Are integrative, multidisciplinary, and pragmatic models possible? The #PsychMapping experience
This presentation delves into the necessity for simplified models in the field of psychological sciences to cater to a diverse audience of practitioners. We introduce the #PsychMapping model, evaluate its merits and limitations, and discuss its place in contemporary scientific culture. The #PsychMapping model is the product of an extensive literature review, initially within the realm of sport and exercise psychology and subsequently encompassing a broader spectrum of psychological sciences. This model synthesizes the progress made in psychological sciences by categorizing variables into a framework that distinguishes between traits (e.g., body structure and personality) and states (e.g., heart rate and emotions). Furthermore, it delineates internal traits and states from the externalized self, which encompasses behaviour and performance. All three components—traits, states, and the externalized self—are in a continuous interplay with external physical, social, and circumstantial factors. Two core processes elucidate the interactions among these four primary clusters: external perception, encompassing the mechanism through which external stimuli transition into internal events, and self-regulation, which empowers individuals to become autonomous agents capable of exerting control over themselves and their actions. While the model inherently oversimplifies intricate processes, the central question remains: does its pragmatic utility outweigh its limitations, and can it serve as a valuable tool for comprehending human behaviour?
Are integrative, multidisciplinary, and pragmatic models possible? The #PsychMapping experience
This presentation delves into the necessity for simplified models in the field of psychological sciences to cater to a diverse audience of practitioners. We introduce the #PsychMapping model, evaluate its merits and limitations, and discuss its place in contemporary scientific culture. The #PsychMapping model is the product of an extensive literature review, initially within the realm of sport and exercise psychology and subsequently encompassing a broader spectrum of psychological sciences. This model synthesizes the progress made in psychological sciences by categorizing variables into a framework that distinguishes between traits (e.g., body structure and personality) and states (e.g., heart rate and emotions). Furthermore, it delineates internal traits and states from the externalized self, which encompasses behaviour and performance. All three components—traits, states, and the externalized self—are in a continuous interplay with external physical, social, and circumstantial factors. Two core processes elucidate the interactions among these four primary clusters: external perception, encompassing the mechanism through which external stimuli transition into internal events, and self-regulation, which empowers individuals to become autonomous agents capable of exerting control over themselves and their actions. While the model inherently oversimplifies intricate processes, the central question remains: does its pragmatic utility outweigh its limitations, and can it serve as a valuable tool for comprehending human behaviour?
Doubting the neurofeedback double-blind do participants have residual awareness of experimental purposes in neurofeedback studies?
Neurofeedback provides a feedback display which is linked with on-going brain activity and thus allows self-regulation of neural activity in specific brain regions associated with certain cognitive functions and is considered a promising tool for clinical interventions. Recent reviews of neurofeedback have stressed the importance of applying the “double-blind” experimental design where critically the patient is unaware of the neurofeedback treatment condition. An important question then becomes; is double-blind even possible? Or are subjects aware of the purposes of the neurofeedback experiment? – this question is related to the issue of how we assess awareness or the absence of awareness to certain information in human subjects. Fortunately, methods have been developed which employ neurofeedback implicitly, where the subject is claimed to have no awareness of experimental purposes when performing the neurofeedback. Implicit neurofeedback is intriguing and controversial because it runs counter to the first neurofeedback study, which showed a link between awareness of being in a certain brain state and control of the neurofeedback-derived brain activity. Claiming that humans are unaware of a specific type of mental content is a notoriously difficult endeavor. For instance, what was long held as wholly unconscious phenomena, such as dreams or subliminal perception, have been overturned by more sensitive measures which show that degrees of awareness can be detected. In this talk, I will discuss whether we will critically examine the claim that we can know for certain that a neurofeedback experiment was performed in an unconscious manner. I will present evidence that in certain neurofeedback experiments such as manipulations of attention, participants display residual degrees of awareness of experimental contingencies to alter their cognition.
Choosing, fast and slow: Implications of prioritized-sampling models for understanding automaticity and control
The idea that behavior results from a dynamic interplay between automatic and controlled processing underlies much of decision science, but has also generated considerable controversy. In this talk, I will highlight behavioral and neural data showing how recently-developed computational models of decision making can be used to shed new light on whether, when, and how decisions result from distinct processes operating at different timescales. Across diverse domains ranging from altruism to risky choice biases and self-regulation, our work suggests that a model of prioritized attentional sampling and evidence accumulation may provide an alternative explanation for many phenomena previously interpreted as supporting dual process models of choice. However, I also show how some features of the model might be taken as support for specific aspects of dual-process models, providing a way to reconcile conflicting accounts and generating new predictions and insights along the way.