Sensory Consequences of Visual Actions
We use rapid eye, head, and body movements to extract information from a new part of the visual scene upon each new gaze fixation. But the consequences of such visual actions go beyond their intended sensory outcomes. On the one hand, intrinsic consequences accompany movement preparation as covert internal processes (e.g., predictive changes in the deployment of visual attention). On the other hand, visual actions have incidental consequences, side effects of moving the sensory surface to its intended goal (e.g., global motion of the retinal image during saccades). In this talk, I will present studies in which we investigated intrinsic and incidental sensory consequences of visual actions and their sensorimotor functions. Our results provide insights into continuously interacting top-down and bottom-up sensory processes, and they reify the necessity to study perception in connection to motor behavior that shapes its fundamental processes.
The role of top-down mechanisms in gaze perception
Humans, as a social species, have an increased ability to detect and perceive visual elements involved in social exchanges, such as faces and eyes. The gaze, in particular, conveys information crucial for social interactions and social cognition. Researchers have hypothesized that in order to engage in dynamic face-to-face communication in real time, our brains must quickly and automatically process the direction of another person's gaze. There is evidence that direct gaze improves face encoding and attention capture and that direct gaze is perceived and processed more quickly than averted gaze. These results are summarized as the "direct gaze effect". However, in the recent literature, there is evidence to suggest that the mode of visual information processing modulates the direct gaze effect. In this presentation, I argue that top-down processing, and specifically the relevance of eye features to the task, promotes the early preferential processing of direct versus indirect gaze. On the basis of several recent evidences, I propose that low task relevance of eye features will prevent differences in eye direction processing between gaze directions because its encoding will be superficial. Differential processing of direct and indirect gaze will only occur when the eyes are relevant to the task. To assess the implication of task relevance on the temporality of cognitive processing, we will measure event-related potentials (ERPs) in response to facial stimuli. In this project, instead of typical ERP markers such as P1, N170 or P300, we will measure lateralized ERPs (lERPS) such as lateralized N170 and N2pc, which are markers of early face encoding and attentional deployment respectively. I hypothesize that the relevance of the eye feature task is crucial in the direct gaze effect and propose to revisit previous studies, which had questioned the existence of the direct gaze effect. This claim will be illustrate with different past studies and recent preliminary data of my lab. Overall, I propose a systematic evaluation of the role of top-down processing in early direct gaze perception in order to understand the impact of context on gaze perception and, at a larger scope, on social cognition.
Cellular mechanisms of conscious processing
Recent breakthroughs in neurobiology indicate that time is ripe to understand the cellular-level mechanisms of conscious experience. Accordingly, we have recently proposed that conscious processing depends on the integration between top-down and bottom-up information streams and that there exists a specific cellular mechanism that gates this integration. I will first describe this cellular mechanism and demonstrate how it controls signal propagation within the thalamocortical system. Then I will show how this cellular-level mechanism provides a natural explanation for why conscious experience is modulated by top-down processing. Besides shining new light on the neural basis of consciousness, this perspective unravels the mechanisms of internally generated perception, such as dreams, imagery, and hallucinations.
The Gist of False Memory
It has long been known that when viewing a set of images, we misjudge individual elements as being closer to the mean than they are (Hollingworth, 1910) and recall seeing the (absent) set mean (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott (1995). Recent studies found that viewing sets of images, simultaneously or sequentially, leads to perception of set statistics (mean, range) with poor memory for individual elements. Ensemble perception was found for sets of simple images (e.g. circles varying in size or brightness; lines of varying orientation), complex objects (e.g. faces of varying emotion), as well as for objects belonging to the same category. When the viewed set does not include its mean or prototype, nevertheless, observers report and act as if they have seen this central image or object – a form of false memory. Physiologically, detailed sensory information at cortical input levels is processed hierarchically to form an integrated scene gist at higher levels. However, we are aware of the gist before the details. We propose that images and objects belonging to a set or category are represented as their gist, mean or prototype, plus individual differences from that gist. Under constrained viewing conditions, only the gist is perceived and remembered. This theory also provides a basis for compressed neural representation. Extending this theory to scenes and episodes supplies a generalized basis for false memories. They seem right, match generalized expectations, so are believable without challenging examination. This theory could be tested by analyzing the typicality of false memories, compared to rejected alternatives.