Cognition seminars

Takaki Komiyama will discuss how cortical circuits maintain information about the value of behavioral options across trials and transform past experience into future choices. The talk draws on longitudinal imaging and circuit manipulation in mice to examine distinct neuronal populations and local and long-range interactions in history-dependent decision-making.

Vanessa Siffredi explores why the corpus callosum is central to typical brain development, yet some children born without it or with callosal abnormalities develop comparably to their peers. The talk connects callosal structure and communication between hemispheres with cognition, attention, executive function, memory, language and socio-emotional development. Structural and functional neuroimaging studies of typical development and callosal dysgenesis examine how developing brains compensate for alterations in this major white-matter pathway. Siffredi is affiliated with CHUV and UNIL; Carole Guedj chairs the seminar. Hybrid: Auditoire de pédiatrie Fred Bamatter, HUG, Hôpital des Enfants, Geneva; online via Zoom. Tuesday 29 September 2026, 09:30–10:30 CEST (Europe/Zurich; UTC+2), followed by CIBM news and networking until 11:00. Organized by CIBM Center for Biomedical Imaging — Breakfast and Science. In-person attendance is free without registration. Remote attendees must register through the Zoom link on the event page and select the 29 September occurrence.

Tal Linzen, an associate professor of linguistics and data science at New York University and a research scientist at Google, will speak in MIT's Siegel Family Quest for Intelligence seminar series. His work combines behavioral experiments and computational methods to study language learning and comprehension, alongside large-language-model post-training, evaluation, and interpretability.

Nick Turk-Browne presents research using infant functional MRI to investigate how the hippocampus supports learning and memory early in life. The seminar connects neural development, memory formation and infantile amnesia through new methods for studying awake infants.

In a first part of the talk, I will present Predictive Coding Light (PCL), a novel unsupervised learning architecture for spiking neural networks. In contrast to conventional predictive coding approaches, which only transmit prediction errors to higher processing stages, PCL learns inhibitory lateral and top-down connectivity to suppress the most predictable spikes and passes a compressed representation of the input to higher processing stages. We show that PCL reproduces a range of biological findings and exhibits a favorable tradeoff between energy consumption and downstream classification performance on challenging benchmarks. A second part of the talk will feature our lab’s efforts to explain how infants and toddlers might learn abstract object representations without supervision. I will present deep learning models that exploit the temporal and multimodal structure of their sensory inputs to learn representations of individual objects, object categories, or abstract super-categories such as „kitchen object“ in a fully unsupervised fashion. These models offer a parsimonious account of how abstract semantic knowledge may be rooted in children's embodied first-person experiences.

Efficient cognition requires flexible interactions between distributed neural networks in the human brain. These networks adapt to challenges by flexibly recruiting different regions and connections. In this talk, I will discuss how we study functional network plasticity and reorganization with combined neurostimulation and neuroimaging across the adult life span. I will argue that short-term plasticity enables flexible adaptation to challenges, via functional reorganization. My key hypothesis is that disruption of higher-level cognitive functions such as language can be compensated for by the recruitment of domain-general networks in our brain. Examples from healthy young brains illustrate how neurostimulation can be used to temporarily interfere with efficient processing, probing short-term network plasticity at the systems level. Examples from people with dyslexia help to better understand network disorders in the language domain and outline the potential of facilitatory neurostimulation for treatment. I will also discuss examples from aging brains where plasticity helps to compensate for loss of function. Finally, examples from lesioned brains after stroke provide insight into the brain’s potential for long-term reorganization and recovery of function. Collectively, these results challenge the view of a modular organization of the human brain and argue for a flexible redistribution of function via systems plasticity.

Over the past thirty years or so, cognitive neuroscience has made spectacular progress understanding the biological mechanisms of consciousness. Consciousness science, as this field is now sometimes called, was not only inexistent thirty years ago, but its very name seemed like an oxymoron: how can there be a science of consciousness? And yet, despite this scepticism, we are now equipped with a rich set of sophisticated behavioural paradigms, with an impressive array of techniques making it possible to see the brain in action, and with an ever-growing collection of theories and speculations about the putative biological mechanisms through which information processing becomes conscious. This is all good and fine, even promising, but we also seem to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater, or at least to have forgotten it in the crib: consciousness is not just mechanisms, it’s what it feels like. In other words, while we know thousands of informative studies about access-consciousness, we have little in the way of phenomenal consciousness. But that — what it feels like — is truly what “consciousness” is about. Understanding why it feels like something to be me and nothing (panpsychists notwithstanding) for a stone to be a stone is what the field has always been after. However, while it is relatively easy to study access-consciousness through the contrastive approach applied to reports, it is much less clear how to study phenomenology, its structure and its function. Here, I first overview work on what consciousness does (the "how"). Next, I ask what difference feeling things makes and what function phenomenology might play. I argue that subjective experience has intrinsic value and plays a functional role in everything that we do.

Our ability to recognize an object amongst many others is one of the most important features of the human mind. However, object recognition requires tremendous computational effort, as we need to solve a complex and recursive environment with ease and proficiency. This challenging feat is dependent on the implementation of an effective organization of knowledge in the brain. Here I put forth a novel understanding of how object knowledge is organized in the brain, by proposing that the organization of object knowledge follows key object-related dimensions, analogously to how sensory information is organized in the brain. Moreover, I will also put forth that this knowledge is topographically laid out in the cortical surface according to these object-related dimensions that code for different types of representational content – I call this contentopic mapping. I will show a combination of fMRI and behavioral data to support these hypotheses and present a principled way to explore the multidimensionality of object processing.

This webinar addressed computational perspectives on how animals and humans make decisions, spanning normative, descriptive, and mechanistic models. Sam Gershman (Harvard) presented a capacity-limited reinforcement learning framework in which policies are compressed under an information bottleneck constraint. This approach predicts pervasive perseveration, stimulus‐independent “default” actions, and trade-offs between complexity and reward. Such policy compression reconciles observed action stochasticity and response time patterns with an optimal balance between learning capacity and performance. Jonathan Pillow (Princeton) discussed flexible descriptive models for tracking time-varying policies in animals. He introduced dynamic Generalized Linear Models (Sidetrack) and hidden Markov models (GLM-HMMs) that capture day-to-day and trial-to-trial fluctuations in choice behavior, including abrupt switches between “engaged” and “disengaged” states. These models provide new insights into how animals’ strategies evolve under learning. Finally, Kenji Doya (OIST) highlighted the importance of unifying reinforcement learning with Bayesian inference, exploring how cortical-basal ganglia networks might implement model-based and model-free strategies. He also described Japan’s Brain/MINDS 2.0 and Digital Brain initiatives, aiming to integrate multimodal data and computational principles into cohesive “digital brains.”

This webinar features presentations from SueYeon Chung (New York University) and Srinivas Turaga (HHMI Janelia Research Campus) on theoretical and computational approaches to sensory cognition. Chung introduced a “neural manifold” framework to capture how high-dimensional neural activity is structured into meaningful manifolds reflecting object representations. She demonstrated that manifold geometry—shaped by radius, dimensionality, and correlations—directly governs a population’s capacity for classifying or separating stimuli under nuisance variations. Applying these ideas as a data analysis tool, she showed how measuring object-manifold geometry can explain transformations along the ventral visual stream and suggested that manifold principles also yield better self-supervised neural network models resembling mammalian visual cortex. Turaga described simulating the entire fruit fly visual pathway using its connectome, modeling 64 key cell types in the optic lobe. His team’s systematic approach—combining sparse connectivity from electron microscopy with simple dynamical parameters—recapitulated known motion-selective responses and produced novel testable predictions. Together, these studies underscore the power of combining connectomic detail, task objectives, and geometric theories to unravel neural computations bridging from stimuli to cognitive functions.

This webinar convened researchers at the intersection of Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience to investigate how large language models (LLMs) can serve as valuable “model organisms” for understanding human language processing. Presenters showcased evidence that brain recordings (fMRI, MEG, ECoG) acquired while participants read or listened to unconstrained speech can be predicted by representations extracted from state-of-the-art text- and speech-based LLMs. In particular, text-based LLMs tend to align better with higher-level language regions, capturing more semantic aspects, while speech-based LLMs excel at explaining early auditory cortical responses. However, purely low-level features can drive part of these alignments, complicating interpretations. New methods, including perturbation analyses, highlight which linguistic variables matter for each cortical area and time scale. Further, “brain tuning” of LLMs—fine-tuning on measured neural signals—can improve semantic representations and downstream language tasks. Despite open questions about interpretability and exact neural mechanisms, these results demonstrate that LLMs provide a promising framework for probing the computations underlying human language comprehension and production at multiple spatiotemporal scales.

In this talk, I will explore how social affective biases arise even in the absence of motivational factors as an emergent outcome of the basic structure of social learning. In several studies, we found that initial negative interactions with some members of a group can cause subsequent avoidance of the entire group, and that this avoidance perpetuates stereotypes. Additional cognitive modeling discovered that approach and avoidance behavior based on biased beliefs not only influences the evaluative (positive or negative) impressions of group members, but also shapes the depth of the cognitive representations available to learn about individuals. In other words, people have richer cognitive representations of members of groups that are not avoided, akin to individualized vs group level categories. I will end presenting a series of multi-agent reinforcement learning simulations that demonstrate the emergence of these social-structural feedback loops in the development and maintenance of affective biases.

Humans and other animals approach reward and avoid punishment and pay attention to cues predicting these events. Such motivated behavior thus appears to be guided by value, which directs behavior towards or away from positively or negatively valenced outcomes. Moreover, it is facilitated by (top-down) salience, which enhances attention to behaviorally relevant learned cues predicting the occurrence of valenced outcomes. Using human neuroimaging, we recently separated value (ventral striatum, posterior ventromedial prefrontal cortex) from salience (anterior ventromedial cortex, occipital cortex) in the domain of liquid reward and punishment. Moreover, we investigated potential drivers of learned salience: the probability and uncertainty with which valenced and non-valenced outcomes occur. We find that the brain dissociates valenced from non-valenced probability and uncertainty, which indicates that reinforcement matters for the brain, in addition to information provided by probability and uncertainty alone, regardless of valence. Finally, we assessed learning signals (unsigned prediction errors) that may underpin the acquisition of salience. Particularly the insula appears to be central for this function, encoding a subjective salience prediction error, similarly at the time of positively and negatively valenced outcomes. However, it appears to employ domain-specific time constants, leading to stronger salience signals in the aversive than the appetitive domain at the time of cues. These findings explain why previous research associated the insula with both valence-independent salience processing and with preferential encoding of the aversive domain. More generally, the distinction of value and salience appears to provide a useful framework for capturing the neural basis of motivated behavior.

Recent research has seen many behavioral comparisons between humans and deep neural networks (DNNs) in the domain of image classification. Often, comparison studies focus on the end-result of the learning process by measuring and comparing the similarities in the representations of object categories once they have been formed. However, the process of how these representations emerge—that is, the behavioral changes and intermediate stages observed during the acquisition—is less often directly and empirically compared. In this talk, I'm going to report a detailed investigation of the learning dynamics in human observers and various classic and state-of-the-art DNNs. We develop a constrained supervised learning environment to align learning-relevant conditions such as starting point, input modality, available input data and the feedback provided. Across the whole learning process we evaluate and compare how well learned representations can be generalized to previously unseen test data. Comparisons across the entire learning process indicate that DNNs demonstrate a level of data efficiency comparable to human learners, challenging some prevailing assumptions in the field. However, our results also reveal representational differences: while DNNs' learning is characterized by a pronounced generalisation lag, humans appear to immediately acquire generalizable representations without a preliminary phase of learning training set-specific information that is only later transferred to novel data.

We can perceive aesthetic properties such as beauty and sublimity in artworks, environmental nature and even ordinary life. How about consciousness? Does consciousness have aesthetic properties? If so, what kind of aesthetic properties conscious experiences can have? If conscious experiences can have some kinds of aesthetic properties, how can we appreciate them? These questions constitute "Consciousness Aesthetics". In this talk, I will introduce consciousness aesthetics as a new field of aesthetics and discuss some of such questions.

Humans share with other animals a complex neuronal machinery that evolved to support navigation in the physical space and that supports wayfinding and path integration. In my talk I will present a series of recent neuroimaging studies in humans performed in my Lab aimed at investigating the idea that this same neural navigation system (the “brain GPS”) is also used to organize and navigate concepts and memories, and that abstract and spatial representations rely on a common neural fabric. I will argue that this might represent a novel example of “cortical recycling”, where the neuronal machinery that primarily evolved, in lower level animals, to represent relationships between spatial locations and navigate space, in humans are reused to encode relationships between concepts in an internal abstract representational space of meaning.