Cognition seminars

Decades of research on understanding the mechanisms of attentional selection have focused on identifying the units (representations) on which attention operates in order to guide prioritized sensory processing. These attentional units fit neatly to accommodate our understanding of how attention is allocated in a top-down, bottom-up, or historical fashion. In this talk, I will focus on attentional phenomena that are not easily accommodated within current theories of attentional selection – the “attentional platypuses,” as they allude to an observation that within biological taxonomies the platypus does not fit into either mammal or bird categories. Similarly, attentional phenomena that do not fit neatly within current attentional models suggest that current models need to be revised. I list a few instances of the ‘attentional platypuses” and then offer a new approach, the Dynamically Weighted Prioritization, stipulating that multiple factors impinge onto the attentional priority map, each with a corresponding weight. The interaction between factors and their corresponding weights determines the current state of the priority map which subsequently constrains/guides attention allocation. I propose that this new approach should be considered as a supplement to existing models of attention, especially those that emphasize categorical organizations.

In our rapidly evolving digital world, there is increasing concern about the impact of digital technologies and social media on the mental health of young people. Policymakers and the public are nervous. Psychologists are facing mounting pressures to deliver evidence that can inform policies and practices to safeguard both young people and society at large. However, research progress is slow while technological change is accelerating.My talk will reflect on this, both as a question of psychological science and metascience. Digital companies have designed highly popular environments that differ in important ways from traditional offline spaces. By revisiting the foundations of psychology (e.g. development and cognition) and considering digital changes' impact on theories and findings, we gain deeper insights into questions such as the following. (1) How do digital environments exacerbate developmental vulnerabilities that predispose young people to mental health conditions? (2) How do digital designs interact with cognitive and learning processes, formalised through computational approaches such as reinforcement learning or Bayesian modelling?However, we also need to face deeper questions about what it means to do science about new technologies and the challenge of keeping pace with technological advancements. Therefore, I discuss the concept of ‘fast science’, where, during crises, scientists might lower their standards of evidence to come to conclusions quicker. Might psychologists want to take this approach in the face of technological change and looming concerns? The talk concludes with a discussion of such strategies for 21st-century psychology research in the era of digitalization.

This webinar addressed computational perspectives on how animals and humans make decisions, spanning normative, descriptive, and mechanistic models. Sam Gershman (Harvard) presented a capacity-limited reinforcement learning framework in which policies are compressed under an information bottleneck constraint. This approach predicts pervasive perseveration, stimulus‐independent “default” actions, and trade-offs between complexity and reward. Such policy compression reconciles observed action stochasticity and response time patterns with an optimal balance between learning capacity and performance. Jonathan Pillow (Princeton) discussed flexible descriptive models for tracking time-varying policies in animals. He introduced dynamic Generalized Linear Models (Sidetrack) and hidden Markov models (GLM-HMMs) that capture day-to-day and trial-to-trial fluctuations in choice behavior, including abrupt switches between “engaged” and “disengaged” states. These models provide new insights into how animals’ strategies evolve under learning. Finally, Kenji Doya (OIST) highlighted the importance of unifying reinforcement learning with Bayesian inference, exploring how cortical-basal ganglia networks might implement model-based and model-free strategies. He also described Japan’s Brain/MINDS 2.0 and Digital Brain initiatives, aiming to integrate multimodal data and computational principles into cohesive “digital brains.”

This webinar features presentations from SueYeon Chung (New York University) and Srinivas Turaga (HHMI Janelia Research Campus) on theoretical and computational approaches to sensory cognition. Chung introduced a “neural manifold” framework to capture how high-dimensional neural activity is structured into meaningful manifolds reflecting object representations. She demonstrated that manifold geometry—shaped by radius, dimensionality, and correlations—directly governs a population’s capacity for classifying or separating stimuli under nuisance variations. Applying these ideas as a data analysis tool, she showed how measuring object-manifold geometry can explain transformations along the ventral visual stream and suggested that manifold principles also yield better self-supervised neural network models resembling mammalian visual cortex. Turaga described simulating the entire fruit fly visual pathway using its connectome, modeling 64 key cell types in the optic lobe. His team’s systematic approach—combining sparse connectivity from electron microscopy with simple dynamical parameters—recapitulated known motion-selective responses and produced novel testable predictions. Together, these studies underscore the power of combining connectomic detail, task objectives, and geometric theories to unravel neural computations bridging from stimuli to cognitive functions.

This webinar convened researchers at the intersection of Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience to investigate how large language models (LLMs) can serve as valuable “model organisms” for understanding human language processing. Presenters showcased evidence that brain recordings (fMRI, MEG, ECoG) acquired while participants read or listened to unconstrained speech can be predicted by representations extracted from state-of-the-art text- and speech-based LLMs. In particular, text-based LLMs tend to align better with higher-level language regions, capturing more semantic aspects, while speech-based LLMs excel at explaining early auditory cortical responses. However, purely low-level features can drive part of these alignments, complicating interpretations. New methods, including perturbation analyses, highlight which linguistic variables matter for each cortical area and time scale. Further, “brain tuning” of LLMs—fine-tuning on measured neural signals—can improve semantic representations and downstream language tasks. Despite open questions about interpretability and exact neural mechanisms, these results demonstrate that LLMs provide a promising framework for probing the computations underlying human language comprehension and production at multiple spatiotemporal scales.

In this talk, I will explore how social affective biases arise even in the absence of motivational factors as an emergent outcome of the basic structure of social learning. In several studies, we found that initial negative interactions with some members of a group can cause subsequent avoidance of the entire group, and that this avoidance perpetuates stereotypes. Additional cognitive modeling discovered that approach and avoidance behavior based on biased beliefs not only influences the evaluative (positive or negative) impressions of group members, but also shapes the depth of the cognitive representations available to learn about individuals. In other words, people have richer cognitive representations of members of groups that are not avoided, akin to individualized vs group level categories. I will end presenting a series of multi-agent reinforcement learning simulations that demonstrate the emergence of these social-structural feedback loops in the development and maintenance of affective biases.

Contrary to the original normative decision-making standpoint, empirical studies have repeatedly reported that risk preferences are affected by the disclosure of choice outcomes (feedback). Although no consensus has yet emerged regarding the properties and mechanisms of this effect, a widespread and intuitive hypothesis is that repeated feedback affects risk preferences by means of a learning effect, which alters the representation of subjective probabilities. Here, we ran a series of seven experiments (N= 538), tailored to decipher the effects of feedback on risk preferences. Our results indicate that the presence of feedback consistently increases risk-taking, even when the risky option is economically less advantageous. Crucially, risk-taking increases just after the instructions, before participants experience any feedback. These results challenge the learning account, and advocate for a dispositional effect, induced by the mere anticipation of feedback information. Epistemic curiosity and regret avoidance may drive this effect in partial and complete feedback conditions, respectively.

Many situations rely on the accurate identification of people with whom we are unfamiliar. For example, security at airports or in police investigations require the identification of individuals from photo-ID. Yet, the identification of unfamiliar faces is error prone, even for practitioners who routinely perform this task. Indeed, even training protocols often yield no discernible improvement. The challenge of unfamiliar face identification is often thought of as a perceptual problem; however, this assumption ignores the potential role of decision-making and its contributing factors (e.g., criterion placement). In this talk, I am going to present a series of experiments that investigate the role of decision-making in face identification.

Recent research has seen many behavioral comparisons between humans and deep neural networks (DNNs) in the domain of image classification. Often, comparison studies focus on the end-result of the learning process by measuring and comparing the similarities in the representations of object categories once they have been formed. However, the process of how these representations emerge—that is, the behavioral changes and intermediate stages observed during the acquisition—is less often directly and empirically compared. In this talk, I'm going to report a detailed investigation of the learning dynamics in human observers and various classic and state-of-the-art DNNs. We develop a constrained supervised learning environment to align learning-relevant conditions such as starting point, input modality, available input data and the feedback provided. Across the whole learning process we evaluate and compare how well learned representations can be generalized to previously unseen test data. Comparisons across the entire learning process indicate that DNNs demonstrate a level of data efficiency comparable to human learners, challenging some prevailing assumptions in the field. However, our results also reveal representational differences: while DNNs' learning is characterized by a pronounced generalisation lag, humans appear to immediately acquire generalizable representations without a preliminary phase of learning training set-specific information that is only later transferred to novel data.

2024 BACN Mid-Career Prize Lecture Adaptive behavior requires the ability to focus on a current task and protect it from distraction (cognitive stability), and to rapidly switch tasks when circumstances change (cognitive flexibility). How people control task focus and switch-readiness has therefore been the target of burgeoning research literatures. Here, I review and integrate these literatures to derive a cognitive architecture and functional rules underlying the regulation of stability and flexibility. I propose that task focus and switch-readiness are supported by independent mechanisms whose strategic regulation is nevertheless governed by shared principles: both stability and flexibility are matched to anticipated challenges via an incremental, online learner that nudges control up or down based on the recent history of task demands (a recency heuristic), as well as via episodic reinstatement when the current context matches a past experience (a recognition heuristic).

2024 BACN Early-Career Prize Lecture Many of our decisions affect other people. Our choices can decelerate climate change, stop the spread of infectious diseases, and directly help or harm others. Prosocial behaviours – decisions that help others – could contribute to reducing the impact of these challenges, yet their computational and neural mechanisms remain poorly understood. I will present recent work that examines prosocial motivation, how willing we are to incur costs to help others, prosocial learning, how we learn from the outcomes of our choices when they affect other people, and prosocial preferences, our self-reports of helping others. Throughout the talk, I will outline the possible computational and neural bases of these behaviours, and how they may differ from young adulthood to old age.

Within the last decade, Deep Artificial Neural Networks (DNNs) have emerged as powerful computer vision systems that match or exceed human performance on many benchmark tasks such as image classification. But whether current DNNs are suitable computational models of the human visual system remains an open question: While DNNs have proven to be capable of predicting neural activations in primate visual cortex, psychophysical experiments have shown behavioral differences between DNNs and human subjects, as quantified by error consistency. Error consistency is typically measured by briefly presenting natural or corrupted images to human subjects and asking them to perform an n-way classification task under time pressure. But for how long should stimuli ideally be presented to guarantee a fair comparison with DNNs? Here we investigate the influence of presentation time on error consistency, to test the hypothesis that higher-level processing drives behavioral differences. We systematically vary presentation times of backward-masked stimuli from 8.3ms to 266ms and measure human performance and reaction times on natural, lowpass-filtered and noisy images. Our experiment constitutes a fine-grained analysis of human image classification under both image corruptions and time pressure, showing that even drastically time-constrained humans who are exposed to the stimuli for only two frames, i.e. 16.6ms, can still solve our 8-way classification task with success rates way above chance. We also find that human-to-human error consistency is already stable at 16.6ms.