Topic: sensory content

Theories of consciousness are commonly grouped into "first-order" and "higher-order" families. As conventional wisdom has it, many more animals are likely to be conscious if a first-order theory is correct. But two recent developments have put pressure on the first/higher-order distinction. One is the argument (from Shea and Frith) that an effective global workspace mechanism must involve a form of metacognition. The second is Lau's "perceptual reality monitoring" (PRM) theory, a member of the "higher-order" family in which conscious sensory content is not re-represented, only tagged with a te

The representation of “what happened when” is central to encoding episodic and working memories. Recently discovered hippocampal “time cells” are theorized to provide the neural substrate for such representations by forming distinct sequences that encode both time elapsed and sensory content. However, while multiple neurophysiological studies have presented contradictory results on the role of “time cells” in memory, little work has directly addressed this discrepancy. Here, we hypothesize that this discrepancy is a result of different studies using tasks that involve different cognitive deman