals, conceptual knowledge is partially organized according to low-dimensional geometries that rely on brain structures and computations involved in spatial representations. Recently, two separate lines of research have investigated cognitive maps, that are associated with the hippocampal formation and are similar to world-centered representations of the environment, and image spaces, that are associated with the parietal cortex and are similar to self-centered spatial relationships. I will suggest that cognitive maps and image spaces may be two manifestations of a more general propensity of the mind to create low-dimensional internal models, and may play a role in analogical reasoning and metaphorical thinking. Finally, I will show some data suggesting that the metaphorical relationship between colors and emotions can be accounted for by the structural alignment of low-dimensional conceptual spaces.
Analogical reasoning and metaphor processing in autism - Similarities & differences
In this talk, I will present the results of two recent systematic reviews and meta-analyses related to analogical reasoning and metaphor processing in autism, together with the results of a study that investigated verbal analogical reasoning and metaphor processing in the same sample of participants. Both metaphors and analogies rely on exploiting similarities, and they necessitate contextual processing. Nevertheless, our findings relating to metaphor processing and analogical reasoning showed distinct patterns. Whereas analogical reasoning emerged as a relative strength in autism, metaphor processing was found to be a relative weakness. Additionally, both meta-analytic studies investigated the relations between the level of intelligence of participants included in the studies, and the effect size of group differences between the autistic and typically developing (TD) samples. These analyses suggested in the case of analogical reasoning that the relative advantage of ASD participants might only be present in the case of individuals with lower levels of intelligence. By contrast, impairments in metaphor processing appeared to be more pronounced in the case of individuals with relatively lower levels of (verbal) intelligence. In our experimental study, we administered both verbal analogies and metaphors to the same sample of high-functioning autistic participants and TD controls. The two groups were matched on age, verbal IQ, working memory and educational background. Our aim was to understand better the similarities and differences between processing analogies and metaphors, and to see whether the advantage in analogical reasoning and disadvantage in metaphor processing is universal in autism.