British Association for Cognitive Neuroscience BACN

2024 BACN Mid-Career Prize Lecture Adaptive behavior requires the ability to focus on a current task and protect it from distraction (cognitive stability), and to rapidly switch tasks when circumstances change (cognitive flexibility). How people control task focus and switch-readiness has therefore been the target of burgeoning research literatures. Here, I review and integrate these literatures to derive a cognitive architecture and functional rules underlying the regulation of stability and flexibility. I propose that task focus and switch-readiness are supported by independent mechanisms whose strategic regulation is nevertheless governed by shared principles: both stability and flexibility are matched to anticipated challenges via an incremental, online learner that nudges control up or down based on the recent history of task demands (a recency heuristic), as well as via episodic reinstatement when the current context matches a past experience (a recognition heuristic).

Keynote Address to British Association of Cognitive Neuroscience, London, 10th September 2024

2024 BACN Early-Career Prize Lecture Many of our decisions affect other people. Our choices can decelerate climate change, stop the spread of infectious diseases, and directly help or harm others. Prosocial behaviours – decisions that help others – could contribute to reducing the impact of these challenges, yet their computational and neural mechanisms remain poorly understood. I will present recent work that examines prosocial motivation, how willing we are to incur costs to help others, prosocial learning, how we learn from the outcomes of our choices when they affect other people, and prosocial preferences, our self-reports of helping others. Throughout the talk, I will outline the possible computational and neural bases of these behaviours, and how they may differ from young adulthood to old age.

An understanding of the self helps explain not only human thoughts, feelings, attitudes but also many aspects of everyday behaviour. This talk focuses on a viewpoint - self as processes. This viewpoint emphasizes the dynamics of the self that best connects with the development of the self over time and its realist orientation. We are combining psychological experiments and data mining to comprehend the stability and adaptability of the self across various populations. In this talk, I draw on evidence from experimental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and machine learning approaches to demonstrate why and how self-association affects cognition and how it is modulated by various social experiences and situational factors

Working memory is about the past but for the future. Adopting such a future-focused perspective shifts the narrative of working memory as a limited-capacity storage system to working memory as an anticipatory buffer that helps us prepare for potential and sequential upcoming behaviour. In my talk, I will present a series of our recent studies that have started to reveal emerging principles of a working memory that looks forward – highlighting, amongst others, how selective attention plays a vital role in prioritising internal contents for behaviour, and the bi-directional links between visual working memory and action. These studies show how studying the dynamics of working memory, selective attention, and action together paves way for an integrated understanding of how mind serves behaviour.

The last decade has seen a burgeoning interest in studying the neural and computational mechanisms that underpin social learning (learning from others). Many findings support the view that learning from other people is underpinned by the same, ‘domain-general’, mechanisms underpinning learning from non-social stimuli. Despite this, the idea that humans possess social-specific learning mechanisms - adaptive specializations moulded by natural selection to cope with the pressures of group living - persists. In this talk I explore the persistence of this idea. First, I present dissociations between social and non-social learning - patterns of data which are difficult to explain under the domain-general thesis and which therefore support the idea that we have evolved special mechanisms for social learning. Subsequently, I argue that most studies that have dissociated social and non-social learning have employed paradigms in which social information comprises a secondary, additional, source of information that can be used to supplement learning from non-social stimuli. Thus, in most extant paradigms, social and non-social learning differ both in terms of social nature (social or non-social) and status (primary or secondary). I conclude that status is an important driver of apparent differences between social and non-social learning. When we account for differences in status, we see that social and non-social learning share common (dopamine-mediated) mechanisms.

SES neuroscience, using imaging and other methods, has revealed generalizations of interest for population neuroscience and the study of individual differences. But beyond its scientific interest, SES is a topic of societal importance. Does neuroscience offer any useful insights for promoting socioeconomic justice and reducing the harms of poverty? In this talk I will use research from my own lab and others’ to argue that SES neuroscience has the potential to contribute to policy in this area, although its application is premature at present. I will also attempt to forecast the ways in which practical solutions to the problems of poverty may emerge from SES neuroscience. Bio: Martha Farah has conducted groundbreaking research on face and object recognition, visual attention, mental imagery, and semantic memory and - in more recent times - has been at the forefront of interdisciplinary research into neuroscience and society. This deals with topics such as using fMRI for lie detection, ethics of cognitive enhancement, and effects of social deprivation on brain development.

Semantic cognition brings meaning to our world – it allows us to make sense of what we see and hear, and to produce adaptive thoughts and behaviour. Since we have a wealth of information about any given concept, our store of knowledge is not sufficient for successful semantic cognition; we also need mechanisms that can steer the information that we retrieve so it suits the context or our current goals. This talk traces the neural networks that underpin this flexibility in semantic cognition. It draws on evidence from multiple methods (neuropsychology, neuroimaging, neural stimulation) to show that two interacting heteromodal networks underpin different aspects of flexibility. Regions including anterior temporal cortex and left angular gyrus respond more strongly when semantic retrieval follows highly-related concepts or multiple convergent cues; the multivariate responses in these regions correspond to context-dependent aspects of meaning. A second network centred on left inferior frontal gyrus and left posterior middle temporal gyrus is associated with controlled semantic retrieval, responding more strongly when weak associations are required or there is more competition between concepts. This semantic control network is linked to creativity and also captures context-dependent aspects of meaning; however, this network specifically shows more similar multivariate responses across trials when association strength is weak, reflecting a common controlled retrieval state when more unusual associations are the focus. Evidence from neuropsychology, fMRI and TMS suggests that this semantic control network is distinct from multiple-demand cortex which supports executive control across domains, although challenging semantic tasks recruit both networks. The semantic control network is juxtaposed between regions of default mode network that might be sufficient for the retrieval of strong semantic relationships and multiple-demand regions in the left hemisphere, suggesting that the large-scale organisation of flexible semantic cognition can be understood in terms of cortical gradients that capture systematic functional transitions that are repeated in temporal, parietal and frontal cortex.

Cognitive and emotional processes are shaped by the dynamic integration of brain and body. A major channel of interoceptive information comes from the heart, where phasic signals are conveyed to the brain to indicate how fast and strong the heart is beating. This talk will discuss how interoceptive processes operate across conscious and unconscious levels to influence emotion and memory. The interoceptive channel is disrupted in distinct ways in individuals with autism and anxiety. Selective interoceptive disturbance is related to symptomatology including dissociation and the transdiagnostic expression of anxiety. Interoceptive training can reduce anxiety, with enhanced interoceptive precision associated with greater insula connectivity following targeted interoceptive feedback. The discrete cardiac effects on emotion and cognition have broad relevance to clinical neuroscience, with implications for peripheral treatment targets and behavioural interventions.

From a workout at the gym to helping a colleague with their work, everyday we make decisions about whether we are willing to exert effort to obtain some sort of benefit. Increases in how effortful actions and cognitive processes are perceived to be has been linked to clinically severe impairments to motivation, such as apathy and fatigue, across many neurological and psychiatric conditions. However, the vast majority of neuroscience research has focused on understanding the benefits for acting, the rewards, and not on the effort required. As a result, the computational and neural mechanisms underlying how effort is processed are poorly understood. How do we compute how effortful we perceive a task to be? How does this feed into our motivation and decisions of whether to act? How are such computations implemented in the brain? and how do they change in different environments? I will present a series of studies examining these questions using novel behavioural tasks, computational modelling, fMRI, pharmacological manipulations, and testing in a range of different populations. These studies highlight how the brain represents the costs of exerting effort, and the dynamic processes underlying how our sensitivity to effort changes as a function of our goals, traits, and socio-cognitive processes. This work provides new computational frameworks for understanding and examining impaired motivation across psychiatric and neurological conditions, as well as why all of us, sometimes, can’t be bothered.

Executive control processes and flexible behaviors rely on the integrity of, and dynamic interactions between, large-scale functional brain networks. The right insular cortex is a critical component of a salience/midcingulo-insular network that is thought to mediate interactions between brain networks involved in externally oriented (central executive/lateral frontoparietal network) and internally oriented (default mode/medial frontoparietal network) processes. How these brain systems reconfigure with development is a critical question for cognitive neuroscience, with implications for neurodevelopmental pathologies affecting brain connectivity. I will describe studies examining how brain network dynamics support flexible behaviors in typical and atypical development, presenting evidence suggesting a unique role for the dorsal anterior insular from studies of meta-analytic connectivity modeling, dynamic functional connectivity, and structural connectivity. These findings from adults, typically developing children, and children with autism suggest that structural and functional maturation of insular pathways is a critical component of the process by which human brain networks mature to support complex, flexible cognitive processes throughout the lifespan.

Abstract: There is no doubt that the study of brain damaged individuals has contributed greatly to our understanding of the mind/brain. Within this broad approach, cognitive neuropsychology accentuates the cognitive dimension: it investigates the structure and organization of perceptual, motor, cognitive, and language systems – prerequisites for understanding the functional organization of the brain – through the analysis of their dysfunction following brain damage. Significant insights have come specifically from this paradigm. But progress has been slow and enthusiasm for this approach has waned somewhat in recent years, and the use of existing findings to constrain new theories has also waned. What explains the current diminished status of cognitive neuropsychology? One reason may be failure to calibrate expectations about the effective contribution of different subfields of the study of the mind/brain as these are determined by their natural peculiarities – such factors as the types of available observations and their complexity, opportunity of access to such observations, the possibility of controlled experimentation, and the like. Here, I also explore the merits and limitations of cognitive neuropsychology, with particular focus on the role of intellectual, pragmatic, and societal factors that determine scientific practice within the broader domains of cognitive science/neuroscience. I conclude on an optimistic note about the continuing unique importance of cognitive neuropsychology: although limited to the study of experiments of nature, it offers a privileged window into significant aspects of the mind/brain that are not easily accessible through other approaches. Biography: Alfonso Caramazza's research has focussed extensively on how words and their meanings are represented in the brain. His early pioneering studies helped to reformulate our thinking about Broca's aphasia (not limited to production) and formalised the logic of patient-based neuropsychology. More recently he has been instrumental in reconsidering popular claims about embodied cognition.