Comparative transcriptomics of retinal cell types
CNStalk: Brain-behavior evolution in domesticated dogs and foxes
NMC4 Short Talk: Neurocomputational mechanisms of causal inference during multisensory processing in the macaque brain
Natural perception relies inherently on inferring causal structure in the environment. However, the neural mechanisms and functional circuits that are essential for representing and updating the hidden causal structure during multisensory processing are unknown. To address this, monkeys were trained to infer the probability of a potential common source from visual and proprioceptive signals on the basis of their spatial disparity in a virtual reality system. The proprioceptive drift reported by monkeys demonstrated that they combined historical information and current multisensory signals to estimate the hidden common source and subsequently updated both the causal structure and sensory representation. Single-unit recordings in premotor and parietal cortices revealed that neural activity in premotor cortex represents the core computation of causal inference, characterizing the estimation and update of the likelihood of integrating multiple sensory inputs at a trial-by-trial level. In response to signals from premotor cortex, neural activity in parietal cortex also represents the causal structure and further dynamically updates the sensory representation to maintain consistency with the causal inference structure. Thus, our results indicate how premotor cortex integrates historical information and sensory inputs to infer hidden variables and selectively updates sensory representations in parietal cortex to support behavior. This dynamic loop of frontal-parietal interactions in the causal inference framework may provide the neural mechanism to answer long-standing questions regarding how neural circuits represent hidden structures for body-awareness and agency.
NMC4 Short Talk: Transient neuronal suppression for exploitation of new sensory evidence
Decision-making in noisy environments with constant sensory evidence involves integrating sequentially-sampled evidence, a strategy formalized by diffusion models which is supported by decades behavioral and neural findings. By contrast, it is unknown whether this strategy is also used during decision-making when the underlying sensory evidence is expected to change. Here, we trained monkeys to identify the dominant color of a dynamically refreshed checkerboard pattern that doesn't become informative until after a variable delay. Animals' behavioral responses were briefly suppressed after an abrupt change in evidence, and many neurons in the frontal eye field displayed a corresponding dip in activity at this time, similar to the dip frequently observed after stimulus onset. Generalized drift-diffusion models revealed that behavior and neural activity were consistent with a brief suppression of motor output without a change in evidence accumulation itself, in contrast to the popular belief that evidence accumulation is paused or reset. These results suggest that a brief interruption in motor preparation is an important strategy for dealing with changing evidence during perceptual decision making.
The neuroscience of color and what makes primates special
Among mammals, excellent color vision has evolved only in certain non-human primates. And yet, color is often assumed to be just a low-level stimulus feature with a modest role in encoding and recognizing objects. The rationale for this dogma is compelling: object recognition is excellent in grayscale images (consider black-and-white movies, where faces, places, objects, and story are readily apparent). In my talk I will discuss experiments in which we used color as a tool to uncover an organizational plan in inferior temporal cortex (parallel, multistage processing for places, faces, colors, and objects) and a visual-stimulus functional representation in prefrontal cortex (PFC). The discovery of an extensive network of color-biased domains within IT and PFC, regions implicated in high-level object vision and executive functions, compels a re-evaluation of the role of color in behavior. I will discuss behavioral studies prompted by the neurobiology that uncover a universal principle for color categorization across languages, the first systematic study of the color statistics of objects and a chromatic mechanism by which the brain may compute animacy, and a surprising paradoxical impact of memory on face color. Taken together, my talk will put forward the argument that color is not primarily for object recognition, but rather for the assessment of the likely behavioral relevance, or meaning, of the stuff we see.